Canberra, 4 February 1964.
Secret
Indonesia/Malaysia/Philippines Meeting
Rogers2 left for Bangkok today to keep in touch with developments through discreet contact with the Malaysian Delegation. Appended is a Departmental Working Paper which contains material for him to talk over with the Malaysians if practicable. It has been sighted by the Minister and has his broad approval.
Tripartite Meeting—Bangkok February 5th
1. This paper considers probable items of discussion at the meeting of the Foreign Ministers of Indonesia and the Philippines and the Deputy Prime Minister of Malaysia, and some suggestions thereon which might be put to the Malaysians.
2. The meeting is probably without precedent. The three Governments concerned do not at present maintain diplomatic relations, there is no agreement on what is to be discussed and hostilities are still continuing on the Malaysian-Indonesian border.
3. Mr. Law-Smith3 has prepared a paper on the major issues before the three Governments with a summary of comments which have been made on them since Mr Robert Kennedy had his first discussions with President Sukarno. These issues are:—
(a) the cease-fire and means of maintaining it;
(b) the use of Thai ‘supervisors’, ‘observers’ or ‘referees’ under the auspices of the United Nations Secretary-General;
(c) resumption of diplomatic relations, or, as the Indonesians term it, ‘recognition’ of Malaysia;
(d) the exercise of self-determination in Sabah and Sarawak;
(e) Anglo-Malaysian defence arrangements;
(f) Maphilindo;
(g) a Summit Conference.
4. Given the present state of tension between the parties, the unusual nature of the meeting, [and] the extent of the ground to be covered there, even if the parties approached the conference table in good faith discussion could last for a long time without anything being achieved. It would seem in the Malaysians’ best interests and ours to try to concentrate the discussion on a few essential points which can be made the test of Indonesia’s real intentions, and on which the Filipinos will not feel bound to support Indonesia too strongly. Moreover we want Malaysia to take the initiative and hold it.
5. The obvious point to concentrate on is the first, the cease-fire. It would seem best for the Malaysians to say that the securing and maintenance of a genuine cease-fire is an essential condition for the fruitful discussion of all the other points at issue. A genuine cease-fire must include the withdrawal of Indonesian regular and semi-independent personnel at present in Malaysia (including saboteurs landed on the Malay Peninsula).4
6. The cease-fire should not be part of some dubious package deal. It should not be wrapped up with plans for the formal creation of Maphilindo, with expressions of intent for the withdrawal of foreign military bases, or with anything else. If the present meeting can achieve a cease-fire then it will have opened up the possibility of settling other issues. If it cannot achieve a cease-fire then it can hardly achieve anything, except perhaps the erosion of the position of Malaysia.
7. As an essential corollary to agreement on the cease-fire is agreement on means to maintain it. At present Indonesian regular and semi-independent military personnel are still on Malaysian soil, showing little disposition to move. Their continued presence is a condition no Government could tolerate. Providing both parties are acting in good faith it should be possible, though difficult given the nature of the country, to devise procedures for their withdrawal. A first step should be the establishment of communication between Indonesia, on the one hand, and British and Malaysian local commanders on the other. Not much is likely to be achieved if both sides simply drop pamphlets from the air.5 But a lot can be achieved if both sides sent mutually agreed instructions through their usual communications services. And this is a matter in which the Malaysians can take the initiative. The operation would have to proceed slowly because of security considerations but it is probably the best way of avoiding clashes if and when the Indonesian units want to get back across the border.
8. The Indonesians may make a counter-suggestion of a withdrawal of all military units to points some distance from the border. Such a move is not essential to the implementation of a cease-fire, and because there are serious objections to it from security and political considerations, it should be rejected.
