Canberra, 27 June 1964
639. Secret
Malaysia and the United Nations
Minister will be discussing matter with the Prime Minister and perhaps the Tunku in London.
2. In the meantime we should not volunteer views but, if required to express a view, it would be on the lines that we supported advice to the Malaysians to submit a letter to the President of the Security Council for information but nothing further.
3. General approach of the Minister is that we should be very cautious about giving advice to the Malaysian Government for which they could later hold us to some extent responsible.
4. Attached is a departmental note included in the Minister’s papers for London.
Begins:
Complaint by Malaysia to the Security Council (brief summary of the prospects)
By Australian standards, and by the standards and principles of the UN Charter, Indonesia is in blatant breach of its UN obligations. A case can be proved that the Indonesian Government has armed forces under its control in the territory of Malaysia.
2. Judged by militant anti-colonialist standards adhered to by Indonesia, large communist elements, and by the more radical African and Middle East countries, Indonesia’s policy is defensible. Forces infiltrated from outside countries helped Algeria to gain independence. If Malaysia is regarded as a neo-colonialist creation, then in the eyes of these countries, Indonesia has some justification for seeking to help the people in their struggle for liberation.
3. A more moderate position held by other interested Asian countries would be that Indonesia is a disorderly state and that border pressures and harassments are things which new countries have to live with from time to time. Certainly Malaysia has right on her side by accepted international standards, but the problem is Indonesia. The problem is how to make Indonesia behave and this will not be served by seeking to condemn her.
4. Against this background of international opinion, the exercise of taking Indonesia to the Security Council is by no means assured of success. It is unlikely that a resolution which was condemnatory of Sukarno would receive 7 votes and, if it did, there would be a Russian veto. (The Russians want to mend their relations with Indonesia as Indonesia is blocking their entry into the full Afro-Asian conference next year.) Nor in our view would such a resolution have much impact on President Sukarno. He is beyond restraint by such means.
5. Would we get a useful resolution which calls on Indonesia to cease all hostilities or to withdraw its forces? We do not think so. The issues would be muddied by amendments and there would be the Russian veto in the background. We also doubt whether the Council would agree to a border commission. In terms of conflict and the number of people killed, the issues are not very serious in the light of what the Security Council is used to dealing with. The membership of the Council does not inspire confidence, the non-permanent members being Ivory Coast, Morocco, Norway, Czechoslovakia, Bolivia and Brazil. None of these have close or direct interests in the matter.
6. It seems to us likely that the Council would end up in one of two positions—
(a) The parties would be reminded of the Tokyo Summit communique and the intention there to keep discussions going through their Foreign Ministers. The Philippines would actively lobby in New York to get this result and it would be a way out for the others concerned.
(b) The Council might remain seized of the matter without coming to any decisions about any particular course of action.
7. It is a matter for opinion whether President Sukarno would be restrained by such a position. Publicly, he has more than once discounted the UN as the instrument of the UK and the US and other reports suggest that while he wants to avoid Security Council consideration, he would not allow the Council to inhibit his conduct.
8. A possible advantage in early recourse to the Security Council would be that the action was being taken while Malaysia was clearly the victim of aggression. The argument is that, thereafter, if the Malaysian Security forces had to take direct action across the border to defend Malaysia, their international position would be the better for having gone to the Security Council in the first place. But it is doubtful whether the position would be as clear-cut as this reasoning suggests.
9. At the same time, the strong moral position of Malaysia and the justice of her position should not go by default and failure to take any action in the UN would contribute to that end. As an aggrieved member state, Malaysia is entitled to have recourse to the remedies of the UN. Our conclusion is that, unless and until Indonesian attacks become more severe and more open, the best course is for Malaysia as a first step to write a letter to the President of the Security Council regarding the position. It is a common and useful procedure. This has been suggested to the Malaysians in the past but action has not yet been taken. The British have now actively revived this suggestion in Kuala Lumpur.
10. This course would also display some positive, Malaysian initiative which is called for and which might put Indonesia a bit off balance. A well presented exposition in the letter would be valuable for American and international opinion.
[NAA: A1838, 3027/9/1 part3]