Washington, 16 July 1964
Secret
[ matter omitted ]
Malaysia
17. The Minister introduced this subject by saying that Australia felt herself to be under a deep obligation towards the United States not to ‘trigger off’ the ANZUS commitment of the United States without prior consultation with Washington. He therefore wished to offer McNamara a very specific assurance that Australia would not alter the nature of her participation in the defence of Malaysia without consultation in advance with the United States. If Australia received any requests for a deeper involvement on her part, she would tell the United States and seek United States’ comments, always reserving to herself, of course, the final decision after due process of consultation. McNamara thanked the Minister for this assurance.
18. The Minister then said that he would like to ‘think aloud’ about Indonesia’s confrontation of Malaysia. He emphasised that this was a personal exercise on his part and should not therefore be regarded as reflecting the considered policy of the Australian Government. In all these circumstances, he wished to ask specifically that there should be no communication of the thoughts he would express to either the United Kingdom or Malaysia. McNamara assured the Minister immediately that there would be no such communication and that the thoughts that the Minister intended to express would be taken in the sense that he had indicated.
19. The Minister then put forward the following thoughts. Indonesia’s confrontation of Malaysia was dragging on and there was no indication that it would be called off in the foreseeable future. Furthermore, it was quite clear that nobody could have any faith in Sukarno or in undertakings he might give. In these circumstances, there was a temptation for Australians to think that the only way out was to ‘crack Sukarno hard’. However, Australia had no wish to be an aggressor and had no designs whatsoever upon Indonesian territory. Moreover, Australia wanted friendly relations with Indonesia. Accordingly, apart from the provocation that certainly existed, Australia would have no motive in hitting back at Sukarno. Another point, the Minister continued, was that nothing would suit Sukarno better than to become a victim. If only Sukarno would step up the scale of the military confrontation, the situation might from some points of view be easier to handle for then Australia and other countries concerned would be justified in cracking back at him. But the chances were that Sukarno would not ‘escalate’ the conflict, for his best policy, and he must realise this, was to drag on confrontation upon much the same scale as at present. This policy, he would hope with some reason, might make the United Kingdom get tired of the whole affair, would strain the capacity of the Malaysian Government and would adversely affect the morale of the Malaysian people. What in these circumstances, the Minister asked, should Australia and the other countries actively helping with the defence of Malaysia do? One suggested answer was that Malaysia and her friends should maintain their defences and exercise patience. A difficulty involved in this answer was that patience would have to be exercised mainly by the United Kingdom and in the United Kingdom there was at the present time a good deal of impatience. Some people in London were saying, for example, that the United Kingdom should carry the conflict across the borders and others were asking why Australia rather than the United Kingdom should not clean up the mess? (The Minister added at this point that in his opinion the British would ‘stick it out’ in Malaysia even if there was a change of government later this year.)2
20. The Minister went on that he had also seen suggestions that there should be arranged some sort of lull or pause in confrontation. While this course would have certain advantages – for example, it would give the Malaysian Government time to improve economic and social conditions in the Borneo territories and hence make Malaysia as a concept seem worthwhile to the Borneo peoples – the course as a policy would seem to him to founder upon the fact that Sukarno could not be assumed to have any good faith at all.
21. A related aspect of the Malaysian problem, the Minister continued, was that the Malaysian Government had shown marked incompetence in presenting its case publicly. This had been brought out quite clearly at the Commonwealth Prime Ministers’ Conference in the course of which it had been shown that Malaysia had not at all convinced a number of the African participants of the merits of its case (these African countries took the attitude that Indonesia’s confrontation of Malaysia was a genuine dispute in which there was much to be said for both sides). This incompetence by the Malaysian Government was bad enough in itself but there were consequences for other countries concerned which made the situation worse. These consequences were that allies of Malaysia, such as the United Kingdom and Australia, had to do more to help Malaysia’s cause publicly and their activities in this direction gave some degree of credence to the charge that Malaysia was a neo-colonialist creation.
22. The Minister concluded his introductory remarks upon this subject by adding that what he had said would show that he was genuinely puzzled in his own mind what should be done. He added that the Australian Government had what some people called ‘a hard line’ upon the problem and it was not likely that the government would change this line.
23. McNamara remarked that, as regards the scale and nature of his future activities, Sukarno might possibly escalate the conflict to such a scale as would justify a sea blockade. Sukarno would be, it seemed, particularly vulnerable to such a blockade because of the dissident groups which existed in the outlying Indonesian islands. McNamara went on to sympathise, in effect, with the Minister’s problem. He said that there was some analogy between the problem in Malaysia and the problem in Viet-Nam in that a low form of aggression did not justify a high form of response but nothing but a high form of response would be adequate. There was also the difficulty of governments seeking to maintain a high degree of patience in the face of a high degree of impatience by the people they governed. The Minister replied that certainly the Australian Government had gained a lot of credit within Australia by adopting a hard line towards Indonesia and it would gain an even further amount of credit were it to make its line tougher. In any event, it was clear, the Minister said, that inducements would serve no purpose with Sukarno. McNamara said that he completely agreed.
[ matter omitted ]
[NAA: A4940, C3904]
1 Hasluck met with members of the US Administration on 16 July before attending the ANZUS Council Meeting in Washington, 17–18 July.
2 General Elections were held in the UK on 15 October 1964.