Kuala Lumpur, 14 October 1963
704. Secret Priority
Malaysia
Your telegram 7411 request for elaboration of paragraphs 6 and 7 of my telegram 694.2
Tunku has recovered from damage to his prestige resulting from Manila talks but he could not get away with another ‘humbling’ of himself. Much in Malaysian politics depends on the Tunku’s image and to damage it would be dangerous. In the present mood of the country the idea that the Tunku should draw back from his conditions for a meeting is not acceptable. For him to do so would cause widespread dismay and a dangerous loss of morale. The following are the main factors.
(a) Singapore Government would react strongly, especially if as seems likely there are no assurances for the end of Indonesian attempts to damage the Singapore economy. Lee Kuan Yew would be tempted to exploit any apparent weakening of the Tunku’s position especially with the Chinese and in the Borneo territories.
(b) The Borneo territories on whose support the Alliance will depend for a majority in the new Parliament would be greatly alarmed by any suggestion that Malaysia is still negotiable or that Malaysia might bow to pressure from Indonesia especially while border incidents continue. Sabah and Sarawak are not only dependent on Kuala Lumpur for defence but need firm and resolute leadership when they are facing increasing dangers of infiltration and subversion.
(c) Opposition parties appealing to Chinese chauvinism would make capital out of suggestions that Maphilindo may be resurrected.
(d) M.C.A. was suspicious of Maphilindo from the beginning wondering what place there was for Chinese minorities in a federation of Malay nations. Indonesia’s subsequent policy, its statement that the rupture of economic relations had been planned for a long time, and the victory of Lee in Singapore have all hardened the position of the M.C.A. The Party is now making a big effort in the National Solidarity Rallies3 and apparently feels that its new espousal of Malaysian Nationalism is improving its electoral prospects.
(e) Tensions within U.M.N.O. could again emerge between the groups wishing to be less or more accommodating to Indonesia if there were suggestions that the Tunku may waver on those conditions.
(f) Indonesian threat is helping to create or foster a feeling of Malaysian identity. It is ironic that an extreme manifestation of Indonesian Nationalism is achieving what might otherwise have taken many years of hard work. The Tunku summed it up at a meeting of the Grand Alliance Council saying confrontation was a ‘blessing in disguise’ because it was helping to unite the people of Malaysia. It is no doubt a mixed blessing but the Tunku’s choice of words shows how he is limited by the present state of popular feeling.
(g) I believe Sukarno wants to change the Tunku’s leadership of the Malays. I personally deplore the burning of Sukarno in effigy but this is an understandable reaction of a people and not only Malays but most Malayans who have resented deeply the attacks made on the Tunku in recent months and the unrestrained abuse which is still coming notably over the Radio North Kalimantan and Radio Free Malaya.4
2. Indonesia’s readiness for further talks is not unexpected. Indonesia may well be banking on the probability that Malaysia’s friends will bring pressure to bear on her to back down. The policy of Indonesians is obviously directed to creating internal strains within Malaysia and they may reasonably hope that if the Tunku does give way he and Alliance will suffer a defeat that will open the way for the disintegration of Malaysia. I think this danger exists.
3. Australia, along with Malaysia has an interest in ensuring that Indonesia is not encouraged in its present policy of warlike threats and pressures.
4. Tunku and Malaysia only have so long to gain from talks if they can know that Indonesia will accept Malaysia and live peacefully with it in spirit of co-operation. This is all Indonesia has to offer but there seems no early prospect that she will be prepared to offer it.
5. If eventually Indonesia realises that she must accept Malaysia it might be possible for a third party to make it easier for her by presenting the conditions for talks in new wrappings. For example, recent mass rallies in Malaysia provide an opportunity for an appeal to both parties to end hostile demonstrations and propaganda.
6. A third party could also stress to Indonesia that negotiations, to be fruitful, must be between equals and that no party should be under duress. (Indonesia has used this argument herself.) This would mean that Indonesia would be requested to agree that in any meeting at official or ministerial level in Bangkok the representatives of Malaysia would be recognised as such and would be able to participate in circumstances where there were no direct or indirect threats to Malaysia.
7. After the resumption of diplomatic relations there could be a summit meeting in Kuala Lumpur to consider ways and means of promoting regional co-operation in the spirit of Maphilindo. Kuala Lumpur as a site would depend upon Malaysian reactions but it might be possible to use it to promote the prestige of the Tunku and Malaysia. A follow-up summit meeting in Djakarta would seem desirable to assuage Indonesian [�]5 to act as a safeguard against the sudden resumption of ‘hostile confrontation’ and to ensure adherence to the agreements reached, which is one of the Tunku’s conditions.
8. I would stress again that I believe it would be premature and dangerous for Malaysia to participate in Tripartite meetings at any level now. For some time I believe the best we can hope for is that Thanat Khoman should maintain his good offices with the three parties with a view to achieving a cooling off period.
[NAA: A1838, 3034/7/1/1 part 2]
1 Not published.
2 Document 126.
3 See paragraphs 3 and 4, Document 126.
4 Radio Kalimantan Utara and Radio KMM—Indonesian radio broadcasts into Malaysia.
5 Possibly, ‘sensibilities’. Text corrupted in original document.