Canberra, 30 December 1963
955. Confidential
Malaysia and the United Nations
Reference your telegram No. 930.1
The question of involving the United Nations directly in support of Malaysia has been under careful study. It is a course of action which on first view appears to have attractions and at some point of time may well become necessary. At present, however, our view is still that we should not court United Nations intervention at this time. From the comments we have seen Britain and New Zealand are similarly cautious. Our reasons include:
(a) The considerable success which Malaysia enjoyed in securing United Nations recognition is not a sure guide for what would happen if an issue of a threat to the peace went to the United Nations. A number of Afro-Asian countries would hedge considerably. Countries like the UAR which have given Malaysia valuable support to date would be obliged to look for compromises and intermediate positions when such issues as the British bases in Malaysia and the presence of British forces on the island of Borneo were argued. An impasse could result.
(b) Because of the relatively low level of incidents we may not be sufficiently able to rouse other countries in the United Nations. Malaysia may not wish2 a clear-cut verdict and it would be more difficult for the United Nations to be moved in the manner we want if and when a serious crisis arises.
(c) A more intangible consideration is that Indonesia should be brought face to face with reality and made to realise that the techniques used over West Irian will not continue to bring gain and that they are paying a heavy economic price. Nothing gives a better outlet for ideological diversions than the United Nations General Assembly.
2. It is not clear from your telegram how far the Malaysians wish to go in involving the United Nations. Do they simply have in mind a request to the Secretary-General to circulate to all missions the text of their protest note concerning Indonesian violations of their air space? Will this be the forerunner of circulation of protests of violations of Malaysian territory on the ground and of protests against aid and comfort for ‘volunteers’, propaganda warfare etc? Do they envisage asking the Secretary-General to do something other than simply circulate their communications?
3. There are probably some advantages in building up a record of no documentation within the United Nations. We should like to be confident, however, that Malaysia and its friends could determine the use that is made of the United Nations without the risk of losing control of developments within the organisation. You might suggest to the Malaysians and to your British and New Zealand colleagues that our respective Missions in New York should jointly study the problems of procedure and tactics.
[NAA: A1838, 3006/4/7 part 18]
1 28 December, reporting that Malaysia had sent a strong protest to Indonesia over seven violations of Malaysian air space between 13 November and 8 December, and that similar protests on violations of Malaysian territory on the ground were being prepared. Critchley said there was growing support for involving the UN and he asked that he be given permission ‘to encourage this trend’.
2 Cablegram 960 to Kuala Lumpur, dated 31 December, amended this word to read ‘get’.