Canberra, 8 May 1964
Top Secret
Australian Forces for the Defence of Malaysia
Introduction
1. On 14th April last, the Cabinet Foreign Affairs and Defence Committee considered the attached message dated 10th April from the British Prime Minister seeking approval to use in Borneo the Australian battalion in the Strategic Reserve and also Australian SAS troops. The Committee decided that there should be no immediate response to this request pending further consideration of it, including an assessment by an Australian military representative of the need for forces and a check as to the United States’ view on the use of Australian forces in Borneo.2
2. The Minister for External Affairs was asked to test the reaction of the United States Secretary of State while at the SEATO meeting in Manila. The Minister reported to Cabinet concerning his talks with Mr Rusk on 21st April (Decision No. 154).3
Assessment by Australian Defence Representative, Singapore
3. In accordance with the above direction, the Australian Defence Representative at Singapore4 visited the Borneo Territories from 19th to 22nd April to assess the intelligence situation and the need for the Australian battalion and/or SAS troops at this time. The Australian Defence Representative’s report on these matters has now been considered by the Defence Committee whose views are set out below.
Intelligence Considerations
4. The British Prime Minister’s request for additional Australian forces is based upon an assessment that continued Indonesian infiltration and the build up of better organized Indonesian forces on their side of the border will, unless checked soon, lead to a serious internal security problem and loss of morale in Sarawak. He states that a new situation has been created because the Indonesians are now employing units of their regular troops and because their operations are more carefully planned and more forcefully executed than previously.
5. The British assessment has been examined by the Australian Joint Intelligence Committee which, in the light of the Australian Defence Representative’s report and other intelligence, has concluded that:—
(a) On the evidence at present available it is unlikely that the Indonesians could over the next three months maintain infiltrations at a higher rate than at present and meet with much greater success;
(b) the Chinese Clandestine Communist Organization (CCO) could at any time embark on a campaign of terrorism, assassination and sabotage, and there might well be such activity within the next few months. A still more serious situation could develop later in the year if remedial steps are not taken and intelligence deficiencies corrected. Unless the CCO programme of indoctrinating the Chinese and other racial groups is successful, and large quantities of arms become available to the organization, it is considered most unlikely that insurrection will occur in 1964;
(c) there has been a political and administrative slackening in Sarawak which, if not corrected, could jeopardize security force and police efforts to combat the military and internal security threat;
(d) in the short term, cross border harassment would probably reduce the infiltration threat considerably.5 The Indonesians could be expected to react by strengthening their own posts all along the border with consequent increased logistic problems. This would in turn seriously strain their resources to maintain infiltrating forces.
The Australian assessment modified the British estimate, and latest British reports from Singapore indicate that recent Indonesian activities have not yet developed as seriously as originally envisaged.
Military Situation in Borneo
6. Allied forces in the Borneo Territories total 10 battalions comprising 1 British and 5 Gurkha battalions, 1 Royal Marine Commando, and 3 Royal Malayan Army battalions.
7. There have been 199 incidents since the terrorist activities started in Sarawak on 12th April, 1963. These incidents include cases of terrorism by individuals, arson and sabotage, as well as armed clashes. The average armed clash has been on a small scale involving 5–10 men on either side with isolated incidents of pitched battles lasting up to one hour or more, involving 40–60 men on either side. Incidents this year have increased and there has been a total of 117 of which 31 occurred in April. In March a large scale effort was made by the Indonesians, and possibly 900 guerillas entered the Borneo Territories. Operations by the Security Forces and severe supply difficulties, however, forced the guerillas to withdraw within two weeks leaving remnants totalling about 300 inside Malaysian territory.
8. Casualties to friendly forces since 21st April, 1963, have been 43 killed and 52 wounded, making a total of 95; enemy casualties over the same period have amounted to 157 killed, 119 captured, 60 wounded, 51 surrendered, making a total of 387.
Need for Reinforcements
9. During the Australian Defence Representative’s visit to Borneo, he was informed by the commander of British Forces in the territory that to meet the threat which he considered could develop steadily over the next few months, the present force of 10 battalions would need to be augmented by a further 9 battalions if ‘hot pursuit’ and ‘harassment’ across the border were not permitted. The Defence Committee has serious doubts on the need for such a scale of reinforcement at the present time. It also noted that the further message dated 28th April from the British Prime Minister (copy attached)6 indicated that approval has been given for British Security Forces to cross the Indonesian border in hot pursuit of terrorists to a limited depth of a mile or two and to reply to Indonesian fire across the border, provided this counter-fire is directed solely against the source of attack. The British Prime Minister also stated that consideration is being given to a British Chiefs of Staff proposal that Security Forces engage in harassment of terrorists across the border, including the ambushing of Indonesian troops using lateral communications just inside the Indonesian border. Latest advice from Kuala Lumpur indicates that harassment will not be authorized at this stage.
