Canberra, 10 March 1964
691. Secret Priority
Indonesia/Malaysia
Reference your telegram No. 669.1
We are grateful for the spirit and skilful way in which you have defended our interests. I am glad you will be having a talk with Rusk. I suggest you give him a short message from me which follows.
Message begins—
Thank you for your letter received on 6th March. This has been supplemented by further discussions which Ambassador Beale has had with Mr Harriman from which it is clear that our points of view are not as close as I had hoped they would be. I have therefore asked the Ambassador to see you personally, discuss the question of Indonesian attacks on Malaysia with you and recapitulate our policy in the light of recent discussions.
Message ends.
2. You should then take Rusk carefully through the following points, preferably reading the text to him, although I should prefer at this stage not to leave another written text with him.
3. Following are the instructions which you should say come from me direct for the purpose of this discussion:—
Begins—
I do not think you need any assurance that the Australian Government’s approach is sober and carefully weighed in full knowledge of the gravity of the issues. No country has a greater interest in peace and stability in South-East Asia than Australia; no country has less interest in courting or provoking a crisis in Indonesia’s external policies. As our capacity to contribute to the strength and security of the region is developing so are we having some success in fostering and developing relationships of mutual confidence with various countries in the region. On the other hand, Australia is the natural heir for anti- Western hostility should it become paramount in the region.
Despite the frictions and difficulties to which Indonesian policy gives rise, we are continually mindful of the importance of the future orientation of Indonesia. We appreciate that the continuation of Indonesian hostility towards Malaysia could produce a climate of tension and long lasting animosity. We remain anxious to explore every avenue of possible agreement in the reconciliation of Indonesia and Malaysia.
You know that we ourselves worked strenuously to this end when we encouraged the Manila talks last year; the postponement of the date for the inauguration of Malaysia; and the United Nations investigation. We did so in the knowledge that the courses we urged upon others could be taken by Indonesia as giving it some voice in the future of our own territories.
We have greatly respected your own patient and tireless efforts to find a basis of accommodation. We have not come to the view that such efforts should be terminated and that Indonesia should be ‘written off’ but as you know, we have consistently urged that efforts to conciliate Indonesia could not be carried on to the point of compromising the vital interests of Malaysia.
We are most mindful of the importance of Indonesia, both in point of numbers, economic potential and geographic position. We do not see any competition, however, between the importance of Indonesia and Malaysia. The latter is now a fact and the West cannot afford to see it fall to such methods as Sukarno has followed. Although not so numerous, Malaysia will have actual economic strength before Indonesia, even if the Indonesians mend their economic fences quickly. Western influence there is already existent. Our desire is not to see one of these countries survive and the other fall. We have a great interest in seeing Indonesia succeed. The problem is how to get her going. We do not believe a failure to condemn their present aims and methods will solve that problem. Hence, our policy of firm but unprovocative refusal to weaken our support of Malaysia or to countenance Indonesian aggression. One of my reasons for supporting the Conference out of which Maphilindo emerged was that it seemed a significant step towards the recognition that the other Malays were acceptable to Indonesia who, at that time, did not affect to see either the Philippines as American-oriented or Malaysia as a British product.
It was a pity that in the search for some rationalisation of their subsequent obduracy the Indonesians espoused neo-colonialism as the explanation of the existence of Malaysia.
It seems to us that all that has so far emerged from the last two conferences in Bangkok has been the formulation of an Indonesian demand that the withdrawal of their armed forces from Malaysian territory can take place only when political issues are resolved to their satisfaction. In other words, Indonesia has asserted its intention to use the presence of its forces to extract political concessions. We have welcomed your Government’s vigorous protests and have, ourselves, made representations in Djakarta. At the same time, I do not think that the Malaysians can be asked to yield to such a naked and aggressive demand.
As I understand the position, President Sukarno has further defined the matter in a proposal that the pace of withdrawal of his forces should be conditional upon progress in the political negotiations: that is to say, that he withdraws as, but not faster than, he succeeds in his political demands whatever they are. If this were accepted, we would have told him that his tactics have earned him substantial dividends, tactics which include not only infiltrating forces into Malaysian territory, in the first place, but also, reinforcing them to a number several times larger than that which existed at the time the cease-fire was discussed and agreed with a representative of your Government. In the second place, we would be providing him with a veto. The political issues are unspecified; the terms of settlement have not been resolved. What we would be accepting is that Indonesia should be allowed to place itself in a situation where it can demand political satisfaction before withdrawing the guerillas.
It may be said that I am over-simplifying the issues. There is much that we would be prepared to accept if we could have any confidence that we were facilitating a complex and difficult exercise in disengagement on the part of the Indonesian leadership. We have always sought to give adequate consideration to the complicated internal dynamics of Indonesia and the play of force surrounding the President. However, everything points to the continued and unremitting exploitation of the efforts of conciliation that other countries have attempted for purposes of further tactical advance.
Clearly, the possibilities that arise for further discussion and negotiation must be carefully examined on their merits, and for our part, we shall continue to examine them with flexibility and patience. I do, however, wish to leave one thought with you which I think is quite vital, and that is that we must dispel any notion on President Sukarno’s part that he can abuse and violate, as he has done, the understanding reached with Mr Kennedy and profit from his actions. In practical terms, I believe that this means that none of us can accommodate ourselves to his demand that the presence of his guerillas in Malaysia can be bargained against political concessions.
I am making a statement on foreign affairs in the House of Representatives in which I shall be outspoken (but not provocative) endorsing publicly Malaysia’s stand and condemning Indonesia’s retention of the guerillas in Malaysia.2 A copy of the statement will be available in Washington in a few days.
[NAA: A1838, 3006/4/7 part 23]
1 Document 171.
2 See footnote 2, Document 168.