Canberra, 26 June 1964
Secret
Malaysia and the United Nations
I spoke to the Minister about the possible involvement of the United Nations over the Indonesian/Malaysian confrontation. I described the various considerations which had made it difficult to arrive at a firm conclusion about the extent to which we should advise the Malaysians about taking a case to the UN Security Council. The Minister indicated that we should be very cautious about giving advice to the Malaysian Government for which they could later hold us to some extent responsible. I said that our present inclination was to do no more than agree with the British, and not necessarily even support them, with the Malaysians; that the British advise the Malaysians to present a letter to the President of the Security Council for circulation for information of members and not with a view to the stimulation of a complaint before the Security Council.
2. The Minister agreed that discussion in the Security Council might simply lead to a muddying of the waters. I suggested that one result might be reference back to the resolutions of the Tokyo Summit, a recommendation that the three Foreign Ministers pursue their talks, and some Afro-Asian committee,2 all of which might help us. I suggested that we keep our eye on our two objectives. These were:
(i) to provide to the extent that was possible some United Nations cover for retaliatory action which the British and Malaysians, and possibly ourselves, might have to take against Indonesia; and
(ii) to bring pressure on the Indonesians to withdraw from their aggressive action.
3. One doubted more and more the importance of (i) in the way that the military activities in Borneo were developing, and one must doubt also the extent to which the UN could be used for the second purpose.
4. I said that we would prepare a paper on the pros and cons for the use of the Minister in London (please send separate copy to the Secretary in London).3 If, in the meantime, we were required to express a view to the British or elsewhere, we should proceed on the lines that we supported advice to the Malaysians to submit a letter to the Chairman of the Security Council for information but nothing further. We should not try to persuade the Malaysian Government either way about further UN activities but we should draw the attention of the British and possibly the Malaysians to the need for a better international public relations exercise.
[NAA: A1838, 3027/9/1 part 3]
1 Partick Shaw, First Assistant Secretary, Division II (Geographic Regions), DBA. Prior to this appointment, Shaw had been Ambassador to Indonesia 1962-63.
2 See editorial note, 1964 Tripartite Talks.
3 See Document 190. Hasluck and Tange were to leave Australia on 29 June for London, where Hasluck was to have discussions with British ministers and officials before assisting Menzies at the Commonwealth Prime Ministers’ Conference, 8–15 July.