11

Cablegram to Canberra

Singapore, 11 December 1962

294. Secret Priority

Brunei Revolt
Political Assessment

While the considerable degree of planning and organisation of the revolt is apparent, the causes remain uncertain. The Party Rakyat contains many factions but is the only popularly based party in Brunei that had wide support. The incompetence and unprogressive nature of the Government and the administration, the disparity of wealth and poverty, and the efforts of the Sultan to retard Constitutional Government have been contributing factors in creating this support.

2. Nevertheless, Party Rakyat was well placed to gain eventual political power through normal domestic processes. The British actually entertained thoughts of getting Azahari’s support by the prospect of a worthwhile political role in Malaysia.

3. It must be assumed that by background and temperament, Azahari was not attracted to the prospect of a useful but subordinate role in Malaysia. The heady language of the Indonesian revolution seems to have struck a response amongst Brunei Malay elements. The idea of a North Borneo federation with Azahari as Prime Minister, unrealistic as it sounds, was probably a serious goal for these strongly Nationalist elements.

4. There is no evidence of material aid from Indonesia for the revolt. Political links of some importance have clearly developed and there has been movement of groups of Borneo Malays across the border for lengthy stays, according to some reports, for military training. The extent of Indonesian instigation and complicity has not yet been determined, but our own judgment is that contacts appear to fall short of a definite politico-military understanding. Freshly captured documents in Brunei will, presumably, throw light on this.

5. Perhaps the Party Rakyat leaders felt sufficiently emboldened from their contacts that Indonesia would not let them down if the revolt succeeded. If they succeeded in the aim of capturing the Sultan and speaking in his name, they may have thought they could help the situation by an appeal to Indonesia which the British colonialists would have to reckon with.

6. Also, they may have believed that the Sultan and the Federation Government would push Brunei into Malaysia and immediately, thereafter, try and destroy the Party Rakyat.

Foregoing are our own tentative and speculative views.

[NAA: A1945, 162/4/4]