Singapore, 20 June 1964
446. Top Secret Immediate
Malaysia
1. I have as yet no details of the progress of the Tokyo summit meeting but after extensive briefings at Phoenix Park2 and in Kuala Lumpur I am gravely concerned at the likely course of events.
2. Nothing I have heard here has in any way diminished my conviction that Indonesia does not want normal relations with Malaysia and I therefore conclude that the summit represents little more than a change of tactics designed in part to give respectability to Indonesia’ s position, in part to force the Malaysians, the British and ourselves into a position in which we, and not the Indonesians appear as the aggressors and if possible to create a situation in which Malaysia’ s position will be slowly eroded, perhaps by a series of further negotiations, a possibility which Subandrio outlined to me in Djakarta.3
3. In some ways the worst alternative might be agreement at the summit that Indonesian withdrawals from Sabah/Sarawak would continue through the additional check-points and that as a result the safe conduct and cease fire which Malaysia has been asked to accord the Indonesian infiltrators will in fact be used as a cover for further infiltration. If a firm deadline after which all Indonesians on Malaysian territory will be shot is written into the summit, this risk will be minimised but not removed.
4. Militarily although the situation is to our disadvantage it is still controllable. The political situation is, however, much less predictable. Malaysia is in grave danger of letting its case go by default internationally. The Malaysians having set conditions for a summit, have gone into a conference without insisting on those conditions. They have done so in the hope of presenting themselves in a favourable light internationally but in reality it may prove that they get neither the conditions they needed nor the reputation they sought. I am also concerned that the Americans may be so relieved at having what they will choose to regard as a successful summit in which Indonesia has made the running that they will begin to exert pressure on the Malaysians and ourselves for further concessions to Indonesia.
5. The argument will be that Sukarno has gone more than halfway to meet Malaysia and that it is now up to Malaysia to make concessions. This is of course far from the truth. All the evidence I have seen here suggests that the Indonesian withdrawals so far have been of troops specially and recently infiltrated for that purpose and that the basic Indonesian design to crush Malaysia remains unchanged.
[ matter omitted ]
[NAA: All 536, 16]
1 John Gorton, Minister for Works and Acting Minister for External Affairs. Hasluck was on an official tour of Southeast Asia, 3–21 June.
2 British Defence, Security and Intelligence Centre in Singapore.
3 Hasluck had visited Indonesia, 3–6 June. He had talks with Sukamo and Subandrio on 4 June in which he stressed Malaysia’ s ‘ right to exist unmolested by its neighbours’ , and that ‘ discussion and not the placing of … troops on other people’ s territory’ was the way to resolve the dispute.