New York, 13 February 1964
UN 149. Confidential
Malaysia and the United Nations
This telegram outlines some of the considerations which will have to be taken into account in deciding whether and how Malaysia should approach the United Nations in the event of a resumption of hostilities. The main conclusions are—
(a) the timing and the type of recourse to the United Nations would need very careful consideration in the light of all the circumstances. Of particular importance would be the evidence Malaysia could lead and the degree of enthusiasm with which the U.S.A. entered into the exercise,
(b) the virtual certainty of a Soviet veto in the Security Council, and the impracticability in present circumstances (mainly Article 19)1 of going to the General Assembly under the Uniting for Peace procedure,2 would limit positive United Nations outcome to action by the Secretary-General or to the establishment of a Security Council sub-committee,
(c) there could be advantages in recourse to the Security Council even if there were no positive outcome, but there would also be risks,
(d) more could be done even now to engage the interest of the Secretary-General and to acquaint member states with the facts of Indonesian aggression.
OBJECT OF APPROACH TO THE UNITED NATIONS.
2. Recourse to the United Nations could provide an opportunity—
(a) to demonstrate that Malaysia has not been cowed into letting its case go by default,
(b) to show that there is very strong international support, particularly United States support, for Malaysia,
(c) to secure positive United Nations action (e.g. observer machinery) to help Malaysia halt aggression, reinstate the cease fire, exert pressure for removal of volunteers or generally to expose to world opinion the nature of Indonesian aggression.
CIRCUMSTANCES PROMPTING APPROACH TO UNITED NATIONS
3. Three broad possibilities may be distinguished—
(a) massive, overt Indonesian aggression (unlikely),
(b) breakdown in negotiations accompanied by open Indonesian denunciation of the cease fire and resumption of significant hostilities (possible),
(c) blurred situation (involving continued Indonesian presence in Malaysia and minor violence), in which the blame for breakdown of negotiations and resumption of hostilities could not be unequivocally sheeted home to Indonesia (probable).
FACTORS FOR CONSIDERATION
4. (a) U.S.A. is at the moment most reluctant to contemplate recourse to the United Nations apparently because it fears that action in the United Nations would
(i) put the U.S.A. under strong pressure to support Malaysia unequivocally in a public statement (which would reduce American influence over Indonesia),
(ii) make it very difficult for President Johnson to certify publicly that further aid to Indonesia was in the U.S.A.’s best interests,
(iii) encourage Malaysia and the United Kingdom to drop the problem into the lap of the United Nations instead of pursuing their efforts to negotiate a settlement with Indonesia.
The U.S.A. made it clear in the quadripartite talks3 that this attitude would change should Soekarno ‘exceed acceptable limits’, but exactly when this point would be reached was far from clear.
The British , if the British Mission here is a reliable guide, have no faith in securing positive United Nations action and see only one real advantage of reference to the United Nations, the severely limiting effect of a Soviet veto in the Security Council, or perhaps even Security Council discussion of Indonesia’s conduct, on the willingness of President Johnson to certify publicly that further aid to Indonesia is in the best interests of the U.S.A. The British also hope that Security Council debate would require the U.S.A. to range itself publicly alongside Malaysia and in opposition to Indonesia.
The U.S.S.R. is virtually certain to veto any substantive resolution which Indonesia did not like (not only because of U.S.S.R.-Indonesian relations but also because of C.P.S.U.4 –P.K.I. relations and because of the need for Moscow not to give Peking further cause for charging that Moscow is more interested in cementing U.S.S.R.–U.S.A relations than in supporting the cause of revolution and anti-colonialism).
The Uniting for Peace procedure, which is the usual device for getting around Soviet veto, could not be used except in the most extreme circumstances because of the general reluctance to force an Article 19 confrontation in the General Assembly. Other factors working against reference to the General Assembly include the general apathy and lack of interest of most member states in the Malaysia problem, the widespread anti-colonial feeling in the General Assembly, probable deficiencies in the Malaysian delegation’s handling of its case coupled with limitations on what friendly Western delegations could do to help, and the Chinese representation problem.
The Secretary-General has a close personal involvement in the situation because of the ascertainment process.
Indonesia is known to be sensitive to the possibility of United Nations action.
POSSIBLE COURSES OF ACTION
5. An approach to the United Nations could take one or more of these forms: recourse to the Security Council, recourse to the General Assembly (more theoretical than practical), activation of the Secretary-General, ‘education’ of member states.
