Canberra, 20 January 1961
Secret
Subject: China
(Note: A Working Paper on China5 dated 19th January was circulated before the meeting)
The Minister opened the discussion by saying that he hoped it would be in nature a general talk with people interposing ideas and comments as they occurred to them. The subject was a familiar one. Was there some element of urgency in it now, or could the status quo be maintained? He himself was quite certain that, after the last vote on the moratorium, it was only a matter of time before the question of Chinese representation (and the future of Formosa) would be discussed in the United Nations as a matter of substance. At least within two years we would be faced with the majority of member nations wanting to seat Communist China. In the past our policy had been not to abandon the United States and leave her out on a limb. This conformity with the United States attitude was correct in view of the obvious Communist tactic to isolate the United States and cause divisions in the free world. The big problem of course was Formosa. In no circumstances could she be abandoned to the Communists: There was, however, the possibility of a deal (if the United States agreed with this) by seating both Communist China and Formosa. It seemed clear that in this event Communist China would occupy the seat in the Security Council.
2. Senator Gorton asked whether it might not be possible to exclude Communist China from the Security Council seat by an amendment of the Charter. It was pointed out by Dr. Walker that the veto applied to amendments to the Charter and that the U.S.S.R. would not, of course, agree.
3. The Minister threw open the question of future policy. Senator Gorton suggested that Australia’s position should be based firmly on the United States assessment of the strategic importance of Formosa. The United States wanted a strong Formosa and to retain the island chain. Senator Gorton went on to say that the Chinese Nationalists were wondering what the United Kingdom position would be. The Nationalists accepted the fact that Communist China would be in the United Nations sooner rather than later. In Senator Gorton’s view, if Communist China was seated, it was essential that Formosa should also be a member of the United Nations. The objective should be a resolution in the United Nations which would seat both Communist China and Formosa in the Assembly and give Communist China the Security Council seat. It would strengthen the position of the Nationalists vis-a-vis the free world if they made the following gestures:
1. retired gracefully from the Security Council, and
2. reaffirmed the renunciation of the use of force against the mainland.
Senator Gorton instanced a number of examples to demonstrate that the Nationalists were not intransigent on the question of ‘Two Chinas’. He quoted their attitude at the Olympic Games, remarks by the K.M.T. Foreign Minister6 and the Ambassador in Canberra.7 Senator Gorton said we would have the best of all worlds if Formosa would agree to a ‘Two Chinas’ solution and the Communists rejected it.
4. Referring to the point made in the Working Paper that the seating of Communist China would lay her policies open to censure from, for example, the Afro-Asian group, Senator Gorton said that the Communist bloc did not modify its policies simply because of criticism.
5. The Minister referred to the offshore islands and commented that this brought us into the ‘perilous seas of prestige’. Senator Gorton suggested that the offshore islands should not be evacuated unless we got something in return from the Communists.
6. Mr. Harry noted that it would be necessary to get the support of all the Scandinavians and all the non-committed Africans, if a ‘package deal’, which seated both Communist China and Formosa, was contemplated. There was some doubt whether the vote would be a simple majority or 2/3, but he assumed that for a package deal it would be 2/3. On the other hand the moratorium could be terminated by a simple majority.
7. The Minister canvassed the idea that there might be a middle course over the offshore islands. Why argue about territorial questions? Why could they not be demilitarized? The Communists could no longer argue that they were then a threat to China. Senator Gorton said this would probably not be acceptable to the United States Defence authorities, e.g. the islands provided early warning radar
8. The Minister referred to a conversation he had had with Adlai Stevenson8 which was devoted wholly to China. Stevenson had been thinking in terms of a ‘package deal’; it was nonsense to keep Communist China out of the United Nations; the only question was to accomplish this on terms which were consistent with United States self-respect and their position in the United Nations. He thought that Communist China should be in the General Assembly and the Security Council; Formosa might be ‘neutralized’ and guaranteed by the United Nations for a period of, say, 15 years before self-determination. Mr. McNicol questioned whether the United States military would accept a demilitarized Formosa. Formosa and Korea provided the only large armies in Asia, and Formosa was part of the island chain.
9. The Minister referred to a conversation he had had with A.H. Sulzberger9 and others at the New York Times. The Minister was satisfied that the New York Times decision to support Senator Kennedy10 had been as a result of their opposition to the negative attitude on China adopted by the Eisenhower Administration. The Minister impressed on Sulzberger that the United States Government should do some hard and real thinking on China policy; he added that Australia was very conscious of the danger of Communist China’s prestige being increased in South East Asia because of a victory over the United States on the question of representation in the United Nations and the future of Formosa.
10. Dr. Walker said it would be a wrong approach to base any policy on the fact that both Communist China and the K.M.T had over the years rejected any suggestion of ‘Two Chinas’; policies changed in the face of hard facts. The Minister agreed saying that it was wrong to postulate policy on the basis of past public utterances. Dr. Walker went on to say that the Chinese Communists and the nationalists would be confronted with an entirely different situation if the United Nations imposed a ‘Two Chinas’ solution.
11. The Minister said that the West had for too long been in a position of being ‘bovinely defensive’. There was a need for negotiation with the Afro-Asians. If the West were to put up a positive proposal on ‘Two Chinas’ (which the Chinese Communists rejected), surely the majority of United Nations members would be compelled to accept it—they simply could not jettison the ten million people on Formosa.
