Canberra, 15 August 1963
565. Secret
I should like you to approach the Malayan authorities as soon as possible regarding our defence arrangements post Malaysia. You might begin by referring to my statement of 27th March, 1963, emphasising that the security of Malaysia is a matter of close concern to Australia even though it has not been embodied in solemn treaty form.1 Cabinet has arrived at the view that the best course in our mutual interest would be for Australia (and New Zealand) to associate itself with the revised United Kingdom–Malaysia arrangements that are to come into force on Malaysia Day in the same way as we are associated with the present ones.2 We visualise a public exchange of letters, the precise text of which we have not yet considered. The text might be purely formal to provide for the change from Malaya to Malaysia; but if the Malayans were to prefer it, we could have a new exchange along the lines of the existing one.
2. Whilst the security of Malaysia is of no less concern to Australia (to put it no higher) than the security of Malaya, the primary responsibility for the security and defence ofMalaysia clearly remains a United Kingdom responsibility.
3. Apart from the circumstances of drawing Australia into over-commitment, the negotiation of a separate agreement at this stage would create difficulties for the Malayans and ourselves without offering to either side any tangible advance on the benefits of the present arrangement. A new agreement would bring the whole question of the presence of Commonwealth forces to public debate in Kuala Lumpur and probably also in Djakarta and Manila.
4. Australia joining the existing bilateral arrangement does not look appropriate and in any case would involve a round of needless diplomatic embarrassment and possibly delay would be involved for no real benefit, Malaysia’s Maphilindo partners having to be consulted.
5. You will appreciate that notwithstanding the fact that the form of the Australian association would be the same vis-a-vis Malaysia as it is at present vis-a-vis Malaya, the extended geographical area and the enhancement of the threat from Indonesia does, in fact, mean that Australia under the new arrangements would be accepting a greater commitment than hitherto.
6. We have informed Wellington and London of what we propose to do and you will no doubt consult your United Kingdom and New Zealand colleagues. We visualise it would be preferable if Australia and New Zealand were to take parallel rather than concerted action—at least at this stage.
[NAA: A1838, 2498/11 part 1]
1 See footnote 4, Document 84.
2 Cabinet Decision No. 974 (FAD), 12 August 1963.