Kuala Lumpur, 28 February 1964
290. Secret Immediate
Your 231.1
Malaysians are understandably most anxious to avoid a summit unless the Indonesians agree in Bangkok to withdraw the forces under their control from Malaysia or (if Subandrio argues that he has no authority) agree to recommend the withdrawal publicly to a summit. This latter proposal seems to me the minimum condition Malaysia could accept for a summit.
2. In opposing a summit, the Tunku may argue that it would be bound to fail and that failure at the highest level would mean the end of any hope of negotiated agreement between the parties.
3. Nevertheless, the Tunku probably believes that if strongly pressed he could attend a summit and get away with it in Malaysia provided he made it clear that he would not give way on the two major issues of—
(a) withdrawal of Indonesian-controlled forces, and
(b) no new ascertainment of public opinion in Sabah and Sarawak.
The fact that he might have to take this position publicly in advance of a summit meeting could have disadvantages for the Malaysians internationally.
4. In any case, I feel that giving way to Indonesia and accepting a summit without an effective ceasefire would be most humiliating for the Tunku after all he has said and that it could lead to a serious loss of confidence in him.
5. I, therefore, agree that if there is to be a summit it would be preferable for the Malaysians to make a new approach especially one that, although reasonable, the Indonesians might not be prepared to accept. In these special circumstances your suggestion of a meeting under the chairmanship of U Thant or his representative might attract them.
6. On the other hand, I believe the Malaysians are on much safer ground while they continue to insist on agreement on withdrawal as the essential condition for further talks. They can argue—
(a) that they must negotiate as equals and not under duress,
(b)that while aggression continues there can be no mutual trust and the atmosphere is unsatisfactory for final negotiations,
(c) that the Indonesians have the opportunity to withdraw without serious loss of face and that unless this minimum of good faith is demonstrated there is no sense in seeking further agreement.
7. Razak and Ismail would certainly agree with me and they must be attracted by the political advantage in Malaysia of maintaining a firm stand especially in view of the coming elections.
8. I also see two serious disadvantages in the U.N. proposal—
(a) in the circumstances that are likely to develop, U Thant could be put in an awkward position and I would expect him to side-step;
(b) once Malaysians proposed a summit in New York they would have given way on the basic principle of no summit meeting without an effective ceasefire. The Indonesians could exploit this and turn the proposal into an argument over venue on which the Malaysian position would be weak.
9. I appreciate United States anxiety to keep the negotiations going but the Malaysian position could hardly be stronger than it is at present and I fail to see how the Americans or the Afro-Asians could effectively oppose it. I do, however, agree that following a deadlock in Bangkok the Malaysians might not find it convenient to appeal direct to the Security Council and that they might be better advised to wait for a serious incident.
[NAA: A1838, 3027/9/1 part 2]
1 Document 163 was repeated to Kuala Lumpur 231.