Canberra, undated
Secret
Recognition of Communist China
Introductory
The context of this question has been considerably altered in recent months. Issues which were only clear to the official experts are now obvious to the public as the drama of Tibet unfolds.2 There is no longer the need to justify the major premise that the Communist Chinese regime rooted on the philosophy of Marxism–Leninism is committed by its very nature to a course of territorial expansion by the techniques of revolution peculiarly combining the resources of ideology and military power. Tibet has a useful eloquence above words. All that needs to be asserted is that non–recognition should be conceived as a positive action and that its validity rests on a policy to contain and arrest Chinese Communist efforts to assert its paramountcy in Asia.
Australia’s Position
2. Australia through her alliances S.E.A.T.O., A.N.Z.U.S. and A.N.Z.A.M. has special responsibilities to herself, her neighbours in Asia and her allies to lead the struggle against the expansion of communism in South–East and East Asia, which is Australia’s northern periphery. These areas are known to be the major objectives of Communist Chinese influence and the logic of this confrontation speaks for itself.
3. Hence Australia has been forced to architect an Asian foreign policy not dissimilar to that being pursued by European powers in dealing with Soviet backed East Germany. The policy is essentially constructive and aims at bringing whatever influences she can to bear on the important Asian states on the communist periphery by inducing these states to accept a role of resistance to communist pressure by aligning themselves to the West whether formally or sympathetically. In so doing, Australia seeks to create a stability in free Asia and dampen the ardour of Communist China for territorial expansion by subversive and ideological means. This would leave only naked military power available to China, which she will find difficult to use and justify in the present context of international affairs. It should be noted that an alternative course of action by free Asia was offered them in the form of neutralism and led by India. Moreover, whatever else this policy showed, its demonstrable weakness as a policy in dealing with communist pressure is now obvious even to its exponents. The point is now made that communism is not to be accommodated but contested. This must be the essential ingredient of the Australian position. On grounds of posture alone Australia cannot afford to give countenance to a policy of recognition. As an anti–communist, essentially European nation in alliance with the United States and a member of S.E.A.T.O., Australian policy has a wider significance than for example a left–wing country with loose commitments even in the same area.
Advantages of a Non–Recognition Policy
4. In contesting communist subversion in Asia, which is the principal threat, the policy of non–recognition offers the advantage that it reduces the impact of Communist China on Japan and South–East Asia.
5. JAPAN. Japan’s technology, initiative and energy make her the most important Asian country in South–East and East Asia outside the communist orbit. Japan is key to China’s design to dominate Asia, because she has the technology, potential seapower and resources Communist China needs.
6. In dealing with the ruling conservative forces in Japan, China has used the same techniques as Mikoyan3 in America and indeed as China and Russia are seeking to do in Australia. Japanese business leaders are baited with offers of trade and this technique arouses all the latent nostalgia for an era when instead of a 3% share in mainland trade which she has today, Japan had 15% of the trade. However, China has continually sought to also combine economic ties with political ties and recognition as a first step. The dual connection has the potential to set in motion trends in Japan which would be very difficult to arrest, and it would seem only a matter of time before China secured a paramount political influence in Japanese internal affairs. Hence it must be Australian policy to gain time by maintaining the non–recognition front and encourage Japan to find alternative interest in markets in the free world. Already much has been achieved. Japan has, however, still the need to disillusion her business interests in the prospects of communist trade and hence it must be a major objective of the West to encourage this trend.
