London, 9 February 1951
SECRET
Thank you for your letter of the 7th February in which you gave your Government’s views on French and Dutch participation in the Colombo Plan.1
You ask for our comments. I do not think I can do better than send you the attached note which sets out in some detail the views of the United Kingdom Government. It seems clear that both Australia and the United Kingdom have been thinking on much the same lines. We are telling our Delegation at Colombo of your Government’s views. They will no doubt take the earliest opportunity to discuss the matter with the Australian Delegation.
Attachment
FRENCH PARTICIPATION IN THE COLOMBO PLAN
The Netherlands
It is the present view of the United Kingdom Government that eventual Dutch participation in the Colombo Plan is desirable. There are, however, powerful arguments in support of the thesis that this matter should be deferred for the present. Relations between the Netherlands and Indonesia are at the moment severely strained over the New Guinea dispute. The Asian members of the Commonwealth consider that the prospect of persuading Indonesia to join the Colombo Plan would be prejudiced were the Netherlands to be brought into the Plan first. They therefore consider that no invitation should be sent to the Dutch until the Indonesians have decided to join the Plan; and that then an invitation should only be sent if Indonesia is in favour of it. The Indonesian attitude to this question is not at present known (though the United Kingdom Ambassador at Djakarta has been instructed to take such informal soundings as he can). Indonesia is sending an observer to the forthcoming meeting in Colombo, and it is hoped that he will be able to indicate his Government’s views on admission of the Dutch.
In the last resort, and for the purposes of the Colombo Plan, it is thought that Indonesian adherence to the Plan is more important than Dutch participation.
United Kingdom policy at Colombo should therefore be—
(a) If by the time the appropriate item on the agenda is reached the Indonesian Government has definitely decided to take a part in the Plan and to become a member of the Consultative Committee, the United Kingdom delegation should:—
(i) do their best to obtain general agreement that the Dutch be invited to take part in the Plan, on the grounds that they can make a real contribution to the Plan, but
(ii) not attempt to force this issue against the wishes of Indonesia.
(b) If at that time Indonesia has not yet decided whether to take part in Plan, the United Kingdom delegation should:—
(i) express general support for Dutch participation on the ground that they can make a real contribution to the Plan.
(ii) be content with a general agreement to re-open the matter when it is known whether Indonesia will take part in the Plan.
France
In the view of the United Kingdom Government it is most desirable that the French should become members of the Consultative Committee. The very great efforts being put forth by France in combating communism in Indo-China required that we should do our utmost to support their position in the Far East. It is clearly vital that the French should continue to hold their position in Indo-China, the loss of which would imperil not merely the success of the Colombo Plan but the security of all South East Asia. Any move on our part which might weaken the French determination to hold on should therefore be avoided.
But in addition to this argument from high policy, it must be admitted that the Associate States of Indo-China will not be able to carry out effective development plans inside or outside the Colombo Plan unless France continues to play a role comparable to that of the
United Kingdom in relation to Malaya in the present emergency.2 It is not only that French help will be needed in drawing up plans for development, but a large part of the finance required must continue to be provided, as at present, by France. The Asian members of the Commonwealth may be inclined to oppose the admission of France to the Consultative Committee. None of them have recognised the present Governments of the Associate States, which they consider to be French puppets. And in the case of India the unsolved question of the French settlements in India creates further friction. An invitation to France to take part is very unlikely to affect the attitude of the Associate States (as distinct from the Dutch Indonesian political imbroglio); indeed they will probably suggest she comes in, though Laos and Cambodia perhaps more enthusiastically than Vietnam. The fact is that, France is already in practice making a substantial contribution to the objectives of the Plan, and since the development programmes of the Associate States are bound to show France as a principal source of external revenue there is no logic in excluding her from what is after all an exercise to be judged from an economic not a political viewpoint. Fortunately there are some grounds for thinking that the opposition to French participation will be considerably less than in the case of the Dutch.
It is the agreed policy of the United Kingdom Government that French participation in the Colombo Plan is desirable; but it would be undesirable to press the question at Colombo, if by doing so the United Kingdom Delegation were likely to provoke an adverse decision in the matter.
The United Kingdom should:—
(i) have discretion to raise the issue of French participation if this is not done by any other Delegation.
(ii) express the support of His Majesty’s Government for admission of France to Colombo Plan, and seek agreement for this.
(iii) if it is not possible to secure immediate agreement to the admission of France, seek agreement that the matter should be considered again at a later stage.
(iv) take into account the views of the Associate States of Indo-China.
[NAA: A3320, 3/4/2/1 part 4]