Canberra, 25 January 1963
59. 98. Secret Piority And Personal
Indonesia/Malaya Relations
I am greatly concerned at the continuing deterioration in Indonesia/Malaya relations. At least some of the blame rests with the Tunku. Your continued personal representations urging moderation on the Tunku have been valuable. I want you to keep this up.
2. In view, however, of the latest exchange with Subandrio1 I should like you to go over the ground again with the Tunku impressing upon him the extreme seriousness of the situation which is now developing. While we deplore Subandrio’s groundless provocation and sympathise with the Tunku in his predicament you should impress upon him the long term importance to Malaya and Australia of a reconciliation with Indonesia. The adoption of inflexible attitudes at this stage could well provoke the Indonesians or at least give some plausible ground for further and unpredictable excesses.
3. I have been turning over in my mind the possibility of our making some positive effort to ease relations and wondered whether you thought we could make use of your relations with both the Tunku and Sukarno2 to carry some sort of message from the one to the other. If you thought this was possible, Shann could invite you for a visit at a time when Sukarno would be available and endeavour to arrange the interview. You could then tell the Tunku you were going and hoped to see Sukarno who would undoubtedly ask about the situation in Malaya. This would enable you to suggest the possibility of a personal message. From then on, we should have to leave the matter to your judgment.
4. Please let me know frankly your reaction to this suggestion.3
5. For Shann. Grateful for your comments.4
[NAA: A1838, TS696/17/1 part 4]
1 Referred to an interview by the Tunku with the visiting President of United Press International (UPI) in reply to Subandrio’s speech on adopting a policy of confrontation towards Malaya. The Tunku had claimed Indonesia had its own form of colonialism under communist influence, for which he blamed Indonesia’s attitude to Malaysia; warned of involving the Soviet Union and UK militarily and the possibility of a World War; and proclaimed that Malaysia was ‘going ahead on schedule’.
2 Critchley had strong personal relations with both leaders. He had been Commissioner/High Commissioner in Malaya since 1955 and his relationship with Sukarno began when Critchley served as Indonesia’s representative on the UN Good Offices Committee, which resulted in Indonesia gaining independence in 1949.
3 Critchley replied on 28 January that he thought the suggestion ‘well worth pursuing’ but there should be no publicity attached to what must be seen as a ‘private visit to see Shann’. He did not believe that the Tunku would agree to send a message to Sukarno but thought that he might provide an ‘opening gambit’ for Critchley’s talks with the Indonesian president.
4 On 26 January, Shann advised Barwick that the idea would be ‘worth trying’ but that he ‘would not be optimistic as to the result’.