Canberra, 27 December 1963
951. Secret
Please pass following message to the Tunku and ensure that Razak is informed as soon as practicable.
Begins:
‘My colleagues and I have considered further Australian military assistance to Malaysia. Your people will now have had an account from Critchley of the outcome of our consideration.1 I am grateful to you for your forbearance and consideration in refraining from making a formal request. Matters of this grave importance must not be determined against the background of publicity which would sooner or later appear after a formal request. Like you, we much prefer to do our business on the basis of informal and continuing consultations which works so well between us.2
We have not gone as far as the proposals in the paper of the British Chiefs of Staff. I am sure that you will readily understand the reasons which have weighed with us. After careful consideration our judgment was that further Australian military contributions should not be made ahead of need, the reasons for this conclusion being explained later in this message.
We wish you to know that this does not amount to any reduction or qualification of the policy which the Prime Minister announced on 25th September in Parliament. Indeed, I believe the position of the Government has been strengthened in this respect as a result of the elections3 in which policy towards Malaysia was an issue. At the same time, our elections did not take on an openly anti-Indonesian character which was a good thing as I believe Australia still retains some influence in Djakarta and it is important in our common interests that we preserve our position there as long as we can.
Briefly the position we have now reached as a result of our latest deliberations is that the Australian Air Force Units at Butterworth have been placed on defence alert for use in the air defence system of Malaysia; that the Australian naval components on the Far East Station are available for patrol duties; and we are agreeable to the Australian element of the 28th Brigade Engineers’ Squadron engaging in airfield construction in Eastern Malaysia, should it be decided to send the Squadron there.
The Government also agrees to the use of Cocos Island by British V-Bombers and Long Range Transport Aircraft.
We are not proposing at the moment to give publicity to the precise forms of our contribution to the defence of Malaysia. It may be useful to do so after we have informed the Indonesians. This we intend to do in the course of further early communications with them.
You will appreciate that our decisions have been made on the assessment that the general military situation will not deteriorate rapidly. We shall continue to watch the situation most carefully in collaboration with yourselves and the British in order to be ready for further rapid action as necessary.
We have given much careful and sober thought as to how Australia best serves our mutual concern to frustrate the present Indonesian policies. We believe our best course is to combine an adequate military contribution with realistic exchanges at the political level. In other words, we aim at a carefully graduated Australian response to the Indonesian harassment. This could give us the means of retaining some scope for exercising a deterrent role in Indonesia.
There is merit in our having room to give clear warnings to the Indonesians—which I should intend to do—that we have exercised restraint about stationing Forces in Borneo in the hope that their border incursions would cease, but that any decisions on expanding direct Australian military involvement depend on what they do in this and other respects. The terms of the Prime Minister’s declaration, which the Indonesians have studied, will have made it clear to them that our military presence in Borneo does not follow automatically, but comes as the consequence of a substantial decision that the conditions for giving support to our friends have come into operation.
We do not think the Indonesians want war. The nature of their build-up in Borneo does not as yet suggest military escalation. What Sukarno may do is dangerous and unpredictable, but he may not be able to compel the Indonesian Armed Forces on a course which would end in disaster.
We suspect that there may be two main points of pressure and influence at work on the Indonesian Armed Forces. First, there must be a worry that a serious military set-back—which they know could be inflicted upon them—would weaken the Army in its major internal struggle against the Communists. Secondly, there is the worry that the sharp economic and social deterioration now under way strengthens the Communists. The Armed Forces do not like Malaysia and they believe they have to lead ‘nationalist’ movements, but in practice it is more and more apparent that the Communists are the sole benefactors from the anti-Malaysia policies.
I do not pretend to be sanguine about developments in Indonesia, but it is perhaps to the leaders of the Armed Services rather than Sukarno (and Subandrio) that we must look for some hope of moderation. At any rate, it is our intention to exploit as best we can such points of pressure and influence. I do not think we lose anything by the attempt.
I should add in this message that my colleagues and I will wish to examine, as soon as practicable, the measures we might take to contribute to the build-up of the Malaysian Armed Forces. We greatly admire the resolution and skill with which you are strengthening your own resources for defence.
Finally, I should like to add a word about the question of external aid for Indonesia. I am anxious to retain the framework of Colombo Plan association with Indonesia. We are not encouraging discussion of new aid but aim to carry on as far as practical four of five existing small projects.4 They can be defined as being for welfare purposes or for contact with the community. They in no way support the balance of payments or help ease the economic crisis. Critchley has full details of our projects and the state of their accomplishment. We have some 250 Indonesian Government-sponsored students in our institutions. Educational training in Australia and technical assistance have the long term aim of creating a more responsible and efficient technical and administrative leadership in Indonesia.
With the return of the Government to office I look forward to our continued personal association in these common endeavours. The coming months will not see any slackening of the need for strong and sensitive Malaysian and Australian diplomatic activity. We must ensure that full responsibility for the present tensions continues to lie demonstrably at the door of the Indonesians. While I do not see solutions coming easily, as you know, nevertheless, I do not lose heart in the search for avenues for easing and not exacerbating tension consistently with our responsibilities and principles.’
[NAA: A1209, 1964/6040 part 1]
1 On 21 December, Critchley had been sent a brief resume of the decision taken on 19 December (see footnote 15, Document 139), and instructed to give the Malaysian authorities preliminary advice on the matter.
2 Critchley also had been instructed to ‘impress upon [the Malaysians] that any publicity at this stage would be most undesirable as it could be open to misconstruction within Indonesia’. The Tunku was ‘quite satisfied’ with this approach, telling Critchley that ‘he had only raised the subject with us at this stage because the British had insisted … he had not liked the idea and approved our suggestion of preliminary informal discussions that would not be embarrassing to either Government’.
3 The Menzies coalition government had been returned to power with an increased majority in the federal election held on 30 November.
4 Australia was assisting with equipment for Radio Indonesia, inter-communications equipment for Indonesia’s Civil Air Services, a road construction unit for Timor, food technology equipment for research, and horses for the production of anti-serum.