Canberra, 23 January 1964
169. Secret
Kennedy Mission
We have not attempted to inject our views into the current discussions conducted by Robert Kennedy. While we should have preferred that the effort ‘to rescue’ the Indonesians from their present course should have been deferred for some time, we do not think that the dangers to Malaysia from negotiations which we saw several months ago are as strong as they were then, although we must remain sensitive to political strains within Malaysia induced by Indonesian tactics. Furthermore the Americans have shown increasing recognition of their involvement with us and others as a result of Indonesian policies and we cannot expect them to refrain from exerting their influence to affect the course of Indonesian policies. Moreover, while we must retain some anxiety about the possible effects of these efforts, it is also in our fundamental interests that the Americans should remain deeply involved in Indonesia. The course facing President Johnson of an American withdrawal from Indonesia, as reflected in the ‘dismantlement’ of aid machinery and programmes and the lessening of their political engagement, would dearly1 be undesirable.
2. Once he was faced with the Kennedy requests, the Tunku probably had little alternative to replying as he has done. If Sukarno is unable to go through with his undertakings, then the Tunku will emerge very well.2 Our effort should now be directed towards ensuring that the Tunku has successful talks with Macapagal,3 not the least reason being to prevent the bad influence with4 Lopez might otherwise exert in a meeting of Foreign Ministers. Also, the Malaysian delegation to any tripartite talks will need to be carefully briefed and composed of strong politicians and advisers.
3. While the future of the exercise started by Kennedy bristles with difficulties, an obvious concern is what Sukarno can hope to get out of talks in order to justify having gone into them. What would happen if, the Indonesians having demanded the withdrawal of British forces, somebody walked out of the tripartite conference? Would the Tunku be pressed to make further concessions?
4. There is one thought which we would like you to keep before the Americans. We note the views expressed in the State Department that the United States regards it as its business to get consultations going and it does not propose to concern itself closely with the substance of the consultations.5 The United States in fact may not be able to remain as detached as expressed in this line of thinking, and we think you should nevertheless stress that the Americans, having taken the plunge, have to accept a large measure of continuing responsibilities for the events that they have put in train. It would be intolerable, for example, if the Indonesians were to feel that if their political demands were not satisfied in tripartite talks, they were then free to return for a third time to confrontation including physical pressure on the borders of Malaysia. The effect on Malaysian morale of the turning on and off of such pressures would be most serious.
5. Kitchen (United States Assistant Secretary, Politico-Military Affairs)6 called on Secretary yesterday who spoke on above lines and stressed that it must never be forgotten that the Tunku has a public and press and parliamentary situation which limited his freedom of action. Sukarno was relieved of these conditions in Indonesia.
[NAA: A1838, 270/1/1 part 2]
1 Perhaps, ‘clearly’.
2 See editorial note, The Kennedy Mediation Talks.
3 Paragraph 7, Document 146.
4 Presumably, ‘which’.
5 The general view was that, once arranged, the tripartite talks should be left ‘in Asian hands’, although desk officers in the State Department claimed that it was ‘ not intended that the United States abdicate all responsibility or all interest’ in obtaining a settlement.
6 Jeffrey Kitchen, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs, US State Department.