Canberra, 3 August 1961
2521. Top Secret
The following is a personal message, dated 3rd August, which Mr. Menzies wants passed to Mr. Macmillan as soon as possible.
MESSAGE BEGINS.
‘Thank you for your message of July 28.1 So far as China is concerned, we have unsuccessfully tried to find out the American approach. I agree with you that the moratorium is pretty certain to break down and that the realities of life require positive action. I put this to Kennedy and Rusk earlier in the year, and went on to say that when the moratorium went, a moral negative attitude on the part of the United States of America would tend to throw the new and uncommitted countries into alignment with the Communists on this issue. I therefore thought it essential for the United States to develop a positive approach and actually to put forward a “package deal”, the rejection of which by Communist China would at any rate leave the United States in a better tactical position. In any “package deal” the essential elements would appear to be the recognition of Formosa as an independent power, if possible an international guarantee of its integrity, its continued membership of the General Assembly, and, these conditions being accepted by Communist China, the admission of the latter to the United Nations. This leaves out of account the question of the Security Council. Rusk seemed to me to be toying with the idea of permitting an extension of members in the Security Council which might make it easier for the American people to swallow Communist China. When I left America, I had some hopes that something realistic might come out. I have been disappointed since to observe what seems to be some hardening of opinion in the direction of the old negative attitude. I think it quite out of the question that the U.S.A. should diplomatically recognise Communist China but I think you will find they draw a clear distinction between “recognition” in this sense and “admission” to the United Nations.
As you will appreciate, we would be very reluctant to depart from our normal adoption of the American attitude for we feel that particularly in South-East Asia any change in our attitude would be regarded as a diplomatic victory for Peking and could have unpleasant consequences right down the line to Singapore and beyond. In any event, none of us would wish the U.S.A. to be isolated on this issue for this could be good fuel for the Russian propaganda machine. Finally, I think that if the U.S.A. can be persuaded to put forward something, whether it is acceptable or not to Peking, it should, if possible, represent the joint will of the great Western Powers. This will be a great test of unity and the spirit of accommodation but its effect, particularly in the new African countries, could be very great.’
MESSAGE ENDS.
[NAA: All37, x]
1 In a letter dealing with a number of matters, Macmillan had raised the problem of Chinese representation and had asked for Menzies’ advice. Writing that he had no information as to US intentions—and conceding that it was indeed ‘very hard to see what it is best to do’—he had concluded: ‘If, as I think is pretty certain, the moratorium breaks down, we must find some other line which takes more account of realities and does not leave the free world with the exclusive blame for keeping ‘Communist China out and Chiang Kai Shek in’.