Tokyo, 17 June 1964
478. Confidential Priority
Malaysia
My telegram 473.2
No ministerial meeting as yet, and it is doubtful whether any start can be made this evening. No word yet received that Thais are even in position ready to verify withdrawal.3
2. I talked last evening with Razak and today with Ghazali and afterwards with both together. General atmosphere within Malaysian delegation strikes me as buoyant, tough and active. Moreover they appear to have their ear to the ground: through their contacts they are aware of
(i) Sukarno’s current threat to leave Tokyo Friday in order to be in Djakarta to meet Mikoyan,4
(ii) Lopez’s night-club cultivation of Subandrio and other Indonesians with Philippines picking up the cheque, and
(iii) Ingraham’s reported difficulty in getting to see leading Indonesians.5
Ghazali exudes confidence and is full of ideas for tactical ploys; Razak seems realistic and undeluded.
3. Current Malaysian tactics are to put Sukarno under pressure while preserving image of Malaysia as the injured, conciliatory and reasonable party. They are therefore anxious for ministers’ meeting to begin as soon as possible, and have agreed to meeting as soon as Thai team is in position and before verification of withdrawal is actually received. In ministers’ meeting they propose to insist that before any summit can take place there must be verification of some withdrawal and Indonesian acceptance of additional check-points (on the ground that it is nonsense to speak of withdrawal across a 1,800 mile border through one point).6
4. If they get these they do not propose to worry too much about actual numbers withdrawn. Provided Thais can report reasonable number of withdrawals Malaysians plan to certify that withdrawal is complete—with the implication that any guerrillas subsequently encountered within the Malaysian border will be regarded as having reentered. They claim to have Lopez’s support for this.
5. When and if summit meets Malaysians propose to ask Sukarno bluntly what conditions he requires to call off confrontation. They will indicate willingness to study these conditions carefully. In meantime they will insist that Sukarno show bona fides of genuine desire for peace by keeping guerrillas out of Sarawak and Sabah. (I sense they are toying with idea of letting Sukarno’s conditions be studied by the suggested commission of four Asian countries, which might be Thailand, India, Japan and Cambodia.) If Sukarno breaks faith they believe that their case will earn additional sympathy and support.
6. At various points throughout discussions I said:
(i) I thought it was true that understanding and sympathy for Malaysia’s position had increased—it was certainly so in Japan, though they should not take too much for granted—and that their eagerness to start meeting at ministerial level should help them further.
(ii) Whilst there was wisdom in making careful conditions for a summit meeting, they would doubtless have regard to the possible reactions of Philippines, United States and also Japan if a summit failed to take place with all three participants assembled here.
(iii) If a summit took place they would no doubt be on guard against specious proposals and prepared for the possibility that any form of agreement might be twisted by the Indonesians to their own ends. (Malaysians insisted they were prepared to expect anything.)
(iv) Another thing to guard against over the longer term, assuming continued confrontation and intermittent attempts at settlement, might be slow erosion of Malaysia’s international position as other Asian and African countries became weary of the dispute under Sukarno’s constant pressure and accusations. (Ghazali’s comment was that Sukarno would not be around long enough for this to happen.)
7. The Malaysians talked freely and with some cynicism (and accuracy) about the differing motives of the Philippines, United States and Japan in wanting a summit meeting. There was an element of bitterness in their references to United States policies which 1 found hard to counteract by underlining some of United States difficulties.
8. I am not sure that the Malaysians see all possible pitfalls ahead, and they may be in danger of trying to be too clever. But it is reassuring that they are at least outwardly confident and determined.
[NAA: A1838, 3006/4/9 part 9]
1 Laurence McIntyre, Ambassador to Japan.
2 16 June, reporting that the Malaysian and Philippine delegations were ‘cautiously optimistic’ that a ministerial meeting could begin on 17 June as there was ‘some confidence’ that official notice of the beginning of the withdrawal was imminent. It also reported that the Indonesians were issuing anti-Malaysian press statements which the Malaysians were ignoring believing that they were for ‘domestic consumption’. There was ‘reasonable confidence’ that there would be only one summit session in which ‘nothing more than an interim agreement [would be] attempted’.
3 On 3 June, Thailand had agreed to formal Malaysian and Indonesian requests to verify withdrawal, but only to the extent of counting troops—regular and irregular—passing through designated check points.
4 The Soviet First Deputy Premier visited Indonesia from 22 June to 1 July.
5 Ingraham had been sent to Tokyo ‘to assist in American reporting [of the meetings] because of his detailed knowledge of the background’.
6 Malaysians wanted three or four inspection points to facilitate the Indonesian withdrawal and reduce the timeframe for its implementation.