Kuala Lumpur, 31 December 1963
939. Secret Immediate
Malaysian Complaint to United Nations
At short notice this morning Razak (in Tunku’s absence) called Wade, Bottomley1 (Acting British High Commissioner) and me to meeting with Dato Ismail, Tan Siew Sin, Donald Stephens, Tunku Ngah and himself to discuss Indonesian attack on police post in Kalabakan, about 30 miles from Tawau.2
2. Razak said only a brief preliminary report was available but clearly a ‘big Indonesian Army force’ was involved. Casualties were soldiers killed 1 officer and 7 other ranks and 29 wounded (including 2 seriously) and 1 civilian killed and 5 wounded. He had called the meeting to seek our advice on what action Malaysia might take in the United Nations.
3.Stressing that I was speaking in personal capacity only I supported the view that United Nations Secretary-General should be informed because:—
(a) Of seriousness of attack and its effect on morale in Malaysia.
(b) The importance of keeping the record straight in United Nations on Indonesian aggression.
(c) Failure to react could give the impression that Malaysia had no confidence in case before United Nations and might give Indonesia opportunity subsequently to take the initiative herself.
(d) Complaint would help to bring home to friendly countries (e.g. United States) seriousness of Indonesia’s aggression.
4. Consideration was also given to making a complaint to the Security Council. There was general agreement that this should not be done without further careful study particularly as Indonesia might be able to turn United Nations debate into demand for withdrawal of foreign forces. I suggested that while there was opportunity for effective propaganda about Indonesian aggression the only positive result Malaysia could reasonably expect would be United Nations presence in Borneo. Likely advantages and disadvantages of this might be analysed in detail as a basis for considering further United Nations action.
5. It was agreed that Malaysia on its own responsibility should make a formal report to the United Nations Secretary-General and privately seek his advice on whether any further action should be taken. This report will be made without delay so that Government can assure Parliament if questions are asked that action has already been taken. It is accepted that Indonesia will probably claim that Tunku forces were involved and that Malaysians should gather facts to supplement the complaint as effectively and as early as possible.
6. It was also agreed that the three High Commissioners should seek the views of their respective Governments and suggest that the Governments keep representatives in New York informed so that the latter can consult with the Malaysian Delegation in New York.
7. Stephens was concerned about the serious effect the raid would have on morale in Sabah and asked whether it might be possible to send a squadron of jets (Australian Sabres, for example) to reassure the population. Ismail quickly pointed out that this would not be appropriate. Instead he suggested and it was agreed that a program prepared by the Psychological Warfare Section of the Information Department should be put into effect without further delay. Stephens told me that he would now have to cancel his plans to visit Africa, with Lee Kuan Yew (my telegram 931 of 28th December)3 but would send somebody else in his place.
8. Grateful for instructions particularly with reference to paragraph 6.4
[NAA: A1838, 3006/4/9 part 2]
1 James Bottomley, UK Deputy High Commissioner, Malaysia.
2 Kalabakan is to the west of Tawau, which is situated on the southeast coast of Sabah, close to the northeastern border of Indonesian Kalimantan.
3 Cablegram reported that Lee Kuan Yew and Stephens were to lead a mission to ten African countries during January 1964 to ‘explain Malaysia and its dispute with Indonesia and the Philippines’ and to counter Indonesia’s propaganda campaign that Malaysia was a neo-colonialist project.
4 On 2 January, Critchley was advised that Barwick agreed that Malaysia should make a formal report to the UN Secretary-General about the Kalabakan attack without making a formal complaint to the Security Council and endorsed Critchley’s reported views (see paragraph 3). Critchley was also instructed to advise the Malaysian Government ‘to proceed carefully in their approaches to the UN and in the first instance concentrate on keeping the records straight regarding Indonesian activities’.