9. As yet the Indonesians have not communicated formally with U Thant asking him to designate the Thais as supervisors or observers of the cease-fire. If they have waited this long, they will probably wait until the meeting begins. In which case the Malaysians might suggest that the three parties jointly cable U Thant asking him to approach the Thais. (During the Summit meeting in August the parties cabled U Thant asking him how long it would take to arrange:—
(a) a plebiscite, or
(b) an ‘ascertainment’ of opinion in the Borneo territories.)
The Indonesians might object that such a procedure would entail Subandrio putting his signature next to that of the Defence Minister of ‘so-called’ Malaysia,6 but the tactic would seem worth trying.
10. Assuming that an approach is made and that U Thant and the Thais concur, the next question is what are the supervisors (observers) going to do. Clearly they cannot maintain continuous patrols along a frontier a thousand miles long which runs through swamp, mountains and rain forest. One suggestion has been that they confine themselves to investigating complaints of breaches of the cease-fire. No one has suggested where they should be stationed. Presumably they should be on both sides of the border adjacent to major communications centres (a fairly fluid term in Borneo).
11. Communications will be a major problem for the supervisors and the problem could become quite unmanageable if the Indonesians started to ‘manufacture’ incidents. Possibly the Malaysians could suggest that the communications systems of the regular formations be put at the disposal of the supervisors. This would raise problems for the military, but probably it would be easier for the British and Malaysians to comply than it would be for the Indonesians. Possibly the Malaysians could suggest that as soon as the Foreign Ministers’ meeting is over, senior military officers of both sides should meet in Bangkok to discuss with the Thais the various problems involved in the supervision.
12. Quite apart from the fact that some procedure for the supervisors has to be worked out, Malaysia has to make it clear to the other two Governments and to the world at large, and the United States and the Secretary-General in particular, that further high-level discussions between the Maphilindo trio are contingent on the success of the cease-fire. The cease-fire is essentially a simple question which everyone can understand, whereas a full understanding of what the Manila Agreements7 amounted to is beyond the capacity of most. However, without prejudicing their essential interests, the Malaysians can go on to say that provided the cease-fire is observed faithfully for, say, two months then further discussions can be held at Foreign Ministerial level, or possibly Foreign Ministerial followed closely by Heads of Government meeting. Two months would seem to be a minimum because:—
(a) it will take a long time for the supervisors to begin operating effectively and for the world to see if the Indonesians are behaving, and
(b) the Malaysians should have sufficient time to hold the General Elections8 before another top-level meeting is held. Probably three months would be a more reasonable minimum.
13. In the meantime govemment-to-govemment contacts could continue without the Malaysians worrying too much over the so-called ‘recognition’ issue. The three parties could continue to use the Thais as a channel or possibly use the Secretary-General or a representative appointed by him. This would seem to offer advantages in associating the United Nations a little more closely with the cease-fire. The Indonesian9 and Malaysian Ambassadors in New York are both accredited to U Thant and they should be able to meet in his presence or in the presence of one of his deputies without too much fuss.
14. Another reason for the Malaysians making some proposals for further meetings is that Dr. Subandrio will have to take some proposals with him and he would not be satisfied with simply arrangements for a cease-fire. Subandrio’s position will be difficult. The P.K.I. and some important elements in the Army will probably be highly critical of whatever he agrees to before he even gets home. He will no doubt (as he did last year) try to use these internal difficulties in pressing the Malaysians to make some concessions. He may offer a cessation of hostilities in return for some further statement on the withdrawal of foreign bases, or something of that order. When rejecting such an offer (as we hope they will) the Malaysians may feel it necessary to offer in return some form of consultation for the settlement of difficulties, provided that a cease-fire is a first condition.
15. Tun Razak has said that Malaysia is prepared to take back the Sarawak insurgents who crossed the border and absorb them in Malaysian society. (The Malayans have had some experience of this sort of thing during the Emergency.)10 This is perhaps one concession he could offer Subandrio. He might even try to get the Thai supervisors associated with repatriation of insurgents though it would throw a very big strain on the Thais. The offer would, however, cause some trouble for Subandrio. The P.K.I. would be quick to accuse him of acquiescing in the forced return of the ‘Freedom Fighters’ into the colonial police- State.
