Canberra, 9 June 1961
959. Secret
For Beale from Menzies
China
Thanks for your telegram 1354.1
While you should not of course press Rusk unduly I would like you to see him reasonably soon and pursue the matter. It becomes increasingly important both to stimulate and to know President’s and his thinking on the China problem. The following paragraphs contain views on which you can draw in course of discussion.
2. In my talks with Kennedy and Rusk in February2 I concentrated on the following points:
(a) there was an urgent need for a positive approach by the United States if undesirable initiatives by some Afro-Asians and others were to be avoided;
(b) Formosa must be guaranteed a separate independent existence as a member of the United Nations;
(c) a defeat for the United States on this issue would be a major victory for the Communist bloc and the effects of this defeat on Asian countries and on S.E.A.T.O. would be devastating;
(d) if the non-committed and smaller countries became convinced that the United States was grappling with this problem in a positive way they might be prepared to hold their hands and not press for any alteration in Chinese representation at the 16th Session;3
(e) this was obviously an issue on which the United States must take the lead;
(f) the indications were that the moratorium procedure would probably fail at the 16th Session.
(I expressed these views against the general background that I was not presuming to hurry the United States in any particular direction but speaking as a friend).
3. With regard to positive approaches I mentioned the following: Peking should not be seated in the United Nations without some concessions particularly in respect of Formosa. For example, on the basis of Charter requirements, Peking should be called upon to renounce the use of force over Formosa and the off-shore islands. The Nationalists should at the same time restate their 1958 repudiation of the use of force,4 preferably in unequivocal terms. They might also express their willingness to withdraw from the off-shore islands if Peking renounced the use of force.
4. I think that an approach along the above lines might win support for the United States and the Chinese Nationalists. Both reduction of tension in the Formosa area and the Nationalists’ withdrawal from the off-shore islands are ends desirable in themselves (as President Kennedy implied in his pre-election speeches). Method of presentation of the proposals would be important in order to avoid giving Asian allies the impression that the West was weakening in their defence. However, the proposals could be represented as examples of the United States Administration’s fresh leadership and desire to reach genuine settlements of dangerous problems. In making them the United States might also state that their acceptance by Peking would ‘create a new situation in respect of the China Problem’ indicating that acceptance might end the impasse on Chinese representation.
5. I suggest that sufficient support for any United States position e.g. the devices State Department has in mind, will not be forthcoming unless there is planned action to muster support in the United Nations, particularly among the waverers. Moreover Governments are already beginning to consider nature of instructions they should give to United Nations Delegations on this and other questions.
6. There is one aspect of recent United States approach to Outer Mongolia5 which is relevant in this context. When, as is inevitable, it becomes generally known that the approach has been made many countries will interpret this move in part as foreshadowing a change in policy towards Communist China. If it does in fact represent a change, the courses of action outlined in paragraph 3 above would further demonstrate that the United States was seriously tackling the problem. If it does not represent a change I think there would still be merit in considering an approach along the lines of paragraph 3.
7. As you will remember the President and Rusk listened to these arguments with interest in February and I certainly gained the impression that something would have been moving before this. Of course I am aware of their difficulties with the Nationalist Chinese and other preoccupations. But this continued drift without a lead in policy seems to me full of danger.
[NAA: A1838, 3107/33/1/1, vii]
1 In Cablegram 1354 (24 May), Beale replied to Cablegram 703 (3 May) from Menzies in which the former had been instructed to sound out Rusk on United States ‘high-level thinking’ on China. Menzies had queried whether the US intention to retain the Security Council seat for Formosa was an essential part of Kennedy’s and Rusk’s thinking or whether it was a bargaining position. Menzies had added that denying the People’s Republic of China the Security Council seat would make it harder to win international support for the retention of Formosa in the General Assembly. Beale reported to Menzies that Rusk was working on a General Assembly resolution which would require an endorsement of Formosa’s continuing membership of the United Nations, commenting that ‘Rusk regards the problem of what to do about Communist China in relation to the Security Council as essentially a long-range matter, to be kept separate from what happens in the Assembly … he is concentrating on the introduction of some resolution which will put the onus on Communist China and make them look so unreasonable that the majority of the Assembly, especially the new and impressionable African and Asian Nations, will not admit the Communists at the cost of throwing Formosa out’.
2 See Document 85 and footnotes. During dinner with Beale on 5 March, Rusk had said of Menzies’ visit that: ‘the President had liked [the Prime Minister] and what [he] said. Moreover, from the point of view of the United States, it was extremely valuable for him and the President to have had the opportunity of putting their views to you, especially in relation to China’.
3 That is, the Session of the General Assembly scheduled for September 1961.
4 On 23 October 1958, the United States and the ROC released a joint communique, which read in part: ‘The two Governments reaffirmed their dedication to the principles of the Charter of the United Nations. They recalled that the [Mutual Defense] treaty under which they are acting is defensive in character. The Government of the Republic of China considers that the restoration of freedom to its people on the mainland is its sacred mission. It believes that the foundation of this mission resides in the minds and the hearts of the Chinese people and that the principal means of successfully achieving its mission is the implementation of Dr. Sun Yat-sen’s three people’s principles (nationalism, democracy and social well-being) and not the use of force’. For the full text of the communiqué, see Foreign Relations of the United States , 1958–60, vol. XIX, pp. 443–4. Note: Sun Yat-sen, 1866–1925, was a Chinese revolutionary revered by both the Communists and the KMT.
5 The Australian Government was informed on 5 June that the United States was beginning talks in Moscow on the possible establishment of diplomatic relations with Outer Mongolia.