New York, 30 June 1961
UN 801. Secret Guard
Chinese Representation
Okazaki (Permanent Representative of Japan)1 told me that Ikeda (Prime Minister of Japan)2 had given him some account of his talks with President Kennedy on the question of Chinese representation. Rusk had also been present.
2. Kennedy had said that the United States would like some procedure whereby Nationalist China would continue its membership at the United Nations and Communist China would come in as a new member.3 I asked whether this would imply that Nationalist China would continue to hold the seat on the Security Council. Okazaki said that such an outcome would not be realistic but that the Americans did not seem to be putting much emphasis on the Security Council aspect except that they seem to feel that if Communist China became a member there would have to be some increase in the total size of the Council so as to offset the bigger vote in the Council on behalf of the Communist bloc.
3. President Kennedy had said that the United States had attempted to persuade the Nationalist Chinese to accept some approach to two Chinas but had not so far been successful. He suggested that Japan might try to persuade the Nationalist Chinese. Dean Rusk intervened to say that Japan and Australia might jointly undertake the task of persuasion.
4. Okazaki said that Ikeda had taken particular note of this remark because Australia was the only other country mentioned through the conversation. Since Okazaki seemed to expect some comment from me I said that Australia had of course had discussions with the Americans from time to time about Chinese representation but as far as I know there had been no suggestion that we attempt to persuade the Chinese Nationalists to any course. The Americans were aware that Australia and Japan had in many ways similar interests and preoccupations on the question. We both recognized Nationalist China and wanted Formosa kept out of Communist hands but at the same time we had trade with Communist China and allowed our nationals to visit Communist China and by the very facts of geography we were both conscious of the long term problems posed by the existence of a nation of over six hundred million people in that part of the world. It was therefore natural that the Americans should think of us both in the same way in certain respects. Okazaki added that of course the Americans must realize that there was very little persuasion on the Nationalist Chinese that could be done by countries like Britain which recognized Peking.
5. Okazaki said that Ikeda had told him that it had been decided that any future discussions on this question should be handled between Okazaki and Adlai Stevenson and not between the Japanese Embassy in Washington and the State Department. Stevenson had confirmed this to him in a talk this morning. Stevenson had been very concerned about the whole question of Chinese representation and told Okazaki that the Americans still did not know whether the moratorium could be maintained or not.
I said that I thought that the practicability of maintaining the moratorium depended on the French African vote. If in the Security Council the United States did not vote against the admission of Outer Mongolia and if in those circumstances Nationalist China vetoed it, the French Africans would vote against the moratorium and might also vote against Nationalist China on any more substantive vote in the General Assembly. I said I did not quite see what Nationalist China would have to lose by refraining from vetoing Outer Mongolia. The Nationalist Government had not effective control of Outer Mongolia and it could hardly be accused by Peking of selling out Chinese interests. By making such a charge Peking would be getting itself in a dispute with Moscow.
6. Okazaki said that there were many elements in the Nationalist Chinese thinking. There was the emotional conception of historical China as a whole. Then there was the fact that Outer Mongolia had once had a separate sort of existence and the Chinese had reversed that position at the insistence of the United States which was now trying to persuade them to do a switch once more. But Okazaki thought that probably the biggest factor in their thinking at the moment was a fear that if a small and sparsely populated segment of old China were admitted to the United Nations it would be thought even more absurd to keep out six hundred million people. I said it could be argued in the opposite direction that if one segment like Outer Mongolia could be broken off and admitted to the United Nations another segment like Formosa could be treated similarly.
7. Okazaki said that whether or not the votes existed for the moratorium this year he thought we should attempt a more substantive approach. The present position of ignoring six hundred million people was quite absurd. Moreover, if we acted now we would be acting from strength because we still had a majority or something very close to it. But if we waited until our voting position was whittled away then we would have to negotiate from weakness.
8. Okazaki is leaving at the weekend for Japan and will not be back until the middle of August. I suggested that he have a talk with McIntyre before he comes back and he said he would be happy to do so.
Plimsoll
[NAA: A1838, 3107/33/1/1, viii]
1 Okazaki Kazuo.
2 Ikeda Hayato.
3 Beale had earlier reported to Canberra a conversation with Rusk in which the latter had said he was ‘very angry’ with a leak from the Japanese party on US plans. Rusk had added that such a ‘gross breach of faith’ might ‘make it necessary for the United States to alter their tactics’. On 6 July, the State Department indicated publicly that it had dropped the ‘two Chinas’ plan because of premature publicity.