(a) Massive aggression. Recourse to the Security Council would be inevitable. A strong Resolution condemning Indonesia and calling for restoration of the status quo would have to be tabled whatever the Soviet attitude. Uniting for Peace procedure would have to be seriously contemplated despite its drawbacks and dangers.
(b) Indonesian denunciation of cease fire and resumption of significant hostilities. Recourse to the Security Council would have a good chance of securing United States backing and of prompting a good pro-Malaysia statement by the United States representative. The minimum resolution we could present would be a call for a cease fire (since violation of the cease fire would have been the reason for the reference). The maximum would probably be condemnation of Indonesia, a call for a cease fire, and a call for withdrawal. Anything between extremes would probably need to include a call for resumption of negotiations preferably conditional on a cease fire and withdrawal. If, as we assume, such resolutions were vetoed it might be considered sufficient to let the matter rest there with the ‘moral advantage’ clearly on Malaysia’s side and with the blame firmly sheeted home to Indonesia. This would not however do anything positive to help Malaysia nor would it involve the United Nations in the situation in any way. We can see only two ways to do this, given a Soviet veto and a general reluctance to use the Uniting for Peace procedure. One way would be to prompt action by the Secretary-General under his own authority and without the prior direction of the Security Council. He might for example be induced to station a personal representative in the Borneo territories following a suitable invitation from Malaysia. Should the Secretary-General be reluctant to act (and he probably would be in the absence of a similar invitation from Indonesia and following an abortive Security Council meeting), an alternative would be for the Security Council to appoint a fact-finding sub-committee on the model of the sub-committee which went to Laos in September 1959. (On that occasion the Security Council, by a procedural vote to which the veto did not apply, appointed a sub-committee ‘to examine the statement made before the Security Council concerning Laos, to receive further statements and documents and to conduct such enquiries as it may determine necessary and to report to the Security Council as soon as possible’.) The sub-committee could go quickly to Malaysia, would provide a United Nations presence for a month or two, and should help convince member states of Indonesian aggression. On the other hand the appointment of a sub-committee would require a helpful President, and it would still leave the problem of what to do after the sub-committee had returned from Malaysia with its report.
(c) Blurred situation. Many of the same considerations as in the preceding section would apply though it would be much more difficult to secure a good American statement and a good vote in the Security Council. At the same time the risk would be greater of having forced on us some ‘compromise’ resolution which equated the parties and forced Malaysia back to the negotiating table under unfavourable circumstances. Activation of the Secretary-General would still be possible or, failing that, appointment of a Security Council sub-committee. More determined efforts could also be made, principally by Malaysia but also by others such as Australia, to put Malaysia’s case before the Secretary-General (e.g. by personal visits to New York by Ministers or by letters) and to play on the sense of paternity which Thant must feel towards Malaysia. More could also be done (e.g. by visits to New York of Malaysian Ministers who could appear on American T.V., letters to the President of the Security Council, for circulation as United Nations documents, under Article 51 of the Charter,5 or attaching the Bangkok communique, etc) to acquaint member states with the facts of Indonesian aggression. Indeed, there is no reason why some of these types of efforts should await resumption of hostilities (see our telegram No. 82).6
[NAA: A1838, 3027/9/1 part 2]
1 Most member states of the UN were reluctant to enforce Article 19 of the Charter in the General Assembly which states: ‘A Member of the United Nations which is in arrears in the payment of its financial contributions to the Organization shall have no vote in the General Assembly if the amount of its arrears equals or exceeds the amount of the contributions due from it for the preceding two full years. The General Assembly may, nevertheless, permit such a Member to vote if it is satisfied that the failure to pay is due to conditions beyond the control of the Member.’
2 The Uniting for Peace procedure was adopted in 1950 under General Assembly Resolution 377, so that stalemates between countries would not prevent the UN from carrying out its mission to ‘maintain international peace and security’. It provides that if, because of the lack of unanimity of the permanent members of the Security Council (France, China, USSR, United Kingdom, United States), the Council cannot maintain international peace where there is a ‘threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression’, the General Assembly ‘shall consider the matter immediately’.
3 See footnote 1, Document 157.
4 Communist Party of the Soviet Union.
5 Article 51 states: ‘Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defense shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security.’
6 24 January. It reported on the view of the British mission at the UN that inaction was working against Malaysia. Previously the mission had advised London to avoid UN involvement unless the situation deteriorated considerably and there was clear evidence of Indonesian aggression. It now believed that they should look for ways of stepping up the presentation of the Malaysian case. Suggestions as to how this might be done corresponded to those listed in this document.