12. Mr. Harry said that the lack of a positive programme had certainly been a factor in the ‘erosion’ of the majority for a moratorium from 23 in 1956 to 16 in 1958 to 8 in 1960. (See Annex).11
13. Mr. McNicol noted that many of the United Nations members might attach so much importance to the seating of Communist China that they would be prepared to accept the exclusion of the Nationalists from the Assembly knowing that Formosa would be preserved and protected by the United States. The Minister questioned this point. Surely the new African States could not deny a separate existence in the United Nations for ten million people?
14. The Minister said that at past Prime Ministers’ Conferences this question had arisen and been dropped. He himself had ‘led the pack off’ from discussion of this matter in view of the bad effect this would have if it became known in the United States. The coming Prime Ministers’ Conference12 would however present a good opportunity for putting up a series of propositions, and, if the Prime Ministers agreed with them, they could be conveyed in a friendly way to the United States.
15. Mr. Heydon pointed to the possibility of the Minister talking outside the Conference to the Prime Ministers of Ghana and Nigeria and others to avoid rejection by them of ‘Two Chinas’.
16. Mr. Harry referred to the key role of India. If after the seating of Communist China, the Russians were to agree to an enlargement of the Security Council, India would have ambitions. Might it not be possible to dangle the carrot of a Security Council seat before India provided she accepted ‘Two Chinas’ and separate membership for Formosa?
17. The Minster said that we should not get involved in procedural aspects within the United Nations too soon. In fact he thought that the first diplomatic activity should start outside of the United Nations. The United States and United Kingdom should approach the subject diplomatically with Moscow and Peking with an appropriate accompaniment of ‘guidance’ to the press about their activities.
18. Dr. Walker wondered whether Communist China might not be confronted with the hard facts of life by the United Kingdom, United States and France agreeing to recognition of both Peking and Formosa. Peking might refuse to exchange representatives but she could not alter the fact that she had been accorded recognition. This sort of manoeuvre might set the world stage for action in the United Nations. Mr. Heydon mentioned that the possibility of U.S. recognition of Communist China had always been on the basis of U.S. reluctant acceptance of a United Nations Assembly decision.
19. Mr. Heydon suggested that it might be useful to put some views to the United States government before the Prime Ministers’ meeting. The Minister saw merit in this suggestion. If he could go to Washington on the way to the Prime Ministers’ Conference, he could talk to the Americans whilst the subject was still at large. The Minister commented that the China problem was ‘most important to us’.
20. The Minister questioned whether Communist China could accept an independent Formosa which still retained the offshore islands. He answered this question in the negative. The Minister enquired about the population in the offshore islands and their geographic position.
21. The Minister raised the question of disarmament noting that this was a major reason for a summit conference and that it was obvious that no realistic disarmament agreement could be achieved without Chinese participation. ‘Disarmament could only be discussed disastrously’ without China being present. Senator Gorton questioned whether the free world really wanted nuclear disarmament because of the value of its possession of the deterrent. The Minister emphasised that there could be no nuclear disarmament agreement until there had also been agreement on conventional weapons. He added that the great danger was that more and more countries would become nuclear powers.
22. Mr. McNicol referred to the effects in Asia when China became a nuclear power. The Minister said that this was an added reason for urgent action on the question of disarmament within the United Nations. The Minister said he believed the United States could give urgent consideration to the problem of disarmament vis-a-vis China if they really wanted to be taken seriously on the subject of disarmament. Senator Gorton commented that a separate existence for Formosa was even more important than Chinese participation in disarmament negotiations. The Minister agreed that a free and independent Formosa was a major Australian objective.
23. The Minister said that now was obviously the appointed hour for plain thinking and action on the China problem. Positive proposals should be made by the United Kingdom and United States to the Communist bloc by the middle of the year, otherwise the matter would be taken out of their hands at the next session of the Assembly. He thought that if the smaller countries became convinced that the world powers were really grappling with the problem, they would be prepared to hold their hands and not press for Chinese Communist representation immediately.
24. Mr. Heydon asked about consultation by Australia with other countries on this subject. The Minister agreed that, in view of the sensitive nature of the problem, consultation at this stage should not go beyond London, Washington, Ottawa and Wellington.
25. Senator Gorton referred to Sir Garfield Barwick’s statement on China at the 1960 Session of the General Assembly13 and said this would have to be explained away in some fashion. He also referred to the possibility that the Nationalists might seek an accommodation with the mainland rather than accept ‘Two Chinas’. The consensus of the meeting was that this was a risk but not a high risk.
26. The Minister enquired about a successor to Chiang Kai Shek. Senator Gorton said there were two or three possible successors but no firm favourite. The Minister asked about internal political opposition to Chiang Kai Shek from native Formosans. Senator Gorton cited evidence of this.
[NAA: A1838, 3107/33/1/1, xiv]
1 Senator J.G. Gorton, Minister for the Navy and Minister assisting the Minister for External Affairs.
2 E.R. Walker, Australian Ambassador to France.
3 R.L. Harry, First Assistant Secretary, Division 2, Department of External Affairs.
4 D.W. McNicol, Assistant Secretary, Pacific and Americas Branch, Department of External Affairs.
5 Document 84.
6 Shen Chang-huan, ROC Minister of Foreign Affairs.
7 Chen Chih-mai.
8 US Permanent Representative to the United Nations.
9 Sulzberger was publisher of the New York Times , 1935–61.
10 That is, John F. Kennedy.
11 Not published.
12 8–17 March 1961.
13 See Document 83.