Washington, 31 July 1961
1915. Secret Priority
Chinese Representation in United Nations
[ matter omitted ]
2. Lutkins1 said that the United States position had already been decided, at least to the extent of what could not be done. Devices such as the ‘New State’ and ‘Successor State’ had been discarded either because the G.R.C. would not agree to what was required of them (for example not to use its veto in the ‘New State’ device), or because of the basic dilemma facing the administration in respect of any device. In order to succeed, a device needed to sound reasonable to other countries, but at the same time United States domestic political considerations prevented the administration from appearing ‘reasonable’ about Peking. In respect of this dilemma Lutkins added that it was clear (and Cleveland’s2 recent trip abroad had confirmed this) that no other countries were ready or in a position to make the running for the United States with a device such as the ‘Successor State’ idea.
3. Lutkins said that G.R.C. had now agreed that the moratorium was not a starter. For a long time they had argued that it should continue to be used but they now agreed that the margin was so slim, and the consequences resulting from a defeat so unpredictable in terms of what might subsequently happen in the debate, that the moratorium should be abandoned. Dr. Tsiang3 (G.R.C. Representative in New York) had then suggested that the debate should be allowed to proceed, but that a ‘no decision’ resolution should be introduced at the end of the debate; but the United States thought such a resolution might get even fewer votes than the moratorium and the idea had been dropped.
4. Lutkins said that in the light of the above considerations it now appeared likely that the United States would rely on having Chinese Representation adjudged a matter requiring a two thirds majority, under Article 18 of the Charter.4 He said it was recognised that this was a negative tactic which would be interpreted as a means of blocking the will of the majority and for this reason the President and Rusk were looking for some form of sweetener (perhaps to be added to the motion about the two thirds majority) to give the appearance of something more positive. Their tentative idea was for some sort of committee to examine the problem, as suggested by Mrs. Rossel of Sweden (U.N. New York’s 755).5 An idea being considered by Rusk was that the committee’s terms of reference might include Charter review and enlargement of the Councils, which would keep the committee occupied for years. Lutkins emphasised that the committee idea was still tentative. The G.R.C. would not like it (he implied it was one of the matters to be discussed with Vice President Chen);6 but in any case the United States might itself decide that throwing the matter open to examination by a committee would provide too much of a headache for the future. Composition of the committee would be a major problem, and it would probably be necessary to ask it to report in 12 months’ time. Lutkins said that the basic idea of requiring a two thirds majority was seen as something which would keep ‘heads above water’ for several years and it might finally be decided that it should be used on its own and without a sweetener.
5. Lutkins said the exact details of getting the decision under Article 18 had not yet been worked out. The first thing was to get G.R.C. approval of the principle (including presumably whether to try a sweetener) after which details would be decided and urgent consultations undertaken with friendly countries.
6. Lutkins said the State Department was ‘fairly sure’ that a simple majority could be found to gain or uphold a ruling that the China question was substantial and required a two thirds majority. The Department was sure that a blocking third would then exist for a resolution on the substance of the question.
7. However, the G.R.C.’s action in respect of Outer Mongolia was a factor: in the voting, especially for the simple majority. Accordingly, President Kennedy would bring ‘heavy pressure’ on Vice President Chen for the G.R.C. to abstain on Outer Mongolia’s application. Lutkins himself thought it was optimistic to expect the G.R.C. to agree, in view of Chiang’s unshakeable belief, expressed firmly since 1955, that this was a first step towards ‘Two Chinas’.7 Lutkins added that the G.R.C., which looked for its security not to the United Nations but to the United States, was less concerned about losing its place in the United Nations than the United States was.
[NAA: A6364, WH1961/06]
1 LaRue R. Lutkins, Deputy Director of the Office of Chinese Affairs and Acting United Nations Advisor for Far Eastern Affairs, US State Department.
2 J. Harlan Cleveland, US Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs.
3 Tsiang Ting-fu.
4 Article 18(2) of the UN Charter states that ‘important questions’, including the suspension and expulsion of members, require for adoption a two-thirds majority of the General Assembly. Article 18(3) of the UN Charter specifies that additional questions, including the determination of other categories of questions to be decided by a two-thirds majority, require a simple majority.
5 31 July. Agda Rossel, the Swedish Ambassador to the United Nations, had suggested in a meeting between various representatives that it might be best to allow debate on China, while aiming at postponement of a substantive decision for at least another year. She proposed that this might be done by appointing a committee ‘to enquire and report on the facts of the Chinese question’.
6 Chen Cheng, Vice President and Premier of the ROC, who was at the time visiting Washington for the purpose of discussing Chinese representation with US authorities.
7 Lutkins reported on 2 August that Kennedy and Chen had agreed that the moratorium was finished and that the ‘important question’ approach would be adopted. On Outer Mongolia, there had been a ’stand-off’, although ROC representatives would have further talks on the matter with Rusk.