New York, 9 October 1963
UNI 342. 32. Secret Immediate
Please pass following message from Minister1 to Thai Foreign Minister Thanat Khoman, who leaves Paris tomorrow 10th October by air for Vienna at 1250 p.m. your time.
‘I was sorry not to be able to see you again before you left New York. In particular I should have liked the opportunity for a further talk with you about Malaysia.
2. We are all looking for ways which could lead to the genuine acceptance of Malaysia by Indonesia and the Philippines and to the reconciliation of the three countries. You have in mind, I know, that a further meeting of the three at foreign minister level, followed by another summit meeting, could be useful. We had some discussion of this a few days ago. I have the impression that pressures in favour of such a meeting are building up, and I should therefore like to put to you my own ideas about it.
3. As you know I have a good many reservations about the wisdom of an early meeting, especially if this involved some further concession or appearance of concession, on the part of the Tunku, but no real advance by the Philippines and Indonesia from their present positions.
4. The Tunku has made a number of concessions already. As you remember he was widely criticized at home for going to Manila and for agreeing to the Manila Declaration, and I think that if Malaysia should become involved in similar meetings again, even at a lower level, without any guarantee of their results or any steps towards meeting the Tunku’s publicly stated conditions, his domestic position—and indeed his international position—could be considerably weakened. Once he agrees to appear at the negotiating table, the Tunku has nothing to give away which would not weaken him – and surely he would have to give something away if he were to have any hope of bargaining with the Indonesians for recognition, for the lifting of their trade boycott,2 and so on.
5. We should remember too that domestic advantage may be taken of any appearance of weakness on the Tunku’s part—and this could seriously disturb, at the very outset, the internal balance of Malaysia.
6. Malaysia is very newly launched and I do not think it should be faced with anything that might increase its internal difficulties. But even more important to my mind, is the need to consider what the real prospects of success of an early meeting are. If I could believe that Soekarno only wanted some obstacle removed before genuinely accepting Malaysia I would be happy to join in attempts to remove it, but I am bound to say that I do not think that this is at present the case. Soekarno is still saying that he wants to destroy Malaysia, to remove Pax Britannica and establish Pax Indonesiana. Does this offer much hope that an early meeting would be used for any other purpose than to advance those ends?
7. As to the Philippines, I am really somewhat puzzled to know their real aims. I hope that they mean what they say about their lack of hostility towards Malaysia, but I am not yet sufficiently sure of it to feel confident about another tripartite meeting at present. After all they joined in, if they did not actually suggest, the words about the military bases in the Manila Accord.3 Indonesia’s intentions are not much plainer. Where do the Philippines stand?
8. It may, I know, be thought that the situation in Borneo itself, and the prospects of trouble on the borders there, lend urgency to the situation—and this can be presented as an argument for an early meeting. But I must say it does not seem convincing to me. I doubt whether Indonesian activities in Borneo would be entirely called off, meeting or no meeting. I think that we shall simply have to live with them for the present—and I am doubtful whether they will develop to the point of open hostilities on any significant scale.
9. I am not of course saying that there should never be a tripartite meeting or that there is no eventual prospect of reconciliation. And I have the highest respect for your own skill and judgement in these matters. But my view in short is that in present circumstances an early meeting would weaken the Tunku, and would offer the Indonesians another diplomatic success at no cost to themselves. I am coming to think that it is vital to the future stability of the area that their run of unbroken diplomatic success should not continue. Should not our first aim rather be to do what we can to bring the Indonesians to accept that what I have called their policy of hostility does not pay? Is it not now for Soekarno to take the next step and should we not continue to wait for him to do so?’
[ matter omitted ]
[NAA: A6364, NY1963/08]
1 Barwick was in New York for the UN General Assembly (see Document 122).
2 See editorial note, Malaysia Day Aftermath.
3 Paragraph 11 stated: ‘The three Heads of Government further agreed that foreign bases—temporary in nature—should not be allowed to be used directly or indirectly to subvert the national independence of any of the three countries. In accordance with the principle enunciated in the Bandung Declaration, the three countries will abstain from the use of arrangements of collective defence to serve the particular interests of any of the big powers’.