Canberra, 25 September 1963
Confidential
Lydman1 saw Waller this morning and in the course of a long discussion on Indonesia and Malaysia said that he hoped the Tunku would maintain a flexible position and not close the door to future negotiations. It would be dangerous just to sit back and assume that the worst was going to happen without trying to do something about it. He also asked how we thought Indonesia would react to the Prime Minister’s statement, last section of which he was given a copy.2
2. He was told that in our view, the Tunku had had a gruelling time, had behaved generally with skill and restraint and that it was highly unlikely that Australia would be prepared to urge any course on him at present which might look like concessions. It was true that he was adopting an uncompromising attitude but it was difficult to see what else he could do at the present. For our part, we were not assuming that ‘the worst could happen’, but with Indonesia pursuing courses beyond all reason, we saw no present opportunity of Australia influencing her.
3. Indonesia would probably react violently to the Prime Minister’s statement, but it had been made perfectly clear to Sukarno and Indonesian leaders during the Minister’s visit what our obligations to Malaysia would be. We were now saying publicly what they had been told privately ten days earlier.3
[NAA: A1838, 3006/4/7 part 13]
1 Jack Lydman, Counsellor, US Embassy, Canberra.
2 This section set out Australia’s commitment to the defence of Malaysia. See Document 119.
3 See Document 111.