Canberra, 3 June 1959
The Acting Prime Minister’s Remarks on Communist China
1. Mr. McEwen, in his television interview,2 said he thought that, if the Communist regime remained in power, then ‘I think it will be recognized as a de facto Government of Mainland China in due course’.
2. These words have a fairly precise meaning in international law. De facto recognition of a government takes place when, in the view of the recognizing state, the new authority, although actually independent and wielding effective power in the territory under control, has not acquired sufficient stability. De facto recognition is in essence provisional. Also, de facto recognition can take place when a government does not comply with other requirements of recognition such as a willingness or ability to fulfil international relations, e.g., the de facto recognition of the Soviet Government before the war because of its refusal to acknowledge financial obligations incurred by its predecessor. In practical effect, the differences between de facto and de jure recognition are not substantial, although, according to the practice of some countries (including the United Kingdom), de facto recognition, while providing for an exchange of missions and the conduct of business, does not bring about the conferment of diplomatic status upon representatives. In recent years there have been no instances of de facto recognition. The term ‘recognition’, unless qualified, is taken to mean de jure recognition.
3. In a second statement, released yesterday, Mr. McEwen has clarified the point and has made it clear that his words did not have the legal significance which could be read into them. He said, in explanation: ‘I then added that if the present Government of Mainland China remained the Government—and it certainly appeared that that was likely—then in due course, at some point of time, the fact would be recognized by all countries as it has already been recognized by the United Kingdom and most great Powers’.
4. The lines of your statement to the Chinese Minister-Chargé might be:—
(i) Press reports to the effect that Mr. McEwen was giving a hint of change in policy have no foundation, as the record of the interview and subsequent statement both show.
(ii) Australia’s policy was set out by the Prime Minister in the Government’s policy statement for the national elections last October.3 It was reiterated by Mr. Casey recently, in answer to a Parliamentary question (papers attached).4
(iii) Both statements emphasized the need to safeguard the position of Formosa. The Chinese Minister-Charge will be aware that Australia’s policy is to build up and support the international position of the Nationalist Chinese in Formosa. We consistently support the Republic in international meetings when its credentials are challenged, and we appropriately give our vote to assist China to win elective places in international bodies.
(iv) We have been interested to see that Communist China has become more and more inflexible and determined in its insistence that any country wishing to recognize it must break off relations with the Republic of China and support its claim in the United Nations. The latest statement to this effect was by Chou En-lai at the recently concluded National People’s Congress (see flag). We believe that the Communist Chinese are concerned at their slow progress in winning recognition, and that they are serving notice on countries that they will not weaken in their position and any country wishing to recognize them must sacrifice the Nationalists. In these circumstances, no question of recognition by Australia can arise. We believe that non-recognizing countries should stand firm against this pressure.
(v) We must recognize, however, the fact of the existence of the Communist regime—as Mr. McEwen has said—and be prepared to have international contacts with it on perhaps an increasing range of subjects. Non-recognizing countries have already had to do this in such examples as the Geneva Conference on Indo-China and Korea, and the Geneva and Warsaw talks5 between the Communist Chinese and United States Ambassadors. Two conspicuous areas where Communist China’s international participation may be needed are commodity agreements and steps on disarmament such as the suspension of testing nuclear devices (see Prime Minister’s statement flagged). In short, Communist China has most, if not all, of the attributes of a significant world power, and ways and means have to be pursued for treating and negotiating with the regime.
[NAA: A1838, 3107/33/1/1, iii]
1 G.A. Jockel, Assistant Secretary, Pacific and Americas Branch, Department of External Affairs.
2 McEwen spoke on the ‘Meet the Press’ program, 31 May 1959.
3 Not published.
4 In answer to a question upon notice, 21 April 1959, Casey replied that it would not be ‘in the interest of peace, trade and international goodwill’ for Australia to recognise the PRC. Recent events, he continued, had reinforced this view. He considered, moreover, that recognition which failed to recognise the Communist claim over Formosa would not result in satisfactory relations with Peking—and Australia would not recognise this claim. Finally, Casey stated that Australia had to consider relations with the PRC in the light of relations with other countries, especially those in the Pacific; in ‘view of Communist China’s past and present conduct, and of the attitudes of other Pacific countries and overseas Chinese communities, and in the light of a careful assessment of Australia’s own interests, the Australian Government is not prepared to give “early recognition of continental China”‘.
5 On 3 August 1958, the US Government had announced that its Ambassador to Poland, Jacob Beam, had been asked to resume in Warsaw Ambassadorial talks with the PRC, which had begun in Geneva in 1953 with the Chinese Ambassador Wang Ping-nan.