Kuala Lumpur, 27 July 1964
824. Secret Immediate
Your 707.2
Prior to receiving your telegram, I had had a discussion this morning with Head (and Wade) about a gloomy exchange between Head and Sandys over prospects in Singapore and the Borneo territories. Head had suggested to Sandys that on Tunku’ s return to London, Home should strongly warn him of the need for better relations with Singapore and the Borneo territories. Head had referred to the way in which Lee had been icily ignored since the elections, Tan Siew Sin’ s apparent intention to favour Malaya over Singapore in financial measures, and the lack of restraint on Malay radicals in Singapore. Head said the Borneo territories had also been mistreated, unnecessarily snubbed, and were under constant pressure over the introduction of Malay language in contravention of the intergovernmental agreement. Of the federal structure as a whole, Head said U.M.N.O. appeared intent on using it as a means of advancing Malay interests with minimum concessions to other communities. There seemed little central direction based on a wider vision of a multiracial community. (In his remarks to us, Head said the Tunku saw himself as some kind of a Sultan rather than the head of a federal structure.)
2. In a reply received over the weekend, Sandys said the Tunku had asked to see Home on 5th–6th August but, while need was seen for Home to speak frankly on lines suggested by Head, Home would be in Scotland at time suggested. Moreover, Sandys suspected that principal reason for Tunku’ s return via London was for medical treatment. Sandys declined Head’ s offer to return with Begg to participate in discussions. Sandys said that during first visit he had spoken to Tunku on need for representation by Borneo and Singapore in Federal Government and for a more obvious multiracial approach, but he had not got any very positive response from Tunku. Sandys suggested that Head should continue trying to influence Razak.
3. Head was also disturbed by reports from C.R.O. that the Tunku had performed very ineffectively in London.
4. My comment on the above messages is that Head’ s concern clearly has considerable justification in the light of the Singapore outbreak. As I have reported, last week’ s events showed up strikingly the lack of rapport we knew existed between Razak and Lee. The lesson is not so much that the Tunku would have been more effective in re-establishing peace in Singapore after trouble began (so far Razak has done quite well) but rather how essential the Tunku is to maintain any sort of working relationship with Lee. Clearly better relationships should be sought while the Tunku is still around.
5. It is hard to assess how much the Razak/Lee antipathy is personal and how much it reflects basic fear/disdain between the two races. Razak has said to me that he can get on reasonably well with others in Singapore (Goh Keng Swee is always mentioned) while Lee is reputed, as you know, to have a warm regard for the Tunku and to get on reasonably well with Ismail. Be that as it may the feeling between the two is clearly deep-seated and I do not see how we can talk about this personal problem being removed by one or the other leaving the political field. It is very hard, though perhaps not impossible, to see a Federal Government being run by anyone other than Razak when the Tunku leaves. I gauge that Razak certainly wants the succession. On the other hand is not Lee extremely important in Singapore politics? Razak himself has commented to me that the others have not Lee’ s leadership talents (and perhaps that partly underlies Razak’ s lesser fear and dislike of them).
6. Singapore is crucial to the federation in ways which Sarawak and Sabah are not, a matter we will hear more of. Singapore also poses unique problems. Its long term place (if one exists) in the federal structure will need a great deal of care and patient work. At this point I see no ready solution to the problem posed by Lee’ s vigour, talents and ambition, however this is assessed, on the one hand and the unpreparedness of the present alliance leaders to give Lee a role which they now claim, perhaps too glibly, he showed himself unable to win at the elections.3
7. The riots, however, may provide some hope that the now evident communal danger may prompt the Tunku, on return, to clamp down on the U.M.N.O. trouble-makers in Singapore. This could at least lower the temperature without being any final answer in itself.
8. As regards the Borneo territories Razak, in recent conversations with Head and me, has shown a sensible appreciation of the need for action. (Head is more fearful of the Tunku’ s attitude – my memo 908.)4 Razak has sent off a team of 20 officials, and two assistant ministers, to investigate and report on what needs to be done. He told me he had given specific instructions that officials were to move out of Kuching and Jesselton and see what was needed in the countryside. Providing the situation in Singapore permits, he plans to go to Borneo himself at the end of the month.
9. Razak has also told me that he sees the need for more representation of the Borneo territories in the Federal Cabinet, but claims that the one or two people with sufficient talent are not prepared to come to Kuala Lumpur. You will have noted Head’ s suggestion (my telegram 819) for some form of National Government,5 but it clearly would be a major move for someone significant to be invited from Singapore.
10. One argument that has been put to me is that Razak, and to some extent even the Tunku, cannot go too far in defiance of Malay racial feelings. Ja’ afar Albar, the eminence grise in Singapore, is alleged to have threatened more than once to take his supporters out of U.M.N.O. if his conditions on particular issues were not met. In looking for solutions it would be unrealistic to ignore the depths of fear which spring quickly to the surface in discussion with practically any Malay. As against this we should not lose sight of the fact that the present team in Kuala Lumpur has governed a multi-racial society remarkably successfully for nine years and may therefore prove to have enough reserves and flexibility to cope with the problems that have emerged from Malaysia and which seem so ominous at present.
[NAA: A1838, 3006/4/9 part 12]
1 Max Loveday, Acting High Commissioner in Kuala Lumpur.
2 27 July. It requested the High Commission’ s views on the reported tension between Lee and the Federal Government.
3 A reference to the PAP’ s failure to win more than one seat in the Dewan Rakyat in the April elections. Every Alliance Cabinet minister had been returned with a bigger majority.
4 Not published.
5 24 July. It reported on Head’ s meeting with Razak that day on ways ‘ to lower the political temperature, both now and after the riots were over’ . Head had suggested that the Tunku might call for some form of National Government in which Singapore and the Borneo states could feel that they had their own responsible representatives.