Canberra, 31 July 1964
Secret Most Personal
At this end, and with the assistance of our most experienced High Commissioner in Kuala Lumpur, we have been giving much thought to Malaysia and to the mind and attitude of the Tunku himself.
Our estimate is that Soekarno is not likely to risk open war. He will, we think, continue irritation tactics along frontier and subversive activities so as to maintain a war of nerves designed to weaken Malaysian morale and the will to resist particularly in the Borneo States.
Putting on one side the very important military factors, we think that Malaysian morale, and therefore victory in the war of nerves, will be greatly influenced by several factors.
The first is the Tunku’s own approach. His own nature is so kindly that, as we saw in London, he may be induced into rather weak compromises. Firmness on his part, not truculently but moderately expressed, is essential. Yet, as you know, this should be conveyed to him with consummate tact, since he is likely to react against what he would regard as pressure or instruction.
The second factor is the degree of success which attends Malaysia’s own presentation of her clear case in and around the precincts of the United Nations, the countries of the Commonwealth and diplomatic posts generally. We saw in London that he cannot rely upon some of the African leaders.1 We are sure that the Tunku underestimates the importance of this international public relations factor, and is too disposed to think that his undoubted virtue will be its own reward.
The third factor relates to the internal cohesion of the new federation. There is still friction between Singapore and Kuala Lumpur where the Government seems to us to be much in need of some representation from Singapore and Borneo. True, Lee may well see no future for Singapore outside the Malaysia structure, but a genuine co-operation seems to us to be urgently desirable and even essential.
The fourth factor is the need to build bridges between the Tunku and the Philippines. There should be no undue insistence upon the rules of protocol in the resumption of normal diplomatic relations. The alleged claim of the Philippines to North Borneo could be willingly referred to the International Court. We feel that anything which would help to detach the Philippines from Soekarno would have a healthy effect upon the latter and might reduce the tensions of confrontation.
There are no doubt other psychological factors. But the ones I have stated are enough, in my humble opinion, to make it very important that, if it is at all possible, you should see the Tunku during his visit to London. As you must acknowledge, after your immense success at the Prime Ministers’ Conference, your own influence exercised with your own wisdom and tact, could do much to clarify the Tunku’s mind and strengthen his future courses of action.
Please do not regard my message as an unnecessary intrusion. I know that it states things that are obvious enough. But, as I most passionately believe in you, I have taken leave to think that you can do things in this field that nobody else can do one half as well.
[NAA: A6706, 35]
1 A number of the leaders of the newly-independent African members of the Commonwealth believed that more could have been done generally to negotiate Malaysia within the region, and more particularly with Sukarno, prior to its formation. These leaders were opposed at first to any expression of ‘support’ for Malaysia being included in the communique issued at the end of the Commonwealth Prime Ministers’ Conference.