Canberra, March 1959
Secret
Notes on Policy Towards China, Formosa, and the Off–Shore Islands
Australia is convinced that Communist China is here to stay. Frictions in leaderships, manifestations of social discontent or apathy, distortions in economic planning, unfulfilled targets, etc., may occur from time to time but will not shake the regime or undermine China’s growing strength. The Communists have established their control in the Mainland and are energetically converting its agricultural peasant economy into a modern industrialised state largely on the Soviet model. They are receiving substantial and well–directed aid from the Soviet Union.
2. In recent years prospects for a general overall settlement seem to have receded completely, i.e. a settlement that would cover such issues as the renunciation of force as a means of settling differences; the future of Formosa; the off–shore islands; the future of Korea; recognition and representation in the United Nations.
3. For their part, encouraged by their progress in mobilising China’s manpower and economic capacity—and sustained by strong Marxist conviction–the Chinese Communists probably feel that time is on their side and that the balance of power will progressively shift in their favour.
4. Chinese Communist foreign policy is focussed on gaining control of Formosa, on reducing Western (and especially United States) influence in Asia, expanding their own influence in South East Asia, and undermining the reemergence of Japan as a major Asian nation. Where entry into the U.N. fits into this picture is speculative; it is highly improbable that the Chinese would make major concessions, e.g. Formosa, in return for U.N. membership.
5. A central feature of Australian policy in the area is that Formosa should be denied to the Communists:—
(i) Formosa is in the centre of an island chain of defence running from Australia to Japan. If Formosa should pass to the Communists, Japan, the Philippines and South East Asia would be more vulnerable;
(ii) If Formosa, which is linked by security treaty with the United States, were abandoned, no country in Asia could feel that it could rely on the support and protection of the United States;
(iii) There are some twelve million overseas Chinese in South East Asia who could be attracted to Peking if Taipeh were lost;
(iv) We are not prepared to place the people of Formosa under Communist rule.
6. Although never precisely defined, our objective is along the lines of a ‘two Chinas’ solution. We could not support military efforts of the Republic of China to re–establish itself on the Mainland. This could only be contemplated in the context of an entirely new situation such as war with Communist China following aggression of Communist China. Our efforts are directed against the use of force by either the Communists or the Nationalists. Australia is prepared to assist the Nationalists in all political ways to establish as secure an international position as possible.
7. Efforts to build up and support the international position of the Nationalists are adversely affected by the situation of the off–shore islands. Along with the bulk of world opinion, Australia believes that the Nationalists should withdraw from the off–shore islands. Such withdrawal could conceivably lead to wider international readiness to entertain and accept a ‘two Chinas’ solution.
8. During last year’s bombardment we advised the Chinese Nationalists, that while stability in the Formosa Straits was likely to be secured only if there was an evacuation of Nationalist troops and Nationalist administration from the off–shore islands, we agreed this result should not be brought about under fire. We publicly supported President Eisenhower’s declaration against appeasement.
9. We feel that to recognise the Peking regime at the present time serves no useful purpose and could possibly be harmful—
(i) By the Communists’ own showing, support for the Nationalists on Formosa could not be combined with developing useful relations with Peking;
(ii) Recognition by Australia would be regarded by some Asian countries as a victory for the Communists and a set–back for the United States;
(iii) In view of Communist China’s virulent hostility towards the United States, it is difficult to see how any country in the Pacific area enjoying close political and security ties with the United States could recognise Peking without exposing itself to slights, indignities, and pressures.
10. While we do not favour recognition at present, at the same time we are anxious to avoid action which could be construed as hostile or provocative and which would run counter to the relaxation of tension particularly in the Formosa Straits. Australia has a prime interest in peace in Asia through finding a way of living with Communist China.
[NAA: A3902, 221/12/2/2, ia]
1 The brief was prepared for Tange’s visit to Japan and Korea in March 1959.