London, 14 February 1961
680. Secret Priority
From External. Your 2351 and 374.2
China
MacDermot3 called me in this morning to give me the replies to the questions I put to Hoyer-Millar arising out of telegram 235.
2. Exchanges have been and are going on on this subject at Assistant Secretary (i.e. Parsons)4 level in Washington. The United Kingdom does not envisage elevating these to Ministerial level until after an exchange of views at that level in London at the time of the Prime Ministers’ Conference. Incidentally, MacDermot told me that other discussions are going on in Washington at the Assistant Secretary level on a ‘whole raft’ of problems.
3. I told MacDermot that there was a possibility that the Prime Minister might wish to discuss this subject in Washington before he reached London, and he said that he would let me know next week the exact state of play between the United States and the United Kingdom at the time of the Prime Minister’s arrival in the United States. The matter will, of course, be discussed in Washington in early April when the Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary go to Washington. There is therefore no possibility of an agreed Western position before the Prime Ministers’ Conference, and in any event the Foreign Office is not inclined to hurry the Americans.
4. MacDermot indeed expressed considerable doubts as to whether there was any possibility of reaching an agreed position at all. There are fundamental differences between the United States and the United Kingdom which cannot be resolved at the present juncture. The attitude of the United Kingdom to the seating of Peking in the United Nations, and in particular to the seating of Formosa, must remain different from that of the United States. A tactical position about the moratorium might be agreed, but this is not something which could be the subject of a joint approach by the United States and the United Kingdom to Moscow and Peking. The Foreign Office cannot see how there could be such a joint approach. In any such approach the position of Formosa in the United Nations must inevitably arise. The United States must in the present circumstances support the continued presence of Formosa in New York. Legally, because it recognises Peking, and by inclination, because in their view Peking should be in and Formosa not, the United Kingdom would in any joint approach be left wringing its hands in the middle. The Russians are going to support China the whole hog on this issue, and they are not going to let the United States off the hook on Formosa. Clearly, if the United States and the United Kingdom could agree on a joint approach, the risks of Afro-Asian initiatives and of Communist exploitation of Western differences would be reduced, but the Foreign Office is quite unable to see how this could be achieved.
5. The United Kingdom agrees that the preservation of an independent Formosa is essential as part of the United States defence system and as a member of the Western camp. MacDermot was at pains to stress this, and to say that there will be no change in United Kingdom policy on this subject. But if anything is certain about the whole question of the representation of China at the United Nations, it is that Peking will not come to the party if Formosa remains in any shape or form represented in New York. The United Kingdom indeed does not feel that they should be expected to. They recognise Peking’s right to China’s seat, and cannot see that Formosa has any right to it. In the Foreign Office’s view Two Chinas in the United Nations is not a workable policy.
6. They would, however, be glad to hear our views as to how we think such an arrangement might be achieved. I said that I would put this question to you, but that I felt that basically our approach arose from our looking at the question from a different angle. We recognised the Nationalist Government as the Government of China, and we were worried at the effect on the morale of the Government in Formosa of excluding them from the United Nations. MacDermot suggested that what to do with Formosa was in fact really a matter for the United States, and for those countries such as Australia, which recognised the Nationalist Government. The United Kingdom itself had no great part to play in this, including the problem of selling some new status to the Nationalist Government and getting them out of the Off-Shore Islands. He recognised that this would in fact be an extremely tricky and delicate operation. Stewart,5 the United Kingdom Charge d‘Affaires in Peking has been asked to come home next week for consultations on this and related problems before the Prime Ministers’ Conference. Mr. Macmillan has expressed the wish to see the man on the spot. MacDermot is also arranging for me to see him at the end of the week. Stewart has told the Foreign Office that he is completely convinced that if the United Kingdom advocates, works for, or shows the slightest sign of voting for a Two Chinas solution in the United Nations, Peking will immediately sever diplomatic relations. The Foreign Office feels that they might get away with some de facto arrangement outside the United Nations after Peking has been seated. They feel it would be bad for the United Kingdom to be kicked out of Peking as their influence may at least represent some Western effort in China. The United Kingdom therefore does think there would be a great difference in her relations with Peking if she supported United Nations membership rather than just an independent Formosa not in the United Nations.
7. The Foreign Office is against any attempt to postpone the abandonment of the moratorium even for a year. In the first place, they think there is a real risk that it will not work in 1961, and in the second place, MacDermot made the significant remark, which he later repeated, that there were clear indications that Rusk recognised that it is unlikely to work and is prepared to take the plunge. The United Kingdom hopes that the Americans will do so now. It will be much more difficult later on, even next year, as by this time the new Administration may be stuck with the old policy. The United Kingdom will not work for the continuation of the moratorium. They believe the Chinese want to get into the United Nations, nuclear capacity or not, and that the Russians want her in too. Several of your questions were predicated on the willingness of the United Kingdom to assist in ‘vigorous campaigning’ etc. on behalf of seating Formosa. They will not do this.
8. Sir Patrick Dean,6 to whom your question about countries which might follow the lead of the United Kingdom was referred, has said that there is little point in trying to make assessments of this kind. Some wobblers may perhaps be affected by the attitude of the United Kingdom, but the key will be the energy with which the United States approaches the matter. In Dean’s view, even if she puts all her efforts into it, the moratorium will probably fail with unfortunate results for the West. If the United States shows any sign of hesitation the moratorium is completely lost.
9. I think this clarifies all of your points. Please let me know urgently if I am wrong. The Foreign Office seems to be glad, and even anxious, to talk about it. I think the possibility of convincing us of their case is very attractive to them knowing our close relations with the United States.
Shann.
[NAA: A1838, 3107/33/1/1, vii]
1 Document 87.
2 Not published.
3 D.F. MacDermot, Assistant Under Secretary of State for Far Eastern Department, UK Foreign Office.
4 J. Graham Parsons, US Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs.
5 M.N.F. Stewart, UK Chargé d’Affaires in Peking.
6 UK Permanent Representative to the United Nations.