Jakarta, 28 November 1963
1143. Secret Immediate
Malaysia
When we had disposed of the border matter1 and the fuss over the Colombo Plan,2 1 asked Subandrio whether he yet saw any light on Malaysia. He said that he did not. The Tunku, encouraged by the British because of their policy of containing Indonesia, and supported also by us, was convinced that he could refuse to deal with Indonesia until Sukarno had been got rid of. The Tunku was convinced of the imminent collapse of the Sukarno regime and was arrogantly refusing to come to any Three Power meetings. Indeed Thanat Khoman had told Subandrio in Bangkok3 that the United Kingdom and Australia were actively discouraging him from doing so on the grounds that he could only lose in such a meeting. (This information, which is true, does not surprise me. Perhaps we underestimate the basic tendency of our Asian neighbours to exchange titbits of information about the white foreigners.) I turned it aside by telling Subandrio that we had indeed not been encouraging anyone to come to [the] conference tables, as it was he who had said to me that others should keep their noses out.
2. I suggested to Subandrio that Malaysia was a fact of life, that Indonesian policy would have the effect of keeping the British in this part of the world when Indonesia wanted them to go, and that present Indonesian policy was only delaying if not destroying Indonesia’s role as the leader of South East Asia. He contested the assertion that Malaysia was a fact of life. He said that even Malaya was not. The stirring up of public opinion against Indonesia was agitating the Malayan population and would result in anti-Chinese feelings. Malayan Chinese feeling would increase. Indonesia could wait for a couple of years and then make up her mind whether Malaysia was a fact of life, which he thought it wasn’t. Indonesia was prepared to see Malaya as part of the Commonwealth, even in association with Singapore as part of the Commonwealth, and with North Kalimantan as another part of the Commonwealth, but it was not and would never be, prepared to accept Malaysia as such. I told him this was unrealistic policy. Britain, supported by us, was committed to see that Malaysia, as constituted, worked. Subandrio was unmoved. He doesn’t think it will.
3. He said that the bases existed, and that Indonesia conceded Britain’s right to be there. But if it came to war, and it well might with people being killed every day, and because of Indonesia’s determination to match British strength in Borneo man for man, then even if Indonesia were ‘licked’ as she well might be, as he conceded that the British were relatively stronger, it would mean the end of Britain in South East Asia forever. Indonesia could be patient, she could go through the same troubles as the United States, but in the end she would win.
4. I told Subandrio that I regarded the idea of prolonged confrontation as excessively dangerous. If they confronted Malaysia for years the chances of something really unpleasant happening were high. Subandrio said that we must face the facts. Indonesia was not confronting Malaysia, it was confronting the British. Malaysia was merely the front for British power. I suggested that we had argued this one before and that understanding seemed impossible, and that, moreover, apparently this confrontation of the British now included Australia. Subandrio conceded that this was so but that we had chosen ourselves to join the ranks of those to be confronted. I told him that this could hardly have come as a surprise as he had known clearly and for months where we stood. Nevertheless we were unattracted by the prospect of years and years of scratchy relations in the area, with the possibility of worse. We did not, however, propose to change our position on Malaysia, which we accepted and would support.
5. Subandrio said that if the British could be got away, then the way was open for an enlarged Maphilindo, which would be non-racial and would need another name. The Thais were interested, so were the Cambodians and the Laotians. I asked him whether he ever thought of Australia in this context and he said ‘of course and I said so to Thanat Khoman’. Defence of the area, in his view, is the responsibility of Indonesia, in association with others such as Australia. Did anyone imagine that the Tunku was a bulwark of strength against China?
6. I derive no comfort from my talk with Subandrio. He is intransigent, and, I think, reflects the fact that the Indonesian Government from Sukarno down, has been caught up in its anti-Malaysian propaganda and in its pretensions to grandeur. I see little present prospect of their backing down and considerable dangers in the future. In present circumstances, it is possible that they couldn’t back down if they wished to. Subandrio says that only the President supported his trip to Bangkok and that the longer the present situation went on the more Indonesian policy would be dominated by ‘extremists’. He made one very scornful reference to Nasution.
[NAA: A1209, 1963/6637 part 4]
1 Demarcation of the border between East and West New Guinea was an issue of continuing concern. Barwick had advised Subandrio on 13 September that an Australian photographic survey of the border was almost complete, and gained his agreement to the placing of markers around 400m inside Australian territory, on the tracks which crossed the border, as a guide to approximately where the border lay. Indonesian soldiers had allegedly crossed the border and removed one of these markers and thrown it in the Sepik River.
2 A reference to recent Indonesian press reports that Indonesia intended to reject Colombo Plan aid from Australia. Subandrio told Shann that Indonesia would not disturb existing arrangements or plans, but that it could ‘be embarrassing both for the donor and the recipient’ in view of Australia’s attitude on the Malaysia issue, if Indonesia asked for additional aid in the future.
3 See footnote 10, Document 133.