Kuala Lumpur, 9 October 1963
694. Secret
Malaysia
In considering the effects of Indonesian policies against Malaysia, I assume that the adoption of confrontation in its present extreme form and with all its dangers for Indonesia is based on a false analogy—the belief that policies that worked for West Irian can work for Malaysia. The Indonesians can be excused for thinking that it was confrontation against the Dutch that got them West Irian. They only made progress after they adopted this policy and the Western press (not least the Australians) must have helped to convince them that it was the warlike threats rather than an inevitable trend of events that brought them West New Guinea. Malaysia is, however, quite different from West Irian as the Indonesians are bound to discover.
2. The breaking of economic relations should not be critical for this country. It will of course have serious repercussions for Singapore to a degree that cannot be estimated because of uncertainties about smuggling.1 But the Singapore Government has plans to cope even on the most damaging assumption that there is little increase in smuggling. I believe smuggling will increase considerably and that the most serious effect of the embargo will be the dangers of naval clashes in disputed territorial waters.
3. On the political side, Indonesian threats and pressures are having exactly the opposite effect to what Indonesia wants. They are unifying Malaysia and solidifying public opinion behind the Government.
4. Major political groupings which support the Alliance Government are accepting the idea that they are in for a period (probably a long one) of difficult and dangerous relations with Indonesia and are preparing and organising public opinion to meet this situation. Senior Government Ministers, leaders of the three parties in the Alliance are attending rallies and demonstrations throughout the country organised by the Malaysian peoples action committee or local groups. The aim is to stir up patriotic feeling and to make it impossible for Sukarno to appeal directly to the Malays.
5. These rallies are proving highly successful. So much so, that both Razak and Ismail have been urging the Tunku to hold early general elections. They are confident of overwhelming success and point out that even the (� C.A.)2 could win more Chinese support at present. Opposition parties are obviously at a loss and are clearly showing their embarrassment over the Malaysian issue and Indonesian confrontation. The Tunku believes that the Government could easily win an election irrespective of whether it is held now or next year. He may, however, accept the advice to hold an early election especially as it would provide an effective answer to further United States pressure for tripartite talks.3
6. If the Tunku was forced by international pressures to agree to holding tripartite talks without his conditions being met, the situation in Malaysia could change drastically to his disadvantage. I appreciate that Sukarno may need a ladder to get off his limb, but it should not be a ladder pulled from under the Tunku.
7. Accepting that Sukarno would never accept conditions laid down by the Tunku we might consider whether in due course that it might be possible to arrange a meeting while maintaining these conditions by a third party presenting them in different wrappings. Such a third party could be Thailand, the U.A.R., the United States or even ourselves. My feeling (subject to Malaysian sensibilities) is that after a preliminary official meeting in say Bangkok or United Nations Headquarters the Summit Meeting might be held in Kuala Lumpur with perhaps a subsequent meeting in Djakarta.
8. It would, however, be premature to attempt such an initiative before we were satisfied that Indonesia realises that it can not succeed with confrontation and is prepared to accept the idea of Malaysia in the sense of continuing normal political and commercial relations and abstaining from attempts to disrupt or overthrow it by force.
9. It seems that for some months the best we can hope for is a situation in which Indonesia does nothing drastic, and can be made to realise the futility of, and the price she is paying for her present course. In the meantime, we might hope that the Philippines with judicious pressure will take steps to extract itself from playing ‘Laurel’ to Indonesia’s ‘Hardy’4 and take steps towards accepting Malaysia.
10. One of our main problems may be the dispensing of bromides to the Americans. You might like to consider whether further high level talks on Indonesia between United States, United Kingdom, Australia and New Zealand might be held in Washington.
[NAA: A 183 8, 3006/4/7 part 14]
1 The straits between the Indonesian islands of Sumatra and the Riau group, and Singapore and the south west coast of the Malayan peninsula, are narrow and smugglers had operated in the area for centuries. At the time of Indonesia’s imposed boycott, smuggling had been claimed to compose up to 30% of Singapore’s imports—it would have thus seemed the logical way of overcoming Indonesia’s policy.
2 Text corrupted in cable transmission. Probably, ‘M.C.A.’, Malaysian Chinese Association—the Chinese component of the Alliance.
3 See Document 118.
4 Reference to the team of US comic film actors in the late 1920s-mid-1940s, Stan Laurel and Oliver Hardy, whose comedy derived from portraying the relationship between seemingly dominant (Hardy) and meek (Laurel) personalities.