Canberra, 31 October 1963
799. Secret Immediate
Reference our telegram No. 796.2
As you know from his talks in Washington one of the factors in the Minister’s mind has been the risk that Lee would attempt to exploit a move by the Tunku for a conference. The Minister has no faith in the outcome of a conference as yet but it might be as well if Lee were denied the opportunity to say that the Tunku’s recalcitrance had unnecessarily prolonged the damage to Singapore.
2. Lee’s arguments will carry great weight in Singapore where there is probably an attitude of disdain for what the commercial Chinese would regard as the emotional excesses of the Malays. Lee’s arguments will also make an impression on the Americans as supporting the case for negotiations. Accordingly reaction of Malayans to Lee’s speech should not be merely irritation, but we would hope they would look at it seriously.
3. We do not know the detailed terms of the Philippines for the resumption of diplomatic relations3 but we think the points in above paragraphs add to the already strong arguments for a real effort to reach a settlement with the Philippines. We hope that the Malaysians will go as far as they can to respond quickly and positively and that the Tunku will not merely sit tight until after the Philippine elections. Nor would we encourage the Tunku to insist on the observance of various features of the Manila Agreements such as ‘welcoming the establishment of Malaysia’ and formally accepting the United Nations report. We do not think the Malaysian position with Indonesia would be weakened if these aspects were put aside. The important thing with the Philippines is to re-establish diplomatic relations so as to detach them from Indonesia.
4. Pursuing this line of thought further, we think some examination should be given to the means whereby, without loss of face, the Tunku might appear more willing for a conference and not open to the criticism of rigidity. We note that the British have already suggested to the Tunku that it is against Malaysia’s own interests to go on talking about their ‘preconditions’ since, in fact, it is Sukarno who is setting intolerable conditions for any talks. You might add your support to this argument. Similarly the Tunku might develop the position that there is no evidence that the Indonesians want a conference. No approaches have been made. No statements have been issued. The evidence is that Indonesia is still seeking to ‘crush’ Malaysia. Worked into this could be the inference that the Tunku is not against a conference if the prospects were reasonable.
5. He could safely appear to be more flexible if the negotiations with the Philippines succeed.
6. For Washington. Please give the State Department a broad indication of the Minister’s thinking.
[NAA: A1838, 3006/2/2 part 3]
1 Repeated to Washington 2730.
2 29 October. It referred to a reported speech by Lee Kuan Yew to the Foreign Correspondents’ Association in Singapore in which he spoke of the need for Malaysian-Indonesian difficulties to be resolved, and of his fear for ‘Balkanisation’ of Southeast Asia. DBA officers were concerned that Lee’s remarks were driven by the political repercussions in Singapore of Indonesia’s trade boycott. They thought that the Indonesian leadership could interpret the speech as evidence that Indonesia’s policy was causing economic difficulties in Singapore and political friction between Singapore and Kuala Lumpur.
3 At this stage, the various Philippine statements being made on the conditions for recognition of Malaysia were inconsistent. However, one condition that Lopez claimed to have submitted to the Malaysians on 18 September, and that he announced publicly in Manila on 2 October, was Malaysian attendance at a tripartite conference. This challenged Malaysian insistence on the re-establishment of diplomatic relations before they could agree to further talks.