7. SOUTH–EAST ASIA. South–East Asia is compounded of countries emerging from colonialism or for the first time in centuries seeking to establish stable systems of governments which can grapple with problems of human welfare and developments. Into this context communist influence is directed first to ensuring the failure of these efforts and supplanting the enticement of communism modelled by Communist China achievement. A major instrument in the policy of subversion is the Overseas Chinese, often the most wealthy and influential of the South–East Asian communities. Non–recognition has meant that these communities have been forced to choose between Communist China and Formosa or even avoid choosing. Moreover in Thailand, Vietnam, Laos, the Chinese communities have been under the aegis of Nationalist Embassies. This has served to curtail efforts by Chinese Communists to control the organisation of Chinese. Moreover, Malaya which has such a large Chinese community has been spared the full impact of Communist Chinese influence. Australian troops are engaged in the security problem in Malaya and the absence of contact between Communist China and Malayan Chinese is an important element in controlling the security problem. Recently the Malayan Government closed the Bank of China which had been operating subversively as a consequence of British recognition. Equally in Burma, the Bank of China, according to the British Ambassador4 has been used to finance Burmese business men who then become beholden to communist ties. Indonesia is another country where the Chinese Embassy is believed to have played a key role in helping to plan the organisation of the K.P.I. (Communist Party of Indonesia), the best organised political party in Indonesia.
8. FORMOSA. Formosa, an island of 10 million, is the most prosperous community in Asia. It plays a key part in U.S. strategy in answering any incursion by Communist China of the territory of U.S. Allies. Its position enables the U.S. to mount a continuing and inhibiting threat to Communist China, which has as a result forced China to deploy her best air and land forces in the mainland opposite—forces which would normally be available for deployment in peripheral areas. Equally, the possession of Formosa by China would enable the Chinese to cut the island chain and the psychological and practical consequences would be considerable. Further, the morale of Formosa has been ‘dicky’ for some time as the island adjusts itself to the practical consequences of its position. It still serves as a considerable symbol to the Overseas Chinese and is a rallying point of anti–communist sympathies. Recognition would be a grievous blow to this general position. Moreover, the general recognition of China would cloud the issues, as the West must continue to assert the independence of Formosa and until China dropped the claim, recognition whether de facto or de jure would only be read to confirm it.
Arguments for Recognition
9. Having stated certain arguments against recognition from Australia’s viewpoint, it might be well to consider some of the arguments sometimes speciously, sometimes seriously, advanced in favour.
10. The main one is that it might open the way for a ‘Two Chinas’ solution to Formosa. If there is a future in the ‘Two Chinas’ concept, it could only come from Chinese acceptance of a negotiable position involving the freedom of Formosa as a primary fact. Until China does indicate her acceptance of such an outcome to negotiation, recognition would achieve nothing. In this context then, recognition should not be considered as a condition precedent but as a quid pro quo.
11. The second one is disarmament. China has large conventional forces. The crucial point is that conventional disarmament has significance only after atomic disarmament has become a fact. This question of China’s association with a disarmament agreement is as removed as an issue as atomic disarmament is as a fact.
12. An older chestnut is the idea of encouraging China to be anti–Russian. That recognition achieves this is now a discarded notion. It should be noted that the emphasis is shifting towards the idea of encouraging the Russians to be wary of the Chinese. While there is much wishful thinking on this point, it is an attractive notion.
Conclusion
13. Generally the advantages of non–recognition as a positive step in assisting countries in South–East Asia to withstand the pressure of communism are real and measurable while the advantages of recognition are in the realm of dangerous speculation. The policy of non–recognition has been confirmed recently by the attitude of the left wing of U.S. Congress, which sees in the Tibet crises confirmation of a policy they were at one time prepared to dispute. In the context of a foreign policy designed to strengthen the stability and self–reliance of the nations of free Asia, non–recognition is a policy of gaining time, the more effectively to create a stable comity of free nations in the area. In this context its validity is beyond dispute.
[NAA: A1209, 1957/4832, ii]
1 An attached note to Timbs from K.H. Herde (an Assistant Secretary in the Cabinet Division of the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet) described the paper as a ‘very thoughtful & upto–date exposition of the subject’.
2 China invaded Tibet in October 1950, after which Tibet was incorporated into China. A rebellion occurred in March 1959 and was suppressed by the Chinese Government.
3 Anastas lvanovich Mikoyan, Soviet Minister for Foreign Trade 1938—49; Minister for Home and Foreign Trade 1953—55.
4 R.H.S. Allen.