Washington, 6 March 1964
665. Secret Guard Priority
Indonesia/Malaysia
Your 667.1
1. I delivered your message to Harriman on 6th March. To emphasize the seriousness of the occasion, I read the message out to him and gave copies to those also present (Hilsman, Forrestal, Cuthell and Ingraham).2
2. A rather stormy discussion ensued. The gist of the United States position as it emerged in the considerable give-and-take was as follows—
(a) Australia was not correct in interpreting Kennedy’s thinking about withdrawal of the guerillas as in para. 3 of your message. Withdrawal of the guerillas was not part of the cease-fire but was one and one only of the issues which it had been understood would be discussed subsequently in tripartite meetings. Moreover, it was understood by Malaysia and the U.K. that it would not be possible to avoid some incidents during the cease-fire.
(b) In advising the Tunku in the terms you did, in particular in agreeing with the Tunku that there was at present no cease-fire (your telegram 622),3 Australia had therefore indicated that she did not accept the agreement negotiated by Kennedy. According to the United States information, the Tunku had moreover interpreted your advice about the non-negotiability of withdrawal as applying not only to a Summit Meeting but also to the Foreign Ministers’ meeting. The effect of this advice to the Tunku could have been the failure of the Kennedy agreement. This situation had dismayed the Americans.
(c) The Kennedy initiative could now be said to have not even a 50/50 chance of success and had led to ‘a miserable situation’. However, it was essential that it be given every opportunity of leading to a solution for there was no alternative.
(d) In not pushing to get the Thai referees into place quickly, Malaysia had been very remiss. Thailand was even now still awaiting a request from Malaysia and formulae like ‘no objection’ (your telegram 652)4 were just not good enough for the Thais.
(e) As regards the future, the three-point proposal ‘worked out by Lopez and Razak’ in Bangkok (our telegram 646)5 offered some prospects of progress towards a solution. The United States was making every effort to see that these proposals were accepted by each of the three countries and would culminate in a Summit Meeting after the Malaysian elections.
3. In reply, I argued strongly without going over again all the points you had forcefully made in your message that—
(a) Malaysia had had every right to seek in the tripartite talks to improve the ceasefire and to secure the withdrawal of the guerillas and could not in any way be criticized for refusing to negotiate under the duress that the presence of the guerillas represented.
(b) It was inconceivable that when asked for advice by the Tunku upon such an issue, Australia as a country with such close relations with Malaysia and so deeply interested should not be free to give her views.
(c) What was the use of pretending that there was still a cease-fire when we all knew that the Indonesians had used the Kennedy agreement to build up the guerillas and to re-group them and when another series of incidents had broken out?6
(d) There was an alternative to allowing Indonesia to get away with horse-trading aggression for political advantages. The alternative was to stand firm and bring Sukarno up to his moment of choice, a choice between behaving himself or finding himself engaged in hostilities with Malaysia and her friends, including the United States.
4. I had no indication in return that either your message or my statements in reply made an appreciable impression upon Harriman or his cohorts. The discussion ended with Harriman once again emphasizing the need now to do everything possible to ensure acceptance of the three-point proposal of Lopez and Razak. Sensing from this that Harriman suspected that Australia might work in a different direction, I assured him that if the Tunku had accepted the proposal as Harriman thought, I could not conceive that Australia would seek to prevail upon the Tunku to change his attitude.
5. I will send a fuller report and my own comments tomorrow. I also handed Harriman your appreciation in telegram as amended.7 He made no comment.
[NAA: A1838, 3006/4/9 part 5]
1 Document 169.
2 Edward Ingraham, Officer-in-Charge Indonesian Affairs, US State Department.
3 3 March. It was a repeat to Washington of Bangkok 202 (see footnote 3, Document 165).
4 6 March, repeating Loomes’s cablegram to Barwick of 5 March, in which Loomes reported that Razak had told Thanat that Malaysia ‘had no objection’ to the despatch of a Thai supervisory team to the Borneo territories, although he ‘had little faith in its effectiveness’ while Indonesian guerillas remained there.
5 6 March. It reported a discussion with the US State Department on the proposals put forward in Bangkok on 5 March as a ‘last-ditch effort’ to break the deadlock in the talks between Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines (see editorial note, 1964 Tripartite Talks ).
6 There were 20 known violations of the cease-fire and incursions into Malaysian territory since Sukarno’s cease-fire order on 24 January and the 29 January. These were listed in a press statement released in Bangkok, 5 March.
7 That is, in line with Berwick’s instruction in paragraph 3, Document 169.