Colombo, 9 January 1950
Recognition of Chinese Communists
1. The attitude of the Australian Government on the question of recognition of the so called Central People’s Government of China is based on our attitude towards Communism everywhere. This attitude is one of no compromise towards Communism anywhere in any form.
2. In the case of China, we consider that recognition of the Communist–controlled Government would not in fact represent a compromise. In our view, all the giving would be likely to come from our side, without any reciprocity from the Communist side. In other words, we are not convinced that any advantages that might be gained from according recognition would compensate for the disadvantages that would follow.
3. We feel that recognition should not be granted unless we are absolutely convinced both that it is warranted by the facts and that it is the right thing to do. At present, we feel far from sure that the Communists will behave as a civilised government, that they will honour their international obligations and generally respect the sanctity of international law and practice. They have not shown much evidence of intention to do so up to the present (vide—their treatment of United States consular officials and other United States nationals). It is, after all, not the practice of Communists anywhere to show gratitude for favours or conciliatory gestures.
4. It is true that the Communists now control almost the whole of the China mainland. But they have occupied it by force, and so far as we can see they will continue to hold it by force. We see no purpose in hastening to condone rebellion.
5. It has been said that it need not necessarily be assumed that a Communist Government of China would be drawn into the Soviet orbit and become subservient to Moscow. But on present evidence this looks to us like wishful thinking. All the utterances of Chinese Communist leaders show that they are Marxian Communists in the fullest sense. Their emergence as the legal government of China, following a policy closely identified with that of Soviet Russia, would have two undesirable consequences:
(a) However preoccupied they may be with the tasks that face them in China itself, they can be expected to do all they can to foment trouble in neighbouring countries, and particularly in South–East Asia. Conditions in these countries are already unstable enough without the added trouble the Chinese Communists would be able to foster. The mere act of recognition by a large number of countries will in itself give a boost to the morale of Communists everywhere.
(b) Representation on the Security Council and other United Nations bodies of a Government that can be expected to vote solidly with the Soviet bloc will be an added embarrassment to us.
6. Lastly, we have our position vis–a–vis the United States to consider, and we do not think that this is an issue on which we should act in advance of the United States Government.
7. We recognise that the United Kingdom and some other members of the Commonwealth have special reasons for wanting to accord recognition without delay. We have raised no objection, even though we have thought it a pity that they could not postpone action at least until the matter could be fully discussed at this Meeting.
8. We realise that we will not be able to postpone recognition indefinitely, but we are not convinced that there are sufficiently strong reasons for according recognition at this time.
[NAA: A1838, 494/2/10, iv]
1 L.R. McIntyre, Officer–in–Charge, Pacific Division, Department of External Affairs. The brief was prepared for Spender’s participation in the Colombo Conference of British Commonwealth Foreign Ministers.