16. To sum up. Mr. Kennedy’s mission has produced a shaky cease-fire (with the two sides not being in agreement on what a cease-fire entails) and an informal Ministerial meeting. The Malaysians made significant concession in agreement to the meeting and made them with some grace. The Indonesians agreed to a cease-fire and a meeting while publicly declaring that confrontation would continue, and they also made a surprisingly candid admission that they had armed units operating in Malaysia.11 The Malaysians have to that extent complied more honestly with Mr. Kennedy’s proposals, which gives them an important initiative in the forthcoming meeting.
17. To retain this initiative they should:—
(i) concentrate on the cease-fire and make the running on proposals for its implementation;
(ii) insist that all the other issues, including even the question of resumption of relations, be left until it is seen whether the cease-fire is being observed;
(iii) make proposals for further meetings ‘in the spirit of Maphilindo’ after the ceasefire has been in operation for some time;
(iv) make it plain in the meeting, and subsequently to the U.S. and the Secretary-General that the test of Indonesia’s good faith and intentions is its performance in the cease-fire;
(v) try to ensure that if this meeting breaks up without achieving anything it is because Indonesia refused to play on the cease-fire;
(vi) try to get the Secretary-General associated with the cease-fire exercise as much as possible, if for no other reason than that this will help build up the case against Indonesia if Malaysia later finds it necessary to go to the Security Council.
[NAA: A 1838, 3006/4/9 part 3]
1 Addressed New York 8; Bangkok 24, Jakarta 17, Kuala Lumpur 20, London 28, Manila 8, Singapore 15, Tokyo 11, Washington 28, Wellington 11, New Delhi 18.
2 Kenneth Rogers, Head, Malaysia and Indonesia Section, DEA. Barwick felt that Rogers’ experience of both Malaysia and Indonesia would facilitate contacts with those delegations, and that that would enable the Australian Ambassador in Bangkok to concentrate on fellow SEATO members, Thailand and the Philippines.
3 Richard Law-Smith, South East Asia Section, DEA.
4 Beginning in early December 1963, Indonesian-trained saboteurs had landed in Singapore and the west coast of Malaya, gaining easy access in small boats from their training bases on the islands immediately south of Singapore. Since that time, most of their activities had been concerned with exploiting the opinions of those Malays who favoured closer cultural and economic cooperation among the Malay-speaking nations, or even assimilation by Indonesia, and rudimentary intelligence gathering. Some attempts at sabotage had been made which had failed to achieve their purpose.
5 Following the issue of Sukarno’s Presidential Order on the cease-fire in the Borneo territories on 23 January (see Document 146), leaflets containing the order that the cease-fire would come into effect at one minute past midnight on 25 January were dropped from Indonesian aircraft over Sabah and Sarawak. The Malaysians had not dropped any pamphlets from the air but, in Sabah, Stephens had distributed pamphlets calling on the freedom fighters including the Indonesians to come out and surrender.
6 An allusion to Indonesia’s non-recognition of Malaysia.
7 Presumably, the Manila Declaration (Accord) and Statement. See editorial note, 1963 Tripartite Talks.
8 General Elections were expected in the first half of 1964. It was announced later this month that they would be held in April.
9 Lambertus Nicodemus Palar.
10 The power of the MCP in Malaya during the Emergency had been broken by the implementation of strategies of resettlement, psychological warfare and judicious use of amnesties for its members.
11 A UPI report of 29 January had quoted Subandrio as stating: ‘Our forces at the border and in North Kalimantan will not obey any order which is not issued by our great leader’. The leaflets dropped over Sabah and Sarawak containing Sukarno’s orders on the cease-fire had been addressed to ‘members of the Republic of Indonesia Armed Forces operating in the border districts’, as well as the CCO members and ‘volunteers’.