Canberra, 13 April 1964
No. 18/1964. Top Secret
Australian Forces for the Defence of Malaysia
In our report of 19th March we recommended that assistance should be offered by Australia along the lines indicated to the informal requests by the Malaysian Department of Defence for assistance by Australian forces.1
[ matter omitted ]2
2. The Malaysian requests have been re-examined in accordance with the direction by the Cabinet Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence on 9th April that consideration be given to the possibility of a stronger response, still paying attention to our other commitments and limitations affecting our capacity to respond, but also recognising the sense of urgency and priority with which the government views the extension of aid to Malaysia in its present circumstances.3
Consideration
3. In an earlier paper dealing with the military implications for Australia of the Malaysian situation, which was considered by the Foreign Affairs and Defence Committee on 19th December 1963, we concluded that, if any commitment is made by Australia in due course to the defence of eastern Malaysia in a deteriorating covert situation, it should be from our elements in the Commonwealth Strategic Reserve.4
4. This is still considered to be a prudent guiding policy, bearing in mind the possible force deployments if it were necessary to prepare a plan against overt Indonesian aggression. The nature of the Malaysian requirements, however, is such that it will be necessary to depart from this view if they are to be met, and the present situation in Malaysia resulting from Indonesian activity would justify some assistance from forces within Australia at this time.
5. The implications for Australian preparedness to meet overt aggression, or the more likely eventuality of covert Indonesian retaliatory and diversionary attacks along the Papua/New Guinea border if Australian forces were committed to anti-insurgency operations in Borneo, are taken into account below in discussing the individual Malaysian requests.
[ matter omitted ]
Subsequent request for possible use of the Australian battalion in the Strategic Reserve and a S.A.S. Squadron for service in Borneo.
30. Subsequent to the requests considered above the British Prime Minister has stated that the British Chiefs of Staff consider that it would be extremely helpful if the Commander-in-Chief, Far East, could call upon the Australian and New Zealand battalions in the Strategic Reserve and Australian and New Zealand S.A.S. troops to help track down and eliminate the greatly increased numbers of Indonesian bands who have crossed the border from Indonesia and are lying hidden on Malaysian territory.5
31. 3 R.A.R., our battalion in the Strategic Reserve, is a good, well-trained and well-equipped unit. It has just completed its tour of anti-terrorist operations on the Thai/Malay border and could be made available immediately and deployed quickly to Borneo. It would have to be supported logistically by Far East Land Forces.
32. Our S.A.S. company consists of two squadrons each of approximately 100 personnel. It is highly trained and permanently on seven days notice to move. In the event of trouble on the New Guinea border one squadron would be the first element of our forces to leave the mainland. It is particularly suited to border-type operations. It would be practicable then to send one of the two squadrons to Borneo for a six months’ tour of operations, to be then relieved by the other squadron if it were not required for duty in New Guinea. Its equipment is light and it could be moved by chartered aircraft or H.M.A.S. Sydney. It could be supported logistically by Far East Land Forces.
33. If the informal requests for limited assistance already made by Malaysia are acceded to in the manner outlined above it may not be wise to grant the use of 3 R.A.R. and a S.A.S. squadron as well at this time. To provide credibility to our diplomatic warnings in Djakarta that Australia intends to back up the assurances given to support Malaysia a policy of graduated response to Indonesia’s confrontation pressures is called for. By meeting the Malaysian request of 28th February, 1964, we are adequately carrying out a policy of graduated response. Any agreement to provide the S.A.S. squadron or the use of our battalion in the Strategic Reserve should be related to our assessment of the situation in the Borneo Territories, consultation with the United States and a considered view that there was no further possibility of deterring Indonesia by other means.
Conclusions
It is concluded that, if the informal Malaysian requests for defence assistance are confirmed:
(a) An A.R.A. engineer squadron could be made available at short notice for service in Borneo.
