Canberra, 4 March 1964
206. Secret Immediate
Reference our telegram No. 202.1
I should like you to give the Tunku and Razak my views on the crucially important matter of the public explanation and presentation of the Malaysian case in the event of the talks breaking down. In that event Indonesia will seek to make great play of the Malaysian refusal to entertain a Summit Meeting. There is a risk that the Malaysians will obscure the basic issues and harm the strength of their case if they are too rhetorical and emotional, especially about the wrong things.
2. My views are of course offered with the provisos that it is difficult to offer detailed ideas from a distance and the Malaysians are no doubt using the discussions in the meeting of Foreign Ministers to lay and build the foundation of their case. But you might be able to see that a number of the following points are worked into the Malaysian presentation. You should give Razak the following paragraphs as a suggested draft.
3. The Malaysians might consider carefully whether they should state the essentials of the problem in a document which could be tabled at the meetings and/or published. The document should be self-contained and complete to enable circulation to Members of the United Nations, to Governments of influential Afro-Asian and other countries and for maximum impact in the United States. In addition to a recital of the basic facts such a document might include the following material on issues of principle.
4. Malaysia entered into talks at the level of the Foreign Ministers in order to consolidate Mr. Kennedy’s initiative and to arrange for a proper and effective cease-fire agreement. If such a cease-fire agreement were concluded, Malaysia would sympathetically and constructively discuss outstanding political issues with Indonesia. Malaysia is still deeply interested in achieving such an agreement but it has become clear since the discussions began that a genuine cease-fire agreement will not be accepted by Indonesia. Indonesia refuses to enter into any arrangement for the withdrawal of the armed groups under Indonesian control from Malaysian territory. It is acknowledged in public and in the Ministerial discussions by the Indonesian Foreign Minister that Indonesia is deploying trained and equipped forces beyond its borders for political purposes. Indonesia is thus violating its pledge as a member of the United Nations to refrain from the threat of use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of other States. It is also violating the Bandung Declaration to abstain from intervention or interference in the internal affairs of other countries.2
5. The Indonesian Foreign Minister has also stated in the discussions that the Indonesian forces cannot be withdrawn because to do so would be to give recognition to Malaysia’s borders. In the first place, whether or not Indonesia recognises the borders of Malaysia, the borders of Indonesia are not in doubt and there can be no justification for armed fighting by Indonesians outside Indonesian boundaries. In the second place, the issue of the withdrawal of armed Indonesian controlled groups from Malaysian territories cannot be made subject of political negotiation. Their presence is illegal. Malaysia has the right to take direct action against them but has been prepared to co-operate in arrangements for their withdrawal through a cease-fire agreement.
6. Malaysia is prepared to enter into a sound and comprehensive cease-fire arrangement and to do everything practicable to facilitate the withdrawal of Indonesian controlled groups without blood-shed or deprivation of supplies.
7. Malaysia is also prepared to enter into a mutual and reciprocal arrangement covering all aspects of the matter including agreement on the following points:—
(i) All armed forces of both sides must be confined to their respective territorial jurisdiction.
(iii) 3 Both Governments agree to prevent the use of their territories as a base for any unlawful acts, propaganda, or preparation against the other.
(iv) Both Governments agree not to permit on their territory the organisation of bodies who have as their object armed warfare or insurrection against the other party.
(v) Both Governments agree not to permit the recruiting or mobilisation of personnel for the armed groups of such organisations.
(vi) Both Governments agree to accept within their respective territories teams of Thai observers and to provide the necessary facilities for them to carry out their duties in the implementation of the cease-fire.
(vii) The duties of the supervisors are to investigate any alleged breaches of the ceasefire and to report thereon to the two Governments and to the Secretary-General of the United Nations.
8. Points (i), (vi) and (vii) should be confirmed at once, and the remaining points further examined at Ministerial level.
9. Indonesia proposes that the unresolved issues concerning cease-fire and withdrawal be taken to a Summit Meeting. The withdrawal of Indonesian guerillas from the Malaysian territories is not part of the political problems for which a Summit may be appropriate. That withdrawal is essential{.I}f the parties at the Summit are to enter into discussion on vital national policy issues with Indonesia while Indonesian forces remain on Malaysian territories [it] would be to defer to the current Indonesian doctrine that they are justified in using military forces both directly and by subversive encouragement against neighbouring powers in order to make effective their objections to the policies and political arrangements of their neighbours. Neither, Malaysia, Indonesia’s other neighbours, nor the international community in general, could accept the implications of this doctrine.
10. In as much as there are political problems between Indonesia and Malaysia, the Government of Malaysia would wish to discuss them in a responsible spirit as problems in the relationship between two sovereign neighbouring States. There are clearly a number of matters which could be examined with great benefit by the two Governments discussing and negotiating as equals and in a spirit of mutual respect. They include:—
the restoration of diplomatic relations
future trade and commercial relations
proposals for regional co-operation under the Manila Agreements
the possibility of a non-aggression pact between Indonesia and Malaysia or the strengthening of the Indonesian-Malayan Friendship Treaty.4
Malaysia wants to live in peace and security with its neighbours. Malaysia is a small country dependent for its defence on collective action. It has no aggressive intentions and no claims on its neighbours other than the moral claim to live in peace and harmony. It has a vital interest in joining with its neighbours in collective agreements for mutual defence and mutual economic co-operation. It will join with its neighbours in talks towards these ends but only when it is apparent that the will to co-operate and the will to live together in peace is present in all parties.
[NAA: A 1838, 3027/9/1 part 2]
1 See footnote 3, Document 165.
2 See footnote 3, Document 47.
3 Original paragraph numbering.
4 A Treaty of Friendship was signed between Indonesia and Malaya in 1959.