Melbourne, 28 January 1964
Secret
Submission No. 30 – Defence Assistance for Malaysia2
The Cabinet agreed:—
(a) that in order to strengthen Malaysia’s defence potential, defence assistance of the nature and scale sketched in the Submission should be given to Malaysia by Australia from a special fund of £3 million created for the purpose;
(b) that a mission comprising representatives of the Department of Defence, the three Services and the Department of Supply should be sent to Malaysia to assist the Malaysian authorities in formulating their requests for the types of aid Australia could provide, and to prepare for consideration firm proposals on the details of the assistance Australia should offer;3
(c) that the Prime Minister should, at the close of the Cabinet meeting, make a public statement, on matter of fact lines, to the effect that the Cabinet has given further consideration to the question of material aid for Malaysia and that a mission will be sent to Kuala Lumpur to assess details.4
2. The Cabinet noted the recommendation that assistance should in general be in a form which can be readily identified in Malaysia as Australian, and that attention should be given to some items which can be made available relatively quickly to make an immediate impact. Although it accepted the recommendation, it also indicated that the central objective should be to give effective and quiet assistance to Malaysia’s own defence capacity rather than to seek dramatic or ‘advertising’ Australian intervention.
3. It was noted that the question of making a financial grant to the Malaysian Government for works projects would need to be considered if and when, following the mission’s visit, specific proposals require examination.
[NAA: A4940, C1473]
1964 Tripartite Talks
The tripartite talks held between Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines during 1964 involved two ministerial conferences in Bangkok and a summit meeting in Tokyo. The first of these followed directly from the Kennedy initiative in late January when Tun Razak, Dr Subandrio and Salvador Lopez met in Bangkok from 5–10 February under the chairmanship of the Thai Foreign Minister, Thanat Khoman. While there was some discussion of broader political issues in preparation for a future summit, the talks were mainly devoted to the cease-fire agreement as Kennedy’s proposal had only been made in general terms. Although a number of guiding principles for an effective truce were adopted, a deadlock occurred when no agreement could be reached on the question of the withdrawal of regular and irregular Indonesian forces. The Malaysians insisted on a complete withdrawal and that further Indonesian personnel be prohibited from crossing the border into Malaysia. The Indonesians refused to accept that the withdrawal of its forces was an essential element of the cease-fire, claiming that this would be part of a political settlement. Despite these differences, on 6 February, the three foreign ministers sent separate but identical messages to UN Secretary-General, U Thant, asking him to nominate Thailand to supervise the cease-fire.
The conference ended inconclusively with the issuing of a communique; an appendix setting out the agreed terms of the proposed cease-fire; and a Malaysian note of reservation pointing out that a cease-fire could not be fully effective while Indonesian military units remained on Malaysian territory. Subandrio was to advise Sukarno of the Malaysian reservation and communicate the President’s decision by 12–13 February.
Sukarno did not respond to the Malaysian note and the situation continued to deteriorate as Indonesian guerillas remained active in Sabah and Sarawak despite the hypothetical cease-fire. Malaysia-Philippine relations, on the other hand, improved with a meeting in Phnom Penh between Tunku Abdul Rahman and President Macapagal, facilitated by Prince Sihanouk, on 10–12 February. Both agreed to consider the mutual establishment of consulates as a step towards the resumption of diplomatic relations and to attend a summit meeting with Sukarno after the conclusion of further talks at ministerial level.
The three foreign ministers met again in Bangkok from 3 March but the talks ended in deadlock on the evening of 4 March. The Malaysians continued to insist that the complete withdrawal of troops from Malaysian territory was a fundamental condition of the ceasefire before a political settlement could be negotiated. The Indonesians held to their position that political problems should be resolved first and that final withdrawal would occur as part of the political settlement. After further negotiations initiated by Lopez and held throughout the day and evening of 5 March, Subandrio agreed to take a three-point proposal drawn up by Razak and Lopez back to Sukarno for ratification. Under this proposal the three ministers agreed to disengage their forces and confine activity to their respective territories, to commence talks with a view to reaching a formal political settlement, and to recommend that a summit meeting be convened. Sukarno later claimed that Subandrio did not present the proposal to him.
By May, Thailand was still unable to begin supervising the cease-fire. Malaysia, maintaining its insistence on complete withdrawal, refused to accept Indonesian proposals either for a ‘stand fast’ of their forces in existing positions or for a concentration of the guerillas in defined areas inside Malaysian territory. The initiative for a summit meeting came from President Macapagal following the Malaysian elections on 25 April. On 2 May he proposed an early resumption of tripartite negotiations and suggested that a summit, preceded by a ministerial meeting, should open simultaneously with an ‘initial withdrawal’’ of Indonesian troops. After two weeks of proposals and counter-proposals from the Indonesians and the Malaysians, it was announced on 30 May that a summit would take place in Tokyo immediately following a meeting of foreign ministers in the first half of June. The consultations were made possible by the Tunku s modification of Malaysia s stance on complete withdrawal, and Sukarno’s acceptance of the principle of withdrawal of Indonesian forces, beginning at the time of the commencement of the foreign ministers’ meeting. Thailand was to undertake the verification of the withdrawal. Tensions in this period of uncertainty did not ease when the official Indonesian announcement of the terms of the proposed summit included a clause additional to the agreed text. It stated, in effect, that Indonesia’s further withdrawal of its troops would only take place in conformity with the progress made in the political negotiations. Difficulties were also encountered in reaching agreement on the means of verifying a withdrawal, including a timeframe, and the location, number and composition of checkpoints.
The ministerial meeting eventually began in Tokyo on 18 June, But in the summit which followed on 20 June, Sukarno s uncompromising contention that he could not accept ‘this Malaysia’, and Malaysian mistrust of Indonesian intentions, given events since the implementation of the cease-fire, resulted in the dispute’s continued stalemate. At one point, Sukarno asked for a reascertainment properly conducted in accordance with the terms of the Manila Agreement. The Tunku replied that the dispute should be put back before the UN. Macapagal sought to salvage something from the conference by putting forward a proposal that the matter be resolved within the framework of a four-nation Afro-Asian Conciliation Commission. The Malaysian and Indonesian leaders could not agree on the role of this Commission and the summit’s final communique recorded their divergent views. It stated Sukarno’s agreement with Macapagal’s proposal and his assurance that he would abide by the Commission s recommendations. The Tunku agreed in principle, but with the proviso that all acts of hostility against Malaysia cease immediately. Although Sukarno refused to accept the Tunku’s condition, the three leaders agreed to instruct their foreign ministers to study the Philippine prosposals.
1 Menzies pre-empted this decision in his statement of 16 January (see footnote 7, Document 150), in which he indicated that the government was ‘consulting with the Malaysian Government to see what it could do to contribute to the development of Malaysia’s own defence effort’.
2 Document 149.
3 The six member representative group, lead by D.S. Clues, Assistant Secretary (Logistics), DD, departed Australia on 9 February for a two week mission.
4 Menzies issued a press statement in Melbourne later that day.