Kuala Lumpur, 21 January 1964
79. Secret
Malaysia—Kennedy’s Visit1
Before lunch today, Kennedy gave Bottomley and me a half hour briefing on his talks so far including meeting with Tunku this morning (21st January).
2. At their meeting in Tokyo Sukarno had agreed to announce on Thursday the calling off of military confrontation provided there was a simultaneous announcement (it was not clear by whom) that Tunku was agreeable to tripartite talks. Kennedy had thought it might be desirable to begin the talks at Foreign Minister level and this was acceptable to the Indonesians. There had been no reference to the withdrawal of British forces. The Japanese ‘unfortunately’ had raised the question of withdrawing forces from both sides of the border and this had led to press speculation about demands for withdrawal of British forces.
3. The Indonesians had accepted the idea of somebody from the area—preferably the Japanese—observing the truce. Kennedy did not think that this was necessary but he saw some value in having a third party that could be consulted if incidents took place and could investigate complaints on the spot.
4. Kennedy spoke of the truce coming into effect in about a week’s time and the talks starting on about 7th February. Jani2 thought there would be no difficulty as far as Indonesian regular forces were concerned in implementing the truce within a week but said it would be more difficult to withdraw irregulars who had almost reached stage of operating independently. Kennedy had agreed with Indonesians that if infiltrators could be withdrawn without bloodshed so much the better, but he pointed out that British could not be expected to refrain from taking action against gangs if they established contact.
5. Kennedy said he had come away from Tokyo satisfied that Sukarno wanted a settlement. In Manila Macapagal had confirmed that this was also his opinion and believed that talks could prove successful. Macapagal wanted the Thais as well as the Japanese to observe truce and did not think Japanese would mind.
6. At their meeting this morning, the Tunku expressed his basic distrust of Sukarno and his motives. From what Kennedy said I gathered that Tunku had rehearsed at length and along familiar lines his grievances against Indonesians. He had been hesitant about agreeing to talks and Kennedy had failed to obtain a firm decision.
7. The Tunku said he would meet Macapagal and if this went well, he would be prepared to participate in tripartite talks. In reply, Kennedy stressed that he brought a firm commitment by Sukarno to call off military confrontation this week. To delay agreement until after the Tunku had talks with Macapagal would mean jeopardising prospects of a truce. He told us (and presumably the Tunku) with great firmness that he was not going to sit around on the beach in Malaysia until the Tunku made up his mind.
8. Kennedy argued that Malaysians had nothing to lose. Calling off military confrontation was in their interests and involved a considerable public concession by Sukarno. If the talks failed the parties might be back where they started, fighting in the jungle, but nothing would have been lost. Kennedy was not prepared to argue this latter point. He insisted that if the Malaysians showed any political skill they would be able to come out of the talks well.
9. Kennedy agreed that representatives of Malaysia would presumably be accepted as such, but clearly did not expect any explicit recognition of Malaysia by Indonesia or the Philippines in advance of the talks. I suggested that there might be disadvantages for Malaysia if question of recognition became the subject of negotiation. Kennedy argued we had to expect an opening speech by Subandrio but that after a couple of days talk the parties might be able to reach a solution. He implied that the Indonesians would have to accept Malaysia as a fact. On truce supervision the Tunku had turned down suggestion that the Japanese might be used. He had plumped for United Nations observers and failing this for the Thais.
10. Kennedy said he had been turning over how the talks might be started and had concluded that best course might be to let Thanat Khoman arrange them in Bangkok. He added that this had been confused by Sihanouk’s visit3 (with which he showed impatience) and he admitted that Macapagal seemed to favour Phnom Penh. He thought that if the Tunku met Macapagal at Phnom Penh the tripartite talks could perhaps be held in Bangkok. Subsequently, at lunch Kennedy said main complaint he had heard from Indonesians and Philippines was not about British troops, but about the announcement of the date for Malaysia before U Thant’s mission had been completed. The Philippines and the Indonesians obviously regarded Malaysia and the way it was brought about as a British plot. Wade and I who were sitting with him endeavoured to explain events leading up to Malaysia but he was not greatly interested in these details. In general I had impression that he was not very interested in details at all but was concentrating on ending the fighting in Borneo and getting talks started. He seems to regard the parties around a table as a major accomplishment and to consider that it will then be up to the parties to reach a settlement among themselves. In stressing the importance of ending the fighting he referred to dangers of escalation and took it for granted that Britain and Malaysia might be obliged to take the war into Indonesian territory if they were to cope effectively with continued Indonesian raids and infiltration.
11. At lunch, Kennedy spoke with some warmth about the failure of Indonesian leaders to promote the welfare of the Indonesian people. Despite his strong criticism of Indonesian leaders he referred with obvious feeling to the catastrophe that would befall us if Sukarno and a hundred million Indonesians went communist.
[NAA: A1838, 3006/4/9 part 2]
1 See editorial note, The Kennedy Mediation Talks
2 Lieutenant General Achmad Jani (Yani), Chief of Staff of the Indonesian Army.
3 Sihanouk made a sudden ‘private visit to his friend Tunku Abdul Rahman’ in Kuala Lumpur on 20 January, coinciding with Kennedy’s visit. On his arrival he announced that his purpose was to initiate a meeting in Cambodia between Macapagal and the Tunku and do what he could to ensure that tripartite talks were held. He also declared that he was willing to talk to Kennedy if asked.