Record of Conversation Between Kimber and Tange

Canberra, 17 January 1963

Secret

The Secretary told Mr. Kimber that as the Minister was on leave he had not yet seen the paper on Indonesia which the British High Commission had forwarded on 16th January.3 The Minister would probably be willing to see an exchange of views on Indonesian motives and capabilities externally and as well on likely developments within Indonesia. If we agree to participate in the proposed tripartite talks we would need to have time to prepare our own appreciations and might even wish to send someone to Washington. This is the leave season in Australia. Mr. Kimber explained that the United Kingdom would be fully committed in its discussions with the Philippines until the end of January. In answer to a later suggestion the Secretary agreed that, on the assumption that we did participate, a date about a month from now would be suitable but we could be ready sooner. The Minister’s decision would be communicated to the British High Commission next week.

2. Mr. Kimber pressed for any reactions to the British paper. He quoted a telegram from London which reported Rusk as saying ‘this expression of views on future Indonesia policy seems to him extremely timely’. The Secretary questioned Mr. Kimber as to why the United Kingdom now regarded Indonesia’s future foreign relations as being of such urgency. At first reading there seemed to be a good deal more ‘heat’ in the analysis than we ourselves felt at present. While some of the possibilities described in the British paper might well occur we would not expect any activity against Australian territory for some years ahead. In the case of Australian New Guinea4 we certainly did expect some eventual Indonesian meddling. We were taking steps in anticipation of this and in any case expected Indonesia to be well occupied for some time to come in establishing themselves in West New Guinea. We had not previously seen a British statement predicting Indonesian claims on East New Guinea. The Secretary recalled that Australia had in the past underlined the likely results of Indonesia gaining West New Guinea through military threats. Regarding Portuguese Timor5 the Secretary mentioned that the United States had sought our views. Aspects of possible Indonesian foreign adventures had been discussed with the StateDepartment in recent months.6 These discussions had not taken place within the framework of any particular agenda. The Secretary emphasised that his comments were very preliminary and that our own assessment of Indonesia’s intentions would be bound up with our conclusions about current internal developments in Indonesia upon which he was reluctant to express an opinion at the moment.

3. The Secretary moved the discussion to the coming British-Philippine talks saying that they would have a direct bearing on the proposed tripartite talks on Indonesia. He stressed that we felt it to be of utmost importance that the Philippines did not leave these talks in a mood of frustration. To achieve this the United Kingdom would have to adopt a very flexible position over what could be discussed during the talks. The Secretary recalled the worsening of British-Thai relations which might have been avoided during the Laotian crisis last year if full use had been made of the opportunities for explaining the British position.7 The Minister in his long talks with Pelaez8 had gained no impression that Philippines had a passionate wish to acquire North Borneo. On the other hand he had found a deep concern over what the Filipinos thought would be the removal of British protection from the Borneo territories. It seemed to us that the Philippines doubted if Malaya will be protected from outside interference and able to cope adequately with the additional burdens of Malaysia. The Secretary referred in this connexion to President Macapagal’s9 recently expressed doubts over the likelihood of Malaysia coming into being. Mr. Kimber sought clarification of how the Philippines pursuit of its North Borneo claim was directly affected by doubts over Malaysia. The Secretary suggested that the Filipinos were very probably not clear in their own minds on this point. They did not want the Indonesians to be in North Borneo. On the other hand they feared that the Government in Kuala Lumpur could well come under Chinese domination which in turn would bring Chinese dominance over the North Borneo territories. The Filipinos needed to be convinced that the only way to stop communism taking over in Singapore was by the early formation of Malaysia with the Borneo territories. The Secretary ended this part of the discussion by returning again to the need in our view for the British Government to be deliberately forthcoming in the talks with the Philippines.

[NAA: A1838, TS696/17/1 part 4]

1 Gurth Kimber, Deputy British High Commissioner, Canberra.

2 Talks to be held in London, 28-30 January 1963, in relation to a Philippine claim to British North Borneo. During 1962, a private claim had been revived stating that the heirs of the Sultan of Sulu still had sovereignty over the territory, as their forebears had only leased and not ceded it to the North Borneo Company (1881), which then transferred it to Britain in 1946. The Philippine claim rested on the basis that Sulu sovereignty was now Philippine sovereignty. The British Government dismissed the claim, pointing out the absence of supporting documentation; the territory’s non-inclusion in the Philippine Constitution’s definition of its territorial limits; and the de facto recognition to British sovereignty given by numerous international agreements. Australia believed that the British attitude towards the Philippines on this issue was obdurate. (The claim was maintained over the next three years and raised again on the Philippines’ recognition of Malaysia in June 1966. No further action has been taken.)

3 See Document 16.

4 Papua and New Guinea, also known as East New Guinea.

5 East Timor.

6 The State Department had asked Australia whether it agreed with their assumption that Indonesia had ‘at least long term intention to acquire Portuguese Timor’. Australia’s view was that if this was achieved ‘by genuinely peaceful means’ and ‘in accordance with the freely expressed wishes’ of the Timorese, Australia ‘would have little alternative but to acquiesce’. Should there be a military takeover, Australian-Indonesian relations ‘would be detrimentally affected’.

7 A reference to British opposition to US-recommended SEATO intervention in the conflict between the Royal Lao Army and the Pathet Lao which was strongly supported by Thailand on Laos’s border.

8 Emmanuel Pelaez, Vice-President of the Philippines and Secretary of Foreign Affairs.

9 Diosdado Macapagal, President of the Republic of the Philippines.