Canberra, 26 August 1958
Top Secret Guard
The Off–shore Islands2
Australian Attitude
Australia regards it as vital that Formosa and the Pescadores should not fall into communist hands. The off–shore islands are historically and juridically different and strategically and politically, less important. Whilst our position has been that the destiny of the off–shore islandsshould not be allowed to precipitate a major war, these are strong reasons why the islands should not fall into communist hands as a result of the use of force:
(a) an attack on them might be a prelude to an invasion on Formosa;
(b) the concentration of nationalist troops on the off–shore islands is so heavy that nationalist military strength and morale would suffer grievously;
(c) the will to resist in the whole of free Asia would ‘receive a set back whether or not the United States participated in the unsuccessful defence of the off–shore islands.
[ matter omitted ]
[NAA: A1838, TS519/3/1, vii]
1 J.P. Quinn, Assistant Secretary, South and South–East Asia Branch, Department of External Affairs.
2 The second offshore islands crisis had been sparked in May 1957 when the PRC intensified air activity around Taiwan and bombarded the Quemoys in response to the placement of US missiles on Taiwan. Menzies and his Ministers were attentive to US suggestions that the situation had evolved into one of major symbolic importance. In 1955 the crisis had been perceived as a precursor to an invasion of Taiwan but in 1958 it was perceived more generally as a test of Allied willingness to resist aggression. In Canberra, a subsidiary to this fundamental shared concern was the hope for US assistance in relation to the growing problem of Indonesia (in particular, a US guarantee that West New Guinea would remain with the Netherlands was sought). Hence, Menzies pursued initiatives that he believed might avert a major war and yet enable the United States to make a visible stand against communism. On 16 September, with Cabinet approval, he cabled Casey in Washington, asking him to pass to Dulles a plan for the demilitarisation of the offshore islands, that would be accompanied by a guarantee of Formosa by the ‘free nations, including Australia’. After Casey replied that the plan might more effectively be put to the United States at a later date, Menzies proposed the alternative suggestion, also to be implemented in conjunction with demilitarisation, of a ‘collective declaration of attitude towards force being used to determine the status of Formosa’. Both ideas were dropped in November on Tange’s advice. Tange argued that the first idea, when eventually put to the United States, had been received with ‘marked coolness’. He remarked of the second idea, that it could not be implemented through the United Nations and that the United States would be unlikely to acquiesce in forcing neutralisation of the islands upon the Nationalists. The crisis itself subsided near the end of the year with the relaxation of the bombardment and the ongoing Sino–American talks in Warsaw.