Colombo, 11 January 1950
18. Secret Immediate
Following for the Prime Minister from Spender.
1. Yesterday’s session of the Conference was devoted mainly to the discussion of China. I opened the discussion with a statement of the Australian attitude towards recognition of the Communist Government, giving reasons why we considered that, while recognition was no doubt ultimately inevitable, the timing was an important consideration in our view, particularly in view of United States attitude. I said that a question of principle was involved in the decision of the United Kingdom, India and Pakistan to announce recognition in advance of this conference.1 I acknowledged that these countries might have special reasons for wanting to hasten recognition, and upheld the right of each member of the Commonwealth to make its own decision in the matter, but said that it was unfortunate that they had not waited until there could be full discussion at the Conference. It had been embarrassing to us to be confronted with United Kingdom’s decision immediately upon assuming office. Doidge2 took the same view. Bevin, Nehru3 and Ghulam Mohammed4 explained why their countries felt unable to delay any longer. Pearson5 said that he had been somewhat embarrassed by the decision of recognition before discussion at Colombo and hinted that Canada might announce recognition some time in February. Ceylon representative6 summed up lucidly by acknowledging the arbiters in favour of early recognition and the right of each country to decide for itself but, at the same time, suggesting that Commonwealth consultation machinery would have gained in prestige if the announcement could have been delayed a few days. The communiqué subsequently made public made it clear that the Commonwealth practice of consultation on all important world problems, leaving each government to make its own individual decision, had again been stressed.
2. There was uncertainty about the procedure under which Chinese representation on the Security Council might be assumed by the Communist Government. Pearson supposed that the change might be effected by a simple vote of the Council and taken as a matter of procedure and accordingly, not subject to veto, though he pointed out that this could possibly be blocked by the use of double veto by the present Chinese representative.
3. Nehru subsequently analysed the position of the Communists in China pointing to their apparent invulnerability and to the failure of the past United States procedure of military aid to Chiang Kai Shek as an example of how not to deal with them. (In the course of general remarks he was especially bitter about the French in Indo–China and in India). He noted that, despite their extravagant utterances, the Chinese Communists were being cautious in action and expressed the belief that recognition and establishment of normal relations with them might help to keep them from subservience to Moscow. Bevin indicated that the United Kingdom would try to co–operate with them, chiefly through trade but would resist any resort to pressure tactics. He looked to Australia and New Zealand to provide a sort of link between the United Kingdom and the East, as Canada provides with the United States. I stressed the dangers of Chinese Communist infiltration throughout South East Asia and called for the fullest exchange of information among Commonwealth countries regarding Communist activities.
[ matter omitted ]7
7. I have already informed the United States Ambassador in Ceylon8 of the general lines of our thinking and think that our Embassy in Washington should be informed briefly of the contents of paragraphs 4 to 7 of this message. United Kingdom fully agrees that it will be necessary to make formal approach to the United States subsequently.
[NAA: A1838, 494/2/10, iv]
1 Commonwealth countries to recognise the PRC prior to the Colombo conference were as follows: India (30 December 1949); Pakistan (4 January 1950); Ceylon and the United Kingdom (6 January 1950).
2 Frederick Doidge, New Zealand Minister for External Affairs.
3 Jawaharlal Nehru, Indian Prime Minister and Minister for External Affairs.
4 Pakistan Minister for Finance.
5 Lester B. Pearson, Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs.
6 D.S. Senanayake, Ceylonese Prime Minister and Minister for External Affairs.
7 Matter omitted relates mainly to discussion of economic conditions in Southeast Asia and possible economic co–operation. In paragraph five, Spender mentioned that he was ‘stressing that the main tactical objective is to show a genuine willingness to meet the serious drift in the political and economic situation in South East Asia, as a basis for an immediate approach to United States with a view to enlisting their active participation’.
8 Joseph C. Satterthwaite.