Canberra, 16 December 1963
5286. Secret Immediate
Please convey the following message from me to Mr Duncan Sandys immediately. Message begins.
I want you to know that our defence machinery is examining, as a matter of urgency, the list of ways in which you think Australia could come to the assistance of Malaysia either in the present situation or in circumstances of a more serious nature which might subsequently develop. We have not yet been approached by the Malaysian Government but we are proceeding on the basis that their suggestions, if made, would be substantially along the lines of the United Kingdom Chiefs of Staff paper.2 We are asking Malaysians to avoid the formality of a ‘request’ at this stage, which, it seems to us, should come only after our consideration of the matter when we know and have indicated what we are in a position to do.3
2. However, in deciding whether we should meet any of the Malaysian request[s], I am sure you appreciate that we must examine carefully the international political implications and the timing of any military response in relation to current intelligence information and assessments of Indonesian intentions. Any military assistance which we may give should be clearly related to a need and not merely be a gesture. I do not think any gestures of support are called for in the present circumstance. The Prime Minister’s statement in Parliament on 25th September was a clear and grave expression of Government policy and it was expressly related to Indonesian aggression. Anything we do should be strictly within the terms of that statement and not an addition to it. It gave the Malaysians what they needed. It followed a series of private warnings to the Indonesians.
3. What we have to do is make a careful, rational judgement as to how Australia best serves the common interest in frustrating the Indonesian attempt to ‘destroy’ Malaysia. We still retain some influence in Djakarta where we cannot rely on other Western countries to engage in realistic exchanges on our behalf. (This is confirmed by the guarded response that the Western Europeans and Japanese are giving to the representations of our two Governments on economic aid.)4 We have to weigh the question whether the value of Australia’s military contribution at the present scale of border intrusions particularly in the light of forces already available, is greater than the loss which might be incurred in Australian influence in Djakarta.
4. This leads me to ponder whether the common purpose would not best be met by a carefully graduated Australian response to the Indonesian harassment. This could give us the means of retaining some scope for exercising a deterrent role in Indonesia. The A.N.Z.U.S. connection gives this added meaning as the Indonesians know what the Treaty says and would probably assess that there was an understanding that American involvement could follow. It is heartening that the Americans have given them some direct indications of the applicability of A.N.Z.U.S.5 Whatever the nature of the Government’s decision on the list of possible additional contributions there is merit in our having room to give clear warnings to the Indonesians—which I should intend to do—that we have exercised restraint about stationing forces in Borneo in the hope that their border incursions would cease, but that any decisions on expanding direct Australian military involvement depend on what they do. The terms of the Prime Minister’s declaration, which the Indonesians have studied, will have made it clear to them that our military presence in Borneo does not follow automatically, but comes as the consequence of a substantial decision that the conditions for giving support to our friends have come into operation.
5. Such a course, if it can be devised and followed, should help Australia with Asian opinion. I may say that we have examined the retaliation Indonesia can bring into play, such as interference with our civil and military air and shipping connections and meddling in New Guinea, and we are developing plans to meet these contingencies. But we must be ready to meet an Indonesian attempt to discredit us in Asia. Australia has gone a significant distance towards answering the problem of living in useful association with the newly independent countries of Asia and a basis has been developed for co-operation in preserving security and resisting aggression. In respect of Indonesia, the positive actions we take should continue to be framed and executed in the manner best calculated to carry Asian opinion with us.
You can rest assured that we shall consider the matter most earnestly.
Message ends.
[NAA: A1838, 270/1/1 part 2]
1 Sir Eric Harrison, High Commissioner in London.
2 See Document 135.
3 See Document 141.
4 Japan and a number of Western European countries had commercial or economic interests in Indonesia. Japan, in particular, argued that continued aid was necessary to keep the Indonesian economy afloat.
5 In an interview with Subandrio on 13 November, Francis Galbraith, Counsellor, US Embassy, Jakarta (Ambassador Jones was in Washington for consultations), reminded the Indonesian Foreign Minister that under ANZUS the US was committed to help Australia and New Zealand should their military support of Malaysia require it, and thus, if there was open war between Indonesia and Malaysia, ‘the United States would very likely be drawn in’.