Canberra, 20 February 1964
Confidential
Malaysia/Indonesia
As you know we have endorsed the type of suggestion you made in your telegram UNI48,2 and previously made by the British Mission in New York, concerning the practical ways in which the Malaysians could substantially help their cause in the United Nations and as you have pointed out, through the United Nations to the American and world press.3
2. We have now seen a depressing account from the New Zealand Mission in New York of the lack of ability of the Malaysians through staff deficiencies and inexperience to conduct their case effectively within the United Nations context.4
3. We sense that the Malaysians are, in fact, doing next to nothing to build on the strong position they hold in the United Nations deriving both from the general principles of the Charter and the specific history of the United Nations association with the formation of Malaysia. Nor, do they appear to be aroused to the importance of what needs to be done. We would even doubt whether the Malaysian Delegation has readily at hand, a prepared basis for a statement in the Security Council should that become urgently necessary.
4. If we are to move them, we shall probably need to make weighty and effective representations in Kuala Lumpur for the urgent strengthening of the staff of the Mission and the stepping up of its activities. In order to make the necessary impression, it occurs to us that Critchley would need to discuss with them a detailed action programme. We wonder if it will be practicable for you and colleagues from other Missions to draw up a detailed paper of recommendations for such a discussion in Kuala Lumpur. We appreciate the suggestions you have made but we are not sure that the Malaysians are sufficiently versed in the practical procedures and techniques of the United Nations to see their value and follow through with them. For example, where you refer to ‘writing appropriately to the Chairman of the Security Council’, it would be useful if the working paper could explain how this is done, what the precedents are and what the advantages have been in such courses of action in the past. It may be that part of the answer will eventually lie in our own officers helping them in these technical preparations in New York.
[NAA: A1838, 3006/4/7 part 21]
1 Addressed New York 141, Ottawa 70, Washington 490, London 835, Kuala Lumpur 200.
2 13 February. It summarised the mission’s appreciation on what would most benefit Malaysia’s case at the UN (Document 159).
3 See paragraph 5(c), Document 159.
4 It reported that the Malaysian mission in New York was in the care of a newly-arrived first secretary and had effectively ceased to function: Malaysia’s Permanent Representative, Ong Yoke Lin, was also Ambassador to the US and required in Washington; Deputy Permanent Representative, Radhakrishna Ramani, was expected to be away for a month for discussions on the Philippines claim in London, followed by consultations in Malaysia; and Zakaria bin Haji Mohamed Ali, Malaysia’s desk officer at the UN, was with the Lee Kuan Yew African mission until the end of the month.