Canberra, 17 January 1963
Secret
British Proposal for Tripartite Talks in Washington on Indonesia
On 16th January the British High Commission passed us the attached copy of instructions1 sent to the British Ambassador in Washington2. The British Ambassador saw Rusk3 on 11th January and was to see Harriman4 {yesterday}, 16th January.
2. Rusk is reported by the British to have felt that tripartite consultations would be timely. The State Department reaction to the United Kingdom analysis itself was to see the need to separate elements of truth from overstatement and the probable from the imaginative.
3. I have already told Eastman5 in London to drop a hint to the Foreign Office that the paper is remarkable for the difference of British assessment of Indonesian intentions towards neighbouring territories from that given to us when we discussed with them in the past what might be done to deter Indonesian threats to the Dutch.6 While not entering into substance of the paper at this stage it seems to be fairly clear that it is not a true reflection of British thinking at this time but is meant to as a ‘cockshye’ to draw the Americans (and ourselves). Before authorising Beale7 to enter into substantive discussions in Washington8 I think we should have the assessments of Indonesian intentions now being prepared by the JIC.9
4. I recommend that London and Washington be told that while we are agreeable in principle to joining in talks on Indonesia it will be some weeks before our own assessments are completed. 1 think we should also say that New Zealand should be included in such talks.10
[NAA: A1838, 3034/7/1/1 part 1]
1 The paper set out what the British alleged to be evidence of President Sukarno’s territorial ambitions, and claimed that these would result in Indonesia identifying itself with the communist bloc whose military and political support it would need to achieve its objectives. The paper also claimed that the large US aid payment pending could be used to subsidise Indonesia’s plans.
2 Sir David Ormsby Gore.
3 Dean Rusk, US Secretary of State.
4 Averell Harriman, US Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs.
5 Eastman had been appointed Senior External Affairs Representative in London in October 1962.
6 A reference to the threat of Indonesian armed aggression during the dispute over the status of Dutchcontrolled West New Guinea.
7 Sir (Oliver) Howard Beale, Ambassador to the United States.
8 Tange made a note in the margin here: ‘Indeed I am not happy about the ability of the Embassy to handle this subject. We may need to send someone at least to advise the ambassador’. Barwick noted his agreement.
9 Joint Intelligence Committee.
10 A handwritten addition by Tange above his signature said: ‘Meantime I shall ask Kimber [Deputy British High Commissioner] what is the British motive for this unexpected [crossed out] demarche on the Americans’.