Jakarta, 27 December 1962
1032. Secret
Brunei
I called on Subandrio this morning mainly to seek his views on the Brunei situation. He had just seen the Malayan Ambassador1 and subsequent checking with Kamaruddin revealed that he took the same line with both of us although he said a number of things to me obviously not for Malayan ears. Subandrio sees the problem at the moment as not being so much one of what is going on on the ground in North Borneo as one of Malayan/ Indonesian relations. Indonesia has not given, he said, physical support to Azahari and the rebels although he did not deny that a certain amount of coming and going might have taken place across the border. Indonesian sympathies were perfectly clear and undisguised. They did not regard the Malayan Government as fully independent or as properly representative of the Malayan people or in complete control of Malaya itself. They regarded the concept of Malaysia as expansionism on the part of the Tunku, and they did not regard it as natural. Given Indonesia’s revolutionary background2—and he expressed scorn of the manner in which Malaya had achieved its independence—and its anti-colonial attitudes, no one could expect any other view from Indonesia. (In this latter statement I think he is perfectly correct.)
2. So far as military assistance to Azahari was concerned, the Indonesians had given none, and if they had the revolution would have been a success. There were many Indonesians fully equipped in paratroop and jungle operations and the whole uprising would have been well organised and impossible to suppress.
3. I told Subandrio that we were disturbed in Australia at the deterioration in relations between Malaya and Indonesia. No good could come of this. Subandrio said that he agreed but said also that relations between Indonesia and Malaya could not be carried out on the basis of public statements by Malayan leaders, especially the Tunku, insulting to Indonesia. If the Tunku continued to suggest that Indonesia was deeply involved in the Brunei rebellion, that the Government was dominated by Communists, and that its intentions towards Malaya were inimical and the product of Malayan economic successes and Indonesian failures, a situation would be built up whereby Indonesia would believe that Malaya had decided on a position of hostility towards Indonesia. If, however, Malayan leaders could show the kind of restraint in difficult times which had been shown by Australian leaders, there was no reason why their differences should not be patched up.He had been encouraged by the fact that that morning the Malayan Ambassador had for the first time presented an aide memoire3 about relations between the two countries. While the views expressed in the aide memoire were entirely unacceptable, this was the kind of channel through which differences between the countries should be discussed. Impetuous public statements would put Indonesia in the position where any gesture of friendship towards Malaya would be regarded as a loss of face.
4. Although I sought on three occasions to get Subandrio’s views on the next step in the problem of Indonesian/Malayan relations and on Malaysia, he would not be drawn except to reiterate his view that everything would stem from an improvement in general relations with Malaya. Seen from here, the Tunku does seem to have been a bit free swinging. The Malayan Ambassador agrees with this and says he is trying to persuade him to be a bit more ‘discreet’.
5. I did not follow the suggestions in paragraph 5 of your 1010.4 The extent of these demonstrations in Djakarta has been grossly exaggerated in the Djakarta press and this may have been reflected Australia. Estimates of both the British and Malayan Embassies here are that no more than three to four thousand people were involved in the public meeting and not four hundred thousand as suggested in the press, and it is perfectly clear that the Indonesian authorities took the most stringent precautions to see that there were no offensive demonstrations against Foreign Embassy property or personnel. Army guards at both the British and Malayan Embassies were greatly increased in advance and without any prompting, and one small column of potential demonstrators approaching the British Chancery were rapidly dispersed and sent home by the military police. The Government having taken such precautions it would, I think, have been unwise to stress the effect on Indonesia’s reputation of an inaccurately reported and rather minor occurrence, even if, of course, press distortions were no doubt authorised by the Government itself.
[NAA: A1838, 3034/10/1 part 12]
1 Dato Kamaruddin Al-Haj bin Haji Mohammad Idris.
2 A reference to the four year struggle by the Indonesians to win independence from the Dutch, 1945–49.
3 A written summary of the key points made by a diplomat in an official conversation. Literally, a document left with the other party to the conversation, either at the time of the conversation or subsequently, as an aid to memory.
4 26 December. Canberra had advised Shann that the anti-British and anti-Malayan demonstrations in Jakarta ‘have attracted a great deal of attention in the Australian press and you might stress how much harm this kind of thing does Indonesia’s reputation abroad’.