10. The Defence Committee observed that harassment in the border area if approved by the British Government would be more significant in its effects than hot pursuit. Striking at the enemy’s bases and camps close to the border and ambushing his troops would require him to deploy more forces for defensive purposes. It would restrict his freedom of movement, make further Indonesian infiltration and incursion more difficult, and would increase the difficulties of logistic support of the forces already infiltrated across the border. The successful control of the border by harassment together with hot pursuit would either remove or considerably reduce the requirement to reinforce the 10 British/Malaysian battalions at present engaged in the Borneo area.
11. It was also observed that, in the present climate of international opinion in the Afro/ Asian group, the maximum political advantage would be gained from such operations inside Indonesian territory as hot pursuit and harassment if participation is confined to non-European troops; it is understood that Gurkhas are to be used in hot pursuit operations. The involvement of British and Australian forces could lead more countries to accept Indonesia’s claims that Malaysia is a ‘neo-colonialist’ concept. Further, in accordance with a policy of graduated response to Indonesian confrontation pressures, it would be premature for Australian combat forces to be sent to Borneo to engage in direct conflict with the Indonesians at this stage. Indonesian aggression is still covert and the confrontation struggle is still mainly a political one.
12. In view of the foregoing, the Defence Committee considered that there is no pressing military requirement to commit Australian combat forces to Borneo at this stage of covert aggression. This view is supported by the impression gained by the Chairman, Chiefs of Staff Committee, in recent discussions in Singapore that the primary concern is the likelihood of overt aggression in a few months time as a result of the build up of terrorists in the area of Sarawak dominated by the Clandestine Communist Organization. The Committee considered that re-establishing control and obtaining reliable information in this area was primarily a Special Police Branch task.
Planning for Overt Indonesian Aggression
13. The Committee noted that plans now being developed by the British Chiefs of Staff to counter overt aggression by Indonesia cover two phases, action confined to the Borneo Territories and action extending beyond them. As these plans develop Australia will participate in the planning, as it can be assumed that we would contribute combat forces if the stage of overt aggression were reached. In concluding that the British request for the use of the Australian battalion in the Strategic Reserve and SAS troops for service in Borneo should not be acceded to at this stage, the Committee considered that Australia should indicate to the British authorities that we would expect to take part in planning to counter overt aggression and would contribute forces if overt aggression occurred. This would assist British preliminary planning. It should be made clear however that no commitment of Australian forces for planning purposes would be entered into until the plans had been further developed in consultation with Australia. It would be necessary to advise the United States authorities if any such commitments are made.
14. It is possible that the situation in the Borneo Territories could deteriorate further before a stage of overt aggression is reached and there may be additional requests for the use of Australian combat forces to meet covert aggression. The situation will be kept under review. In this regard the Committee re-stated its view that it would be a prudent guiding policy for force commitments to the defence of Malaysia in a deteriorating covert situation to be taken from our elements in the Commonwealth Strategic Reserve. The need for likely force deployments in an overt situation must be borne in mind. Deployments to Borneo to meet overt aggression would come mainly from the Strategic Reserve and it may be unwise, in advance of a possible overt stage, to further erode the defence capability available within Australia. The nature of the response to be made to further requests to meet covert aggression however would depend on the circumstances at the time.
Conclusions of Defence Committee
15. The Defence Committee:
(a) concluded that, for the reasons outlined, the British request for the provision of the Australian battalion in the Strategic Reserve and SAS troops for service in Borneo should not be granted at this stage;
(b) recommended that the British authorities should be informed that Australia would expect to participate in planning to meet overt aggression either in Borneo alone or in the ANZAM area generally resulting from Indonesian confrontation of Malaysia and would participate militarily if overt aggression occurred. This would be on the understanding that no force commitments for planning purposes would be entered into until planning had been developed further in consultation with Australia. The United States authorities would be advised if any such commitments are made.
(c) concluded that any further requests by Britain or Malaysia for the use of Australian forces to meet a deteriorating covert situation in Borneo should be examined in the light of the circumstances at the time; it would be a prudent guiding policy for any further force commitments in a covert situation to be from our elements in the British Commonwealth Far East Strategic Reserve.
Submission to Cabinet
16. I support the conclusions of the Defence Committee and recommend their endorsement.7
[NAA: A5827, vol. 6]
1 Senator Shane Paltridge, Minister for Defence.Senator Shane Paltridge, Minister for Defence.
2 See footnote 5, Document 180, and Document 181.
3 No written record of Barwick’s discussion with Rusk was provided to Canberra.
4 Colonel Robert Hay.
5 Douglas-Home’s message to Menzies of 10 April also advised that the UK Government had ‘decided in principle’ that cross border operations into Indonesian Kalimantan should be approved.
6 Not published.
7 On 12 May, the FAD Committee of Cabinet accepted the Defence Committee’s conclusion that the British request for the provision of Australian forces in Borneo should not be granted at this stage, as well as the Committee’s recommendations on further Australian action. Menzies informed Douglas-Home on 15 May.