Canberra, 25 July 1960
GUIDANCE 10 Confidential
Chinese Representation in the United Nations
There follows a summary of a paper prepared recently in the Department which examined some procedural aspects of the above question.
Likely Voting on ‘Moratorium’ Proposal
2. Because possibly 15 newly independent African States will be admitted to United Nations membership at the forthcoming Assembly no certain prediction can be made of likely voting at this year’s General Assembly on the expected United States ‘moratorium’ proposal. Yet the chances of its being defeated appear very slight. While some new African members may not vote for the United States’ ‘moratorium’ resolution, none seem likely to vote against it (for instance, five of the six African States which have so far achieved independence this year are reported to be establishing diplomatic relations with Nationalist China).
3. Apart from the new Africans, at present the only two obvious changes from last year’s voting are Malaya and Cuba (pro-‘moratorium’ and abstention respectively in 1959), making the vote 43 to 31 with 8 abstentions. The United Kingdom and the Netherlands for example (which while recognizing Peking have supported the ‘moratorium’) are not expected to desert the United States. Although some other countries have at times shown impatience over the deadlock on Chinese representation, it seems very unlikely indeed that enough of them would switch their votes so that a simple majority could be mustered this year against the ‘moratorium’ unless
(a) some new Africans (and others) switched to support of Peking; and
(b) a pro-Peking movement then gained momentum.
Procedural Difficulties for a ‘Two Chinas’ Solution
4. Few supporters of the usual Indian ‘Chinese Representation’ item at the United Nations General Assembly, have probably thought further than ‘600 million Chinese exist and this fact must be recognized in the United Nations’.
However, supporters of the Indian item probably fall into two groups:—
(a) those—Soviet Bloc and others—who will not accept a ‘Two Chinas’ solution, demanding the exclusion of the Nationalist Chinese and their complete replacement (absorption?) by Communist China; and
(b) those (far fewer) who are at present prepared to support Communist China taking over China’s full status as a permanent member of the Security Council but who would also seek to have ‘Formosa’ recognized at the same time as an ordinary member.
5. No real procedural difficulties exist to the solution as in 4(a) above, provided that (I) the votes are there in the Assembly (simple majority?) and (II) the Security Council treats the replacement in the Security Council as a procedural matter (which it might properly be). The Security Council would have no jurisdiction concerning replacement (i.e. rejection and acceptance of the relevant credentials) in the Assembly.
6. The ‘Two Chinas’ solution (4 (b) above) raises the real procedural difficulty of ensuring ordinary membership for Formosa without involving the Security Council in the procedure of admitting ‘Formosa’ as a new member (veto applies). This could perhaps be done by the General Assembly adopting a resolution recognizing that China had become two separate States, one of which (Peking), it recognized as the successor to the China which had been the original member of the United Nations, and the other (Taipeh) it recognized as an additional ordinary member. Besides setting what might be an unfortunate precedent for other divided States (Korea etc.), such a course would be a departure from the procedure followed in 1947 when Pakistan was treated as an ordinary applicant for membership while India continued a member as the successor State. It would also not be strictly in accordance with Charter requirements on admission of new members but it might perhaps be pushed through if there were strong enough support for it. (On the other hand, the ordinary admission procedure was not followed when the United Arab Republic was recognized as a member following the merger of Egypt and Syria, United Nations members merely being notified of the change by the Secretary-General). But even if adopted, such a course would really require unanimous support or at least no substantial opposition if the ‘Two Chinas’ solution thus recommended were to be put into actual practice in the United Nations—and this would assume basic changes in the attitudes of both Peking and Taipeh (see below).
7. To sum up, the existing three-way split in any substantive voting on Chinese representation in the United Nations (opponents of Communist Chinese representation on the one hand and two separate groups of supports1 on the other) makes it hard to see sufficient support being mustered at present for any departure from the ‘moratorium’. The only certain effect of any Assembly consideration, of a substantive kind, of a ‘Two Chinas’ solution, would probably be a serious weakening of Nationalist China’s international position. Both Communist and Nationalist China refuse to contemplate a ‘Two Chinas’ solution. Communist China is adamant that it will not sit in any international meeting in which Nationalist representatives are seated. Assuming neither China would budge from this position, a proposal for a ‘Two Chinas’ solution, if approved other than without real opposition by the General Assembly, might be expected to have the following essentially negative effects:—
(a) Peking would not in fact come in; but the United States would have suffered a reverse, and the Nationalist Government a blow to its international status and prestige, its internal morale would be weakened and the allegiance of many South East Asian Overseas Chinese no doubt affected, etc.
(b) With the refusal of its invitation to Communist China to take its seat, the United Nations General Assembly would exchange its present position of moral condemnation of Peking for that of a rejected suppliant.
(c) A recommended ‘Two Chinas’ solution having proved abortive in practice, the Soviet Union might press hard—and gain sympathy—for a replacement solution as in paragraph 4(a) above. As part of such pressure the Soviet Union might claim that all Security Council ‘decisions’ taken in the absence of Communist China were invalid under Article 29 of the Charter.2 (Such tactics were overcome in 1950 on the Korean question but they could create serious difficulties.
(d) The Communist Chinese would probably view the invitation to take a seat in the United Nations, even under a ‘Two Chinas’ arrangement, as a major weakening of the stand hitherto maintained against them: Peking might expect further gains and hold out firmly for the acceptance of other demands (notably a replacement solution, abandonment of Formosa by the United States, etc.). The force of pressure for a solution of the Chinese representation question might then fall on the United States (and its allies).
8. The above may be drawn upon in any discussions of this subject you may have with appropriate officials. We would appreciate any comments.
[NAA: A6366, XL1960/01ST]
1 The word ’supports’ should presumably read ’supporters’.
2 This appears to be a mistake. The author may have meant Article 27(3) of the UN Charter, which specifies that, on non-procedural matters, Security Council decisions must be made with the concurrence of permanent members.