(b) A light anti-aircraft battery could be made available for service in Malaya if it could be accepted that there would be no L.A.A. defence in Australia until an emergency arose warranting the call-up of the C.M.F.;6 if the A.R.A. L.A.A. battery were sent to Malaya preference should be expressed for its employment to defend R.A.A.F. base, Butterworth.
(c) It would not be practicable to meet the Malaysian request for a field ambulance unit from A.R.A. or C.M.F. sources, or the alternative request for a limited number of medical personnel from A.R.A. sources; it is considered unlikely that sufficient C.M.F. volunteers of the right calibre would be available to meet the alternative request.
(d) Two R A N. coastal minesweepers could be made available for patrol duties in Borneo waters and still leave a reasonably acceptable minesweeping and minehunting group in Australia; four is the maximum number that could be sent but their employment in the Far East for an unspecified period would have a progressively deleterious effect, on the R.A.N.’s minesweeping capability and would not leave any other patrol craft available for service in New Guinea if the need arose.
(e) Four R.A.A.F. helicopters and 4 to 5 pilots could be made available within four weeks to meet the Malaysian request for up to 14 but it would be preferable that they be based at Butterworth for operations on the Thai/Malay border and that the pilots be posted for a normal two-year tour of duty. If the aircraft were deployed to Borneo the numbers of supporting personnel would be increased and the need for more frequent reliefs would increase our training commitments, delay the build-up of our helicopter squadron and leave little capacity to meet a contingency in New Guinea. An increase to six helicopters would increase the number of supporting personnel required.
(f) An offer could be made now to add a Dakota and crew to the two now at Butterworth to meet the Malaysian request for short range transport aircraft for airdropping supplies in the last quarter of 1964.
(g) We could offer Malaysia six C130 freight flights per month whilst on the normal Australia-Butterworth courier run. Such flights however may not meet the desired Malaysian timings and the question of effective utilisation of the flights would have to be discussed with the Malaysian authorities. If Indonesia retaliated by denying overflying rights over her territory an additional 70–80 C l30 flying hours per month would be necessary to cover the longer route; this could only be achieved by an equivalent reduction of our participation in S.E.A.T.O., Army and R.A.A.F. operational exercises.
(h) It would not be practicable to meet the Malaysian request for five light reconnaissance/liaison aircraft as this would leave only four aircraft in Australia which would be quite inadequate to meet a requirement in New Guinea, training in Australia and the planned expansion of the Army light aircraft squadron.
(i) H.M.A.S. SYDNEY should be utilised to transport the Army and R.A.A.F. contributions to the Malaysian requests for assistance.
(j) By meeting the Malaysian request of 28th February, 1964,7 we are adequately carrying out the policy of graduated response to Indonesia’s confrontation policy. Any agreement to provide the S.A.S. squadron or the use of our battalion in the Strategic Reserve as suggested in the British Prime Minister’s letter of 10th April should be related to our assessment of the situation in the Borneo Territories,8 consultation with the United States and a considered view that there was no further possibility of deterring Indonesia by other means.
[NAA: A1209, 1964/6040 part 2]
1 See paragraphs 3-5, and footnote 6, Document 176.
2 Matter omitted relates to the list of requests. The items are covered in the conclusions to this report.
3 Not published (Decision No. 134).
4 See Document 139.
5 Douglas-Home sent a message to Menzies on 10 April setting out the British view of the ‘seriousness of the threat [in Borneo] and the need for some move to arrest this process’. He asked Menzies’ consideration of the suggestion by the British Chiefs of Staff that it would be ‘extremely helpful’ if CINCFE could call upon the Australian battalion in the CSR, and that Australian SAS troops ‘would be ideally suited to the particular tasks facing the security forces’.
6 Citizen Military Forces.
7 See footnote 3, Document 176.
8 There were continuing differences between Australian and British intelligence assessments of the degree of the threat posed by Indonesian infiltration into Borneo. Australia was now questioning the current British view that ‘continued Indonesian infiltration and the build-up of better organised Indonesian forces on their side of the border, will unless checked soon, lead to a serious internal security problem and loss of morale in Sarawak’.