Canberra, undated
Secret
[ matter omitted ]
The Problem of Communist China:
Pressures and Possible Counteraction
China’s Objectives:
The major foreign policy objectives of Communist China are:
(a) to gain control of Formosa,
(b) to reduce as far as possible the risk of attack on her territory,
(c) to ring her borders with communist or neutral buffer states and to ensure that other Asian governments are at best pro-Communist and at worst neutral,
(d) to promote the spread of Marxist–Leninist ideology; her interpretation of this ideology is militant and doctrinaire and urges revolutionary struggles to overthrow ‘bourgeois’ governments,
(e) to remove Western, and particularly United States, influence in Asia. (While this is in fact a means towards the above objectives, its importance makes it appear an objective in itself.)
Australia’s Interests:
2. In regard to the above objectives—
(a) Australia is opposed to a Communist takeover of Formosa; and we are also opposed to military adventures by Chiang Kai Shek against Communist-controlled territory.
(b) We have an interest in reducing tension in the Pacific area. Assuming that a Communist China is a continuing part of Asia, and that she has some genuine fear of being attacked (a fear which assists her leaders to justify extremist internal and external policies), we have an interest in demonstrating to her that she is not in danger of attack, unless she breaks the peace.
(c) We have a special interest in getting China into test-ban or disarmament commitments less [sic] the U.S. and Western powers ‘take a risk’ on China if they can get agreement with the U.S.S.R.
(d) We have an interest in preventing further countries from becoming committed to the Communist bloc lest a cumulative shift of manpower and economic resources affect the balance of power in Asia.
(e) We oppose the spread of Marxism–Leninism because this could assist the establishment of regimes committed to the Communist bloc and result in rebellion or subversion designed to overthrow non-Communist regimes. For the foreseeable future Communist China will continue to disseminate Marxism–Leninism by various means. It is in our interests to initiate strong counters to her activities.
(f) We have a strong interest in maintaining the United States concern with an influence in the Western Pacific. It is in our interest that her prestige should not suffer from political or military defeats in the area.
[ matter omitted ]
Effect of Acquisition of Nuclear Weapons2
10. The acquisition of nuclear weapons by China may reduce Chinese inhibitions against military involvement in the area. It would also add considerably to her prestige and strengthen the pressures she is able to exert on countries throughout the region. This could result in smaller countries adopting an attitude to China similar to that taken by Cambodia.3 As yet we are unable to assess reliably the effect that present economic difficulties and the cut-back in Russian technical assistance has had on China’s programme for development of nuclear weapons. It is possible that it may be several years before China has the capability to explode a nuclear device …4 the Chinese Army in 1961 expected to have to rely on conventional arms for 3 to 5 years.
Position on Disarmament
11. Peking has stated on several occasions, the most recent being April 3rd this year, that she will not be bound by any agreement reached on disarmament to which she herself is not a party. If it were necessary to invite Chinese participation in a nuclear test ban agreement after she had acquired the capability of exploding a nuclear device, she would almost certainly insist that. she be recognised as representing the Government of all China before agreeing to participate. While it is probable that she would adopt a similar attitude before possessing nuclear capability, the degree of her insistence may be modified. If, as we consider possible, there will be a delay in her acquiring nuclear capability, an opportunity may exist for seeking Chinese participation in disarmament negotiations on terms which we would not regard as unacceptable.
[ matter omitted ]
Possible Lines of Western Action
FORMOSA AND THE QUESTION OF CHINESE REPRESENTATION IN THE UNITED NATIONS
15. A particular reason for our wishing to see Formosa remain a member of the United Nations is to retain international guarantees for her security against attack from the mainland; if she were ousted and Communist China seated with her claim to Formosa accepted, the West might find it more difficult to justify assisting with the defence of the island. The passage of the ‘important question’ resolution in 1961 makes it less likely that Peking’s supporters will for some years be able to muster the two-thirds majority required to oust Formosa. On the other hand, the ending of the moratorium means that the question of Chinese representation will be open for substantive discussion each year; the pressures for Peking’s admission are likely to grow, and to grow rapidly when she acquires some nuclear capacity.
16. International support for continuing Formosan membership of the United Nations may in time be eroded. In 1961 there was considerable feeling in favour of a ‘two-Chinas’ solution to the question of Chinese representation; this may be dissipated if it is not exploited.
17. The United States is confronted in its approach to the China question by domestic political opposition in Congress and elsewhere to any change of policy, even for tactical purposes. While members of the Administration (e.g. Stevenson) personally favour some form of ‘two-Chinas’ approach, it is unlikely that the United States will be able to take any initiative in the matter. The Administration might, however, privately welcome an initiative by friendly countries, which it might be unable to support itself, but which could assist in preparing U.S. public opinion for some modification of policy.
18. An approach which has been considered in the Department, and to which Mr. Menzies expressed no objection last year, is one whereby the General Assembly might be asked to approve a resolution saying that ‘The General Assembly invites the People’s Republic and the Republic of China to submit the credentials of their respective delegations to the Secretary-General and recommends that the People’s Republic should take over China’s permanent seat in the Security Council following the General Assembly’s acceptance of the credentials of both delegations to the General Assembly.’
19. The passage of such a resolution would maintain the status quo until Peking changed its attitude and took the seat in the Assembly and Security Council. If Peking refused to consider this, the onus for her continued absence from the United Nations would be on her for having rejected a reasonable offer.
20. The United States would be unlikely to be able to work actively for such a resolution this year. Soundings might, however, be taken with the old Commonwealth in the first place and later with some other Commonwealth countries (e.g. Nigeria, Cyprus, Malaya) and other countries (e.g. Japan and some responsible Latin-Americans), and it might be possible to gather a group of responsible sponsors for such a resolution. If this were so, the United States might agree not to work actively against it.
21. If such a proposal were put forward, the fact that the U.S. was not a co-sponsor would cushion its effect on the morale of Asian allies (including Formosa) who rely on the United States for their defence. Moreover, the Communists would have less justification for maintaining that it was an American device simply to obstruct Peking’s entry into the United Nations.
22. We ourselves would not wish to initiate discussion of such a resolution. Whether the idea should be proceeded with would depend on whether a reliable, responsible and influential group of sponsors could be formed as a result of preliminary soundings among the Commonwealth. New Zealand might well favour action along the above lines; her permanent Mission in New York has expressed some doubts whether the present level of support for Formosan membership of the United Nations can be long maintained. It would be useful to get a high-level United States reaction to the above idea.
Self-Determination for Formosa
23. An alternative approach to the problem of Formosa, which is sometimes canvassed, is that the island should be placed under United Nations protection for a period of time during which the islanders should have a right to self-determination. The difficulties in the way of this are discussed in the section of the brief dealing with the position of the Chinese Nationalist Government.5
[ matter omitted ]6
[NAA: Al0576, xv]
1 The meeting was held in Canberra on 8 and 9 May 1962.
2 Paragraphs 10 and 11 are within a section entitled ‘The short-term problem’.
3 In a part of the brief detailing China’s relations with Southeast Asian states, it was asserted that: ‘Cambodia is receiving Chinese aid. [Cambodian Prince Norodom] Sihanouk continues to take action against Communist subversive activities in Cambodia, but he is apparently convinced that China will ultimately dominate South East Asia and that it is in Cambodia’s national interest to reach an accommodation with Peking’.
4 Matter expunged.
5 The fundamental difficulty identified was Taipei’s claim to be the government of all China.
6 China was discussed at length during the Council meeting. Rusk questioned Casey over Australian wheat sales to China, indicating that the United States might wish to ‘reverse the slogan “Food for Peace” into a slogan of “Peace for Food”, if Chinese actions, for example, in South East Asia, became more aggressive’. Moreover, though concluding his statement with the assurance that he thought trade with China was ‘on balance … a good thing’ for the moment, Rusk warned Casey that ‘many questions were asked in the U.S.A. as to why something had not been done to restrain Australian sales to China’. Concerning Chinese representation in the United Nations, Rusk said that Washington felt no compulsion to make concessions unless the Chinese did so themselves. In terms of tactics, he offered nothing specific, but remarked that the United States could not broach a ‘two Chinas’ approach and nor could the United Nations ever afford to expel the ROC and seat Peking. As for the Security Council, the US would oppose any formula which would give the PRC a permanent seat: the ‘eventual solution might lie … in reconstituting the Security Council, and other United Nations bodies, and in using such devices as